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WHEREAS DECONCENTRATION SEEKS EFFICIENCY, THE MAJOR VALUES OF POLITICAL DECENTRALISATION
INCLUDE PARTICIPATION, EFFECTIVENESS, AND RESPONSIVENESS—IN SHORT, DEMOCRACY.
NKRUMAH, 2000 
1. Introduction: Theoretical and Methodological
Foundations
Decentralisation  is  so  central  to  Mali's  development  and democratisation  strategy that  the
country's  constitution  explicitly  recognises  local  governing  bodies,  and  articulates  a  pro-
decentralisation  agenda  (Republique  du  Mali,  1995).  Mali  is  far  from alone;  seven  other  African
nations  enshrine  local  governing  bodies  in  their  constitutions,1 and virtually  every country  on the
continent  is  employing decentralisation as a strategy  to  strengthen governance  at  all  levels,  and
improve  service  provision  (Oyugi,  2000).  International  organisations  claim  decentralisation  is  the
centrepiece  of  current  policy  reforms  in  Africa  (Ribot,  2002;  UNCDF,  2000;  World  Bank,  2000).
Despite widespread agreement about the importance of decentralisation, the debate on its promises
and limits is far from over. Some claim that as powers are "redefined by the state through the process
of decentralisation, contradictions, paradoxes, and unintended consequences increase, and struggles
over meaning and power intensify (Benjaminsen, 2001 p15)."  Others herald decentralisation as “a
silent  revolution  in  public  sector  governance....to  move  decision  making  for  local  public  services
closer to the people (Shah and Thomson, 2004 p5).” 
Empirical  data  emerging  from  these  ongoing  decentralisation  experiences  shows  that
decentralisation is a useful tool for some, but not all development challenges it has been employed to
address (Manor, 1997). Decentralisation's goals are generally categorised as administrative, political,
and developmental, all of which will be defined in the following section, and applied to the Malian
context in Chapter 2.  The current decentralition debate currently centres on two issues.  The first
question is why decentralisation is successful at achieving some of the political and developmental
impacts  it  should  theoretically  be  able  to  deliver,  but  not  others.   The  second  question  is  why
decentralisation  is able  to  achieve some goals  in  certain  situations,  but  not  others.    These are
questions that are only answerable by emerging empirical evidence, which is refining the theory of
decentralisation.   It  is both  providing a more robust  discussion of  the potential  and limitations of
decentralisation,  as  well  how contextual  factors  affect  the  implementation  of  the  process.   One
contextual  factor  that is contentuous is migration;  its political impacts are particularly important  to
1 Ethiopia, Ghana, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda
3
Caitlin Blaser 1 September 2007
understand given the unique questions it raises about social inclusion and access to services that are
highlighted when political decisions are made at the local level.  These debates are often all the more
applicable in the case of forced migration.  This study contributes to this discussion adding the impact
of refugees as an explanatory variable. 
This thesis will present evidence from Loulouni to argue that, based on this particular case, in
places with  a  refugee  presence  it  is  easier  for  the political  dimensions  of  decentralisation to  be
achieved.  This includes increased interaction between community members and local government
officials,  and  increased  allocative  efficiency  of  resources.   The  creation  of  the  downwardly
accountable mayor fostered communication between local government and the residents of Loulouni.
However, a lack of resources and capacity in the office of the mayor threatened to undermine this
relationship, as the mayor was unable to deliver on the commune's development goals.   With the
arrival of the refugeesand the resources that accompanied them, the demands of the residents of
Loulouni changed from service provision to negotiating rights  and access to services.   Since the
mayor was able to respond to these needs of the community, this relationship was strengthened.  
However, this thesis will also argue that a refugee presence makes it more difficult to achieve
the  administrative  aspects  of  decentralisation.   This  includes  certain  aspects  of  implementing
downward accountability structures, transparency, and participatory systems of decision making.  The
relief  effort  was accompanied by a lack of  clarity  of  roles,  and consequently  aggravated existing
power struggles at the local level.  In terms of the developmental aspects of decentralisation, there is
a  balance  between  more  efficient  allocation  of  resources  stemming  from  a  more  constructive
relationship between citizens and local government officials, and a lack of clarity of mandate between
local government and other service providers.  
Exploring the impact a refugee presence has on decentralisation is compelling for numerous
reasons. First, in an attempt to understand decentralisation's successes and failures, there is a call in
the literature to look at decentralisation in the context of global economic and political trends (Litvack,
1998;  Work,  2002).  The  connection  to  state  transformation  that  is  nascent  in  decentralisation
literature is already well established in the literature surrounding refugees. Forced migration is widely
considered to be "a product of wider processes of social and economic change...normally referred to
as 'globalisation'....It follows that forced migration....can provide a kind of window on these processes
(Turton, 2003 p7-8)." It is equally compelling because decentralisation and forced migration are both
central to understanding the process of state transformation in Africa. 
While  Africans  constitute  only  12  per  cent  of  the  global  population,
around 28 per cent (i.e. 3.2 million) of the world’s 11.5 million refugees
and just  under  50 per cent  (i.e.  9.5  million)  of  the world’s  20 million
internally displaced persons are to be found in Africa.....Of  the 20 top
4
Caitlin Blaser 1 September 2007
‘refugee-producing’ countries around the world, nine are to be found in
Africa. Twenty-five African states have refugee populations in excess of
10,000... (Crisp, 2000 p158). 
Mali is among these twenty-five states (UNHCR, 2003),  and certainly not an isolated case where
interaction must occur between the decentralisation process and a refugee presence. 
While this study on one hand responds to questions posed by decentralisation literature, there
is also a need to bring decentralisation into refugee studies literature. There is growing evidence that
refugees have more than a material affect on their host communities; they are also transforming the
host  country's governmental practices, and the expectations citizens have of their elected officials
(Landau,  2003).  As  it  becomes  increasingly  clear  that  refugees  have  an  impact  on  the  very
foundations of  democracy at a local level, it  is a necessary step to bring decentralisation into the
debate, since it is the central player in Africa's democratic reforms. This study focuses on the places
where these literatures coincide,  exploring how decentralisation and a refugee influx are mutually
shaping the impacts of the other.
To look at the impact a refugee presence has on decentralisation, this study takes the case of
Loulouni,  a  rural  commune  capital  in  southern  Mali  implementing  the  national  decentralisation
initiative. Soon after fighting broke out in Cote d'Ivoire in 2001, the town also hosted a refugee camp.
The refugee presence is both a symptom and a cause of the current process of state transformation
in  Loulouni  and,  as  such,  is  simultaneously  shaping  and  being  shaped  by  the  decentralisation
process. It is apparent that the refugee presence is enabling decentralisation to accomplish some of
its goals, while inhibiting it from accomplishing others. Understanding how the refugee presence is
affecting decentralisation in Loulouni will accomplish the following three goals:
1.  Build  on  the  current  understanding  linking  refugees  to  state  transformation  by
contextualising it in a very specific way - the case of decentralisation.
2.  Contribute to a technical  understanding of  how a specific  factor,
refugee  presence,  may  shape  decentralisation's  successes  and
failures.
3. Link decentralisation to issues of state transformation through a
case study in which refugees shape the local context.
In  the  following  sections,  the  theoretical  and  methodological  bases  of  this  study  will  be
examined.   The  trends  in  both  decentralisation  and  forced  migration  studies  literature  will  be
presented as they apply to each other, to bring to the forefront places of intersection in the literatures.
Comments are also made about the structure and methodology of this study.  Chapter 2 looks at how
decentralisation is being practiced in Mali today.  It first presents a brief overview of the history of
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political and administrative decentralisation movements in Mali, and then a snapshot of the current
decentralisation effort's accomplishments, motivation, articulation, and challenges. This is done first
on a generalised national level, and then Loulouni is introduced, along with how the various aspects
of  decentralisation  are  playing  out  in  one  specific  context.   Chapter  3  discusses  the  refugee
dimension of  Loulouni,  with an overview of  migration trends between Mali  and Cote d'Ivoire,  the
establishment of the camp in Loulouni, and then the perceptions and relationships between the host
community of Loulouni and the refugee population.  Chapter 4 interrogates the impact this refugee
influx has had on the decentralisation process in Loulouni.   It looks at the impact in terms of the
three generalisable  aspects  of  decentralisation:  political,  administrative,  and developmental.   The
conclusion places these findings in a broader political context, exploring the extent to which lessons
from Loulouni can be applied to different contexts, as well as addressing where the limitations of this
study demand further research.  
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Defining Decentralisation
Defining decentralisation for this study is only necessary as far as it affects the implementation
and measurements of success of decentralisation in Mali.  As such, it is necessary to understand two
aspects of decentralisation.  This section will explore the political rationale for decentralisation, which
is  ultimately  what  determines  not  just  the  process  of  implementation,  but  also  the  indicators  of
success of the decentralsiation process.  The following section will frame decentralisation historically,
since it is the history of decentralisation in a global economic context that has shaped the successes
and failures of implementing decentralisation in Loulouni.  
One challenge to studying decentralisation is that it has been used to serve such a wide variety
of objectives.  Some claim it is a response to economic crises (Therkildsen, 2001), others look at it as
a strategy  central  governments  employ to  offload  burdens  of  service  delivery and administrative
capacity (Litvack,  1998).   It  is commonly described as a knee-jerk reaction to the failure of  large
centralised governments  to  promote  development  in  many  countries  (Wunsch  and Olowu,  1995;
Faguet,  1997).   In some places it  has been the outcome of  populist political movements (Olowu,
2001),  while  perhaps  more  frequently  it  is  more  the  outcome  of  external  pressures,  either  from
donors, or as a condition in structural adjustment packages (World Bank, 2000; Therkildsen, 2001).
For still others, it is framed as a response to politicised identity, or a pandering to local elites who
have various problematic relationships with the central government (Crook and Sverrisson, 2001).  In
Mali,  a small  part  of  all  of  these views applies,  and each one impacts  differently on the specific
successes and failures of the process in Loulouni. 
Only since the mid 1990s has the discussions about  decentralisation come from a history of
implementation, comparison, and empirical evidence.  Before beginning an analysis of the debate on
decentralisation, it is important to define the process.  The decentralisation literature has developed a
large  vocabulary  to  differentiate  between  different  processes  and  structures  involved  in
decentralisation, but since this is not a comparative study and only one decentralisation process is
being examined, it is only necessary to establish working definitions of applicable concepts in order to
proceed.  One of the best and most widely accepted definitions of decentralisation was developed by
Rodenelli, et al. (1984) as: 
the transfer  of  responsibility for  planning,  management,  and resource-
raising and allocation from the central  government  to (a)  field units  of
central government ministries or agencies; (b) subordinate units or levels
of government; (c) semi-autonomous public authorities or corporations;
(d) area-wide regional or functional authorities; or (e) NGOs/PVOs.
Private firms are often added to (e), and while there is a lively debate about the acceptability of this,
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the limited role of the private sector in decentralisation in Mali does not make it terribly important to
take a stance in this case.   Bennet (1990) makes a useful  distinction between intergovernmental
decentralisation, which is the transfer of authority and resources downward among different actors
within  the  public  sector,  and  market-based  decentralisation,  which  transfers  these  powers  from
governments to NGOs or private sector players.  These two processes are happening in tandem in
Mali, as will be explored in more detail in the following chapter.  
While  the above definition is theoretically informative,  it  is  not  adequate  for  more empirical
studies of decentralisation. Since there is rarely a higher level than the central government, nearly
every  restructuring  undertaken  by  the  central  government  could  then  be  described  as
decentralisation.   Further  articulations  of  decentralisation  is  commonly  used  by  practitioners,
particularly in fields of natural resource management, distinguish between different decentralisation
processes based on how powers are being reallocated.  This study draws heavily from Ribot's (2002)
framing of decentralisation, simply because for the concepts relevant to the processes in Mali, his
terms  proved  to  be  the  most  mutually  exclusive  and  collectively  exhaustive.   He  distinguishes
between the following four kinds of decentralisation: political, administrative, fiscal, and delegation.
All four are important for understanding decentralisation in Mali, but the first two are particularly key.  
Political  decentralisation  is  when  powers  and  resources  are  transferred  from  the  central
government to downwardly accountable, lower level political institutions.  (Manor, 1999; Crook and
Manor, 1998; Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2002) Because of the element of accountability to a
local population, this form of decentralisation is also often called democratic decentralisation.  Most
contemporary advocates of decentralisation argue that this is the 'strongest' form of decentralisation,
and offers  democratic  advantages such as greater  participation,  and through greater  participation
more effective service delivery and maximised use of public resources.  
Administrative decentralisation2 is often contrasted with political decentralisation.  This is the
transfer of powers and resources to localised braches of the central state, whether on a territorial
basis (from a national to state or district level), or through technical line ministries.  In this form of
decentralisation, while power does move from the centre out, those exercising it are still accountable
to  the  central  government,  and as  such  it  is  considered  a  weaker  form  of  decentralisation  than
political decentralisation.  Its advantage is articulated in terms of efficiency, rather than effectiveness.
Fiscal decentralisation is often described as a separate process from political or administrative
decentralisation, although is usually a feature of both of those decentralisation processes, and never
stands  alone.   Fiscal  decentralisation  is  the  transfer  of  fiscal  resources  and  revenue generating
2 Also commonly called deconcentration in decentralisation literature 
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powers from the central government to local authorities, whether they are upwardly or downwardly
accountable.  While fiscal decentralisation cross-cuts political and administrative decentralisation to
such an extent that it is not necessarily a distinct process in itself, the practical mismatch between
political/administrative decentralisation and their fiscal aspects in Mali make it a useful concept.  
Delegation  is  when  functions  that  are  the  responsibility  of  the  central  government  are
transferred to lower levels of government, public corporations or institutions, technical line ministries,
or  authorities outside the government's  political-administrative structure  to implement  activities on
behalf of the central government (Ostrom et al., 1993; Ribot, 2002).  Because the central government
generally  maintains  decision  making  power  when  delegation  is  taking  place,  it  is  considered  a
relatively weak form of decentralisation.  Interestingly, this form of decentralisation is not an inherent
feature of Mali's decentralisation process, but was called upon in the refugee relief effort.  
These  kinds  of  decentralisation  rarely  take  place  in  isolation  of  one  another,  and  any
decentralisation  process  generally  has political,  administrative,  and  fiscal  elements.   The  current
decentralisation process in Mali is primarily political in nature, but for a number of reasons that will be
explored in the following chapter, the administrative elements have been more easily adopted than
the political elements.  Additionally, there are challenges to the fiscal aspects of decentralisation that
have implications for the rest of the process.  
Academics  are  split  about  the  relative  importance  of  each  aspect  of  the  decentralisation
process.  Prud'homme (2001) places a great  deal of  importance on the administrative aspects of
decentralisation, arguing that the structures established for formation and functioning of government
are central  to the shape the political  aspects  of  the decentralised society will  take.   Ribot  (2002)
argues that administrative decentralisation is merely a reflection of the objectives of decentralisation,
and that to learn about the true functioning of decentralisation, it is necessary to look at the political
aspects.   For  example,  whether  the electorate's  values  are truly  reflected  in  the actions of  local
government  officials.   While  many authors  sideline fiscal  decentralisation  as simply a supporting
element of political or administrative decentralisation, others (de Mello, 2004; Ebel and Yilmaz, 2001)
argue that it is often the most crucial determinant in the other aspects of decentralisation.  The claim
that  fiscal  powers  offer  a  more  accurate  reflection  of  where  power  truly  lies  in  a  decentralised
structure than the voting or vetoing powers emphasised by focussing on the political or administrative
aspects respectively.  Since this paper aims at targeting one influence on a specific decentralising
system,  it  takes  a  more  descriptive  than  prescriptive  approach.   The  result  is  that  the  relative
importance of each aspect is only determined by the impact it has on governance in Loulouni.  
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Decentralisation and Democracy
Nothing about democracy inherently implies decentralisation; in fact, decentralisation in Mali
was also used as a development tool of  socialist  regimes.   However,  the current  decentralisation
process in Loulouni is integrated into the process of democratisation in the country.  In fact, the form
of  decentralisation  taking  place  in  Mali  is  sometimes  referred  to  in  the  literature  as  democratic
decentralisation, due to the shift from upward to downward accountability at the local level.  Because
of this, certain democratic values become indicators for the success of the decentralisation process in
Loulouni, which will be discussed in more detail in future sections.  
More generally than the case of Loulouni, there are a number of reasons, both theoretical and
empirical, to tie the two processes.  The origins of decentralisation stem from fundamental arguments
about democracy and the relationship between citizens and the state.  Much of the classical cannon
of 17th and 18th century political philosophy advocated decentralisation on the basis that the liberty of
free men could best be preserved through small democratic units, which should share fundamental
values  and  collective  objectives.  Madison  argues  in  the  Federalist  Papers  that  tyranny  can  be
prevented  by  balancing  powers  between  central,  regional,  and  local  governments.   Tocqueville
echoes his sentiments, saying
Decentralisation  has  not  only  an  administrative  value,  but  also  a  civic
dimension, since it increases the opportunities for citizens to take interest
in public affairs;  it  makes them get  accustomed to using freedom.  And
from the accumulation of these local, active, persnickety freedoms, is born
the  most  efficient  counterweight  against  the  claims  of  the  central
government, even if it were supported by an impersonal, collective will. 
It may be surprising how little the argument has evolved in two centuries.  Wolman (in Bennet, 1990)
presents a very similar modern case for decentralisation.
Decentralisation,  by  placing  government  closer  to  the  people,  fosters
greater responsiveness of policy-makers to the will of the citizenry and, it
is argued, results in a closer congruence between public preferences and
public policy....because decentralisation permits these decision-makers to
be held directly accountable to the local citizenry through local elections.
While there are no intuitive problems with these claims, the argument is a priori - as are many
on the other side of the decentralisation debate.  Both sides of the debate have a vast reservoir of
real world anecdotes and examples to support their points, but there is relatively little systematic or
rigorous  analysis  in  the  decentralisation  discussion.   Additionally,  the  academic  literature  has
concentrated on what  should happen under  decentralisation,  from a political  theory point  of  view.
With the recent emergence of empirical evidence indicating that the reality is not always exactly as
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the theory would suggest, there is little in the literature that could be used to address why this is the
case.   This study tries to compensate for  this weakness in the decentralisation literature both by
taking  a  historiographical  approach,  and  by  juxtaposing  decentralisation  literature  with  forced
migration literature, since forced migration literature has a history of grappling with the irrelevance of
theoretical expectations that have little empirical justification (Misago, 2005).  
Decentralisation in Africa particularly is an old phenomenon, having gone through many waves -
at least three identifiable throughout francophone West Africa, and several more limited to specific
locales.  During colonialism, discourse around decentralisation was centred around penetrating and
managing rural  populations and resources efficiently.   Of  course,  this led to the establishment of
upwardly accountable local officials, and a deliberately non-democratic system often hiding behind
'tradition.' Post-independence articulations of decentralisation focussed on national cohesion and the
engineered  development  of  local  populations.   This  was often  a  thinly-veiled  method  for  corrupt
central governments to expropriate rural resources. The current wave of decentralisation, however, is
a  discourse  focused  on  participatory  democratic  processes  and  rights-based  approaches  to
development.  This new discourse does not mean the success of decentralisation is inevitable, but it
also cannot  be dismissed as repeating the errors of the past.  
The arguments for and against decentralisation have been reiterated many times, each time
altered slightly to reflect the economic or political context of the day.  The arguments themselves,
however, have remained remarkably unchanged.  Simplifying for the sake of brevity, advocates of
decentralisation generally claim that it is an avenue for the disempowered to take part in the political
process,  since it  brings  the institutions that  deliver  public  services closer  to  the recipients.   This
proximity  also  makes  the  accountability  of  public  officials  more  likely.   Furthermore,  it  localises
unwieldy state apparati,  making service delivery more effective.3  This is often inherently linked to
democracy, as the democratic system that helps local governments respond to the needs of their
constituents and provide a means for these constituents to hold officials accountable is the foundation
underpinning these benefits (Smoke, 2000).  
Many critics of decentralisation argue that the goal of participation is undermined by the fact
that decentralisation effectively gives power and legitimacy to power structures already in place on
local levels which are often unequal and exclusionary, having given rise to the marginalisation of
certain sectors of the population to begin with.  Central governments, with superior human resources
and less to gain from oppression (in theory), are thought to be better placed to protect minority rights.
3 While proponents of decentralisation do not always – although do occasionally – claim that it is a more
economically efficient way of delivering services in aggregate, it is very often claimed to be more effective in
that the available resources are used to more accurately address the desires of local populations.  
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They also argue that  efficiency of  service delivery is undermined as decentralisation often simply
adds another level of bureaucracy without the necessary oversight and coordinating bodies.  
A  second,  rapidly  growing  branch  of  critics  of  decentralisation  let  by  Oyugi  (2000),  Olowu
(2001),  Ribot  (2002),  Shah (2004)  and others,  argue  not  that  there  is  a  structural  or  theoretical
problem  with  decentralisation  itself,  but  that  the  way  it  is  currently  being  implemented  in  the
developing world is flawed.  Oyugi (2000, 10) goes so far as to argue that “the legal-political design of
local government in Africa tends to weaken the cultivation of a democratic culture at the local level as
well as weaken the ability of local authorities to take initiative in the field of service provision.”  As the
arguments  about  the implementation of  decentralisation tend to be situation-specific,  they will  be
discussed in more detail in the next chapter,  which will speak specifically to the articulations and
implementation of decentralisation in Mali.  
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Empirical additions to decentralisation theory
Recent empirical studies are finally adding some substance to the debate on decentralisation.
With  so many conflicting  theoretical  aims,  and so many divergent  examples of  decentralisation's
practice,  many  of  the  outstanding  debates  in  the  literature  can  only  be  taken  forward  with  the
emergence of empirical evidence.  While in rhetoric decentralisation is still often heralded as either
the harbinger or destroyer of democratic institutions, a consensus is emerging among theorists and
practitioners that it is a useful tool to achieving some goals while blunt in other arenas.  This study
supports  such  an  assertion  in  several  concrete  ways.   Empirical  evidence  gathered  in  Loulouni
indicates that decentralisation has been quite successful in accomplishing its political goals, but less
successful in accomplishing its adminsitrative goals.   However, by looking at the way the refugee
influx shaped this outcome, other empirical trends emerge.  For example, it is clear that in Loulouni, a
lack of resources at the local level threatened to undermine the successes of decentralisation before
the arrival of the refugees.  
Manor,  a  leading  decentralisation  theorist,  has  led  several  large  comparative  studies  of
decentralisation often connected to the World Bank, and is a reserved supporter of decentralisation.
He  argues  in  “Promises  and  Limits  of  Decentralisation”  that  decentralisation,  while  generally  a
positive  step  in  transforming  governance,  has  often  suffered  from  misplaced  expectations  and
therefore misapplications.  Several of the expectations that Manor suggests are misplaced are true of
the decentralisation process in Mali, and understanding the roots of these expectations is essential to
defining how to measure the success of this political transformation process.  
First, Manor argues that some conditions are crucial for the success of decentralisation, while
others are quite helpful.  Topping the list as the most essential element is the existence of reliable
accountability mechanisms, both to ensure that elected politicians are held accountable to citizens,
and that bureaucrats are accountable to elected officials.  This is problematic in cases including Mali
where  a  central  goal  of  decentralisation  is  the  creation  of  these  very  same  accountability
mechanisms.  Other crucial conditions are sufficient financial resources, and administrative capacity.
Arguably, Mali has neither.  However, a great deal of the effort going into the decentralisation process
in Mali has been directed towards compensating for the shortcomings in these two areas.  Manor
further cites as helpful a history of democracy before the decentralisation process, and social capital.
He emphasises the fact that there is no formula for whether or not decentralisation will work.
While the above factors can provide some guidance, a complex combination of history, geography,
sociology, economic structures, international support, and internal political dynamics all interplay to
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determine how decentralisation will play out.  Based on the list of factors Manor lays out, Bolivia in the
early  1990s would not  have been a  good candidate,  and yet  it  is  heralded as one of  the  most
successful decentralisation processes in the developing world.  One anthropologist argues, “Bolivia is
the poorest, most backward country in South America. It has dozens of spoken languages, a ruinous
geography,  and almost  no infrastructure.  If  we can make decentralisation work here,  it  can work
anywhere” (Armando Godinez, quoted in Faguet, 1997, p136).  Faguet and other analysis (Alfonso,
1999) give much of the credit for Bolivia's successful implementation of decentralisation to the ability
of Bolivia's civil society at a grassroots level to hold political leaders to account.  An effective system
of accountability tops Manor's list of necessary conditions for decentralisation.  While Bolivia had few
other characteristics to recommend it for decentralisation, effective accountability mechanisms alone
may have compensated for Bolivia's lack of economic development and democratic history.  Similarly,
many countries  with more attributes  of  a “good candidate”  have experienced far  less success in
decentralising.  Manor's laundry list just begins the conversation about the specific considerations for
any country embarking on decentralisation.  
Given favourable conditions for a successful decentralisation process, Manor claims that it is
then often able to promote collective action through association building, enhance the responsiveness
of  government  institutions  to  the  needs  of  the  community,  and make  government  function  more
transparently and accountably.   These are all  central  goals of  decentralisation in Mali.   However,
Manor goes on to argue that even if successfully implemented, decentralisation is not well equipped
to alleviate poverty that is characterised by local inequality, reducing overall government expenditure,
mobilising local  resources,  and providing services delegated by the central  government,  some of
which are also expectations of decentralisation in Mali.  
Looking at resource mobilisation in some detail  is useful  in uncovering some of the political
dynamics that often accompany the implementation of decentralisation.  The frequent inability of local
governments to successfully mobilise local resources is an oft-cited frustration of central governments
with decentralisation efforts, and many theorists and practitioners say it indicates the lack of capacity
of  local  governing  officials.   Fageut  (1997),  in  an  extensive  study  of  decentralisation  in  Bolivia,
strongly argues against those who criticise decentralisation on the basis of a lack of local capacity.
By  analysing  quantitative  data  on  changes  in  government  expenditure,  Fageut  found  that  local
government  patterns  in  both  tax  collection  and  spending  do  change  substantially  with
decentralisation.   Furthermore, he found that 
these changes were better reflecting the desires of the community. This
directly contradicts claims that local government is too poor, too ignorant,
or too prone to interest-group capture to operate efficiently, necessitating
the guiding hand of national government which is technocratic, capable,
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and generally knows what to do. Here we begin to see evidence of the
opposite: local government has a deep understanding of its task, and has
the capability and the incentive structure to produce the public outputs
that people want.
Manor and Ribot also reframe the criticism of local government capacity as one of incentive
structures.   First, local governments are often actually given disincentives to collect taxes.  This can
be for  numerous  reasons,  whether  central  governments  hesitate  to  devolve  important  tax-raising
powers to local officials, economic structures make the administrative costs of collecting taxes nearly
prohibitive,  there  is  strong  political  undesirability  to  raise taxes,  etc.   Secondly,  in  evaluating  the
performance of local governments, standards developed at the central government are still used.  For
example,  if  the  promotion  of  judicial  authority  is  a  priority  of  the  central  government,  but  the
constituents of one district are instead concerned with access to basic services, when the elected
official acts in line with the interests of his constituency, he will likely be accused of either lacking the
capacity  or  will  to  strengthen  judicial  authority  in  his  district.   Finally,  neither  Manor  nor  Faguet
discount claims that human resources of local governments may be lacking,  or that  capacity is a
genuine problem.   Rather,  they argue that  it  is  not  often  a limiting factor,  and can be managed
through effective planning.  
Other  studies  also  point  out  that  decentralisation  is  often  characterised  by  poorly  defined
administrative boundaries (Smoke, 2000; Oyugi, 2000; Crook and Manor, 1998).  Some excuse this
lack of clarity as likely to be a feature of any large-scale political transition.  Most, however, grant that
decentralisation uniquely lends itself to certain administrative ambiguities, although not always due to
any undesirable features it may have as a political system.  Decentralisation involves more levels to
which powers must be delegated and clarified, for  example, and the inclusive ideal of  democratic
decentralisation  mean  that  more  role  players  with  more  agendas  become  a  part  of  the  political
process.  The consequences of this can include accusations of a lack of capacity (because it is not
clear  who  is  supposed  to  be  doing  what),  or  slow  implementation  that  is  frustrated  by  power
struggles.  Similarly, a lack of capacity can be caused by the power struggles themselves, as they
then prompt a reluctance to coordinate and share resources.  This is a central issue in this study as
decentralisation has been effectively implemented in Mali before ongoing legislation establishing the
rights and responsibilities of political role-players has been solidified.  
While the literature on decentralisation is vast and somewhat diffuse, it is grappling with a wide
variety of political changes that have taken place in a wide variety of social, economic, and historic
contexts.  Political theory literature is useful in defining the decentralisation debate.  Embedded in this
literature are the fundamental questions of governance to which decentralisation hopes to provide
answers, as well as certain critiques to using decentralisation as the response to these challenges.
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The  nascent  empirical  decentralisation  literature  adds substance  to  these  theoretical  debates  by
providing evidence about where decentralisation has proven effective, and where the criticism has
proved to be correct.  However, evidence is still emerging, and the body of literature is not yet large
enough to provide definitive answers to many of the decentralisation debates.  
Forced migration  studies literature  is  in a position to  contribute to both the  theoretical  and
empirical decentralisation literature.  As discussed, much of the contemporary decentralisation theory
deals  with  implementing  decentralisation  in  a  specific  socioeconomic  context.   This  process  of
contextualising theoretical  ideals is one that forced migration literature has grappled with from its
founding.  Since the legal definition of a refugee emerged with the 1950 UN Convention, there has
been a discourse of international standards that has often been in sharp contrast to the reality on the
ground.  Bringing these two divergent conversations closer together has often been an explicit role of
forced migration studies.  Additionally, forced migration literature, while perhaps not the most intuitive
source for answers to fundamental political questions such as the relationship between citizen and
state, in fact represents an excellent departure for such inquiries, since it is these 'grey areas' that
must be drawn on to challenge assumptions, or precisely delineate the limits of claims.  Furthermore,
as an interdisciplinary area of study, forced migration has almost by definition looked at the same
issue through a number of different lenses.  Theory in forced migration has often evolved because
one specific case is looked at from anthopological, sociological, political, economic, environmental,
and other points of view.  As such, the literature provides solid critiques for decentralisation theory,
since it is a process that has social, economic, and political dimensions, but which is theoretically
nested in one particular field.  
Looking purely at the political science literature, the empirical decentralisation literature, while
rapidly growing, lacks texture due both to the limited number of cases studied, and the limited number
of  'lenses'  used  in  understanding  its  impacts.   Very  practically,  linking  this  to  forced  migration
literature first  builds on it by contributing to a technical understanding of how a refugee presence
shapes decentralisation, which may also suggest inquiries for related contexts, such as situations of
labour migration, or areas of limited state control.  However, forced migration literature also provides
a bridge from empirical decentralisation studies to broader issues of state transformation.  Currently,
there is  a  gap  between the theoretical  discussions of  decentralisation,  which discuss,  often  very
broadly, the kind of relationship between citizens and state institutions such a political system can
foster, and the practical discussions of decentralisation, which often take the form of 'lessons learned'
from specific cases where decentralisation has been implemented.  Theoretical contextualisations of
practical cases, or a search to link the results to the theory is much needed yet largely absent from
decentralisation literature.  This process of contextualisation and linkage is currently mushrooming in
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forced migration, as the field asserts itself as more theoretically substantive than its rather recent
beginnings on the periphery of the social sciences.  
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Forced Migration Literature
Forced  migration  literature  was  born  from  refugee  studies,  which  initially  focused  nearly
exclusively on the plight of refugees themselves, framing them as victims of the international system.
The field began expanding when a group of scholars (spurred in part by Chamber’s “Hidden Losers”
article in 1993) began exploring the impact  refugees have on their  host  communities.  By now, a
growing body of  literature  is developing on the costs and benefits  refugees impose on their  host
communities. Looking at the impact refugees have on their environment, rather than the way their
environment affects them, demonstrates a change from  framing refugees as victims to agents of an
international  system,  affected  by  and  simultaneously  shaping  this  system.   This  is  particularly
apparent in this study, since refugees in Loulouni were both affected by the decentralisation process
in terms of their access to public services and economic opportunities, and at the same time affecting
the decentralisation process through the changes in the local political and economic landscapes their
arrival prompted.  
Whitaker (2002) looks at the impact a large number of refugees from neighbouring countries
had on Tanzania in the late 1990s.  She sums up that “refugees generally impose a burden on local
infrastructure,  environment,  and resources, but they also provide cheap labour,  expand consumer
markets, and justify increased foreign aid.” She also argues, however, that the aggregate impact of
refugees on the host community as a whole is not relevant.  She then goes on to disaggregate the
impact these changes are having on different groups in the host community.  For example, women
may be disproportionately affected by deforestation, as firewood collection is their responsibility.  She
joins Chambers (1993) and Waters (1999) in the disaggregation of hosts using the economic patterns
of both refugees and hosts to argue that some parts of the population are benefiting from the influx,
while others are being marginalised.  The stance of all of these authors is essentially that a refugee
influx  exacerbates  certain  inequalities  through  the  economic  characteristics  shared  by  refugee
situations, such as an increase in cheap labour and increased pressure on common pool resources
the poor are being further marginalised, while the increased labour pool and markets, and a select
few high paying jobs with the relief effort benefit the wealthy.   
Landau (2003) uses a comparative study to question the causal relationship assumed between
economic changes and the refugee influx.   He argues that while the influx he studied did in fact
change economic patterns, these changes were not transformatory, and moreover did not represent
a shift towards integration into the cash economy.  Rather, they reflect the continued application by
both refugees and hosts of diverse and creative livelihood strategies.  Profound economic changes,
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he argues, are more the result of macro-economic policy than the refugee influx.  
Moving away from the immediate questions about who was losing and who was gaining from a
refugee presence, several authors are now looking towards longer term, fundamental transformations
refugee impacts could have on host populations (Waters 1999, Jacobsen 2002, Whitaker 2002 and
Landau 2003 and 2004).  Waters (1999) begins this discussion by speculating that these economic
patterns are creating fundamental social and political changes.  Whitaker (2002) has taken short term
material indicators and, by putting them in the context of economic liberalisation, drawn conclusions
about the possible longer term material and social affects they may have. For example, by looking at
the development projects of international organisations in refugee hosting communities in the context
of declining government budgets for service provision, Whitaker predicts that the added expenditure
on  services  despite  the  lack  of  government  funds  prevented  frustration  with  the  government.
Jacobsen (2002) advances this line of inquiry, arguing that refugee resources could be tapped into
the help with the state building process.  In her argument, however, she does not move beyond the
economic potential refugees come with, meaning the discussion on how a refugee influx could best
be tied to state building could be taken further. 
Whitaker (2002) suggests the refugee presence in Tanzania seems to increase in ‘mwanko’ in
the host population ('awareness,'  largely in the socio-political sense).  This is a key intersection of
decentralisation  and  forced  migration  literature.   Landau  (2004)  builds  on this  speculation  about
political  transformation,  finding  that  the  refugee  influx  is  in  fact  fundamentally  changing  the
relationship between citizens and the state in Tanzania.  
Bluntly stated, Kasulu4 residents have affirmed their normative affiliations
to  a  Tanzanian  nation,  population,  territory,  and  Government,  while
material and functional expectations for the national administration have
declined.   Supra-domestic  actors'  insinuation  into  logics  of  cause and
responsibility  -  what  I  term  the  transnationalisation  of  governmental
practice - goes a long way in explaining this counter-intuitive outcome.
(p37)
This finding is crucial when looking at decentralisation - a specific transformation of government
institutional form and practice.  The affirmation of normative affiliations Landau discusses is closely
connected to the national unity articulation of decentralisation.  Proponents of decentralisation argue
that this is accomplished as decentralisation creates downwardly accountable structures that citizens
are then more willing to invest in.  However, the impact of the refugee influx as described by Landau
simultaneously  also  creates  a  threat  to  accountability  structures.   The  'transnationalisation  of
government practice' is essentially an introduction of resources used for things that were traditionally
the responsibility of governments.  Accountability is threatened not only because there is a significant
4 a refugee hosting district in Tanzania
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injection of resources that are not a part of downwardly accountable, local government structures, but
also because with the decline in expectations from government that accompanies these resources,
the population will be less likely to hold the government accountable as expectations are lowered.
While this could be seen as desirable confidence building in the short term, its long term dangers are
clear.  
A common starting point when looking at host country political processes is that refugees serve
as an “other,” or opposing social force that will create solidarity in the community.  “The significance
of  outsides threats  in  rousing  national  allegiance  is...almost  too much of  a truism to  deserve to
deserve further comment” (Landau, 2002 p20) and many forced migration theorists positing that the
refugee presence provides just such an “other” identity to rally against, this presence ought to help
decentralisation achieve its goals.  
While the idea that refugees are a distinct group often in opposition to the local population is a
dominant one in forced migration literature, it has not gone unchallenged. Bakewell (2000) argued
that it was necessary to 
put down the lens of the emergency, which portrayed the world starkly in
terms of refugees and hosts, and use a more fuzzy lens which allowed
boundaries to be blurred between refugees and hosts, or emergency and
normality. (p2)
When this  was done,  he claims that  the discourse of  aid agencies that  defines  practice is quite
inapplicable to the local situation.  This study has found that in the case of Loulouni, the assumption
that “othering” is a characteristic that can be assumed of all refugee situations is off base. While an
extensive discussion of identity is beyond the scope of this study, one possible explanation for the
different perspective is methodological, as this study has adopted Bakewell's grounding in the local
population rather than the relief effort.  Another possible explanation is historical; the construction of
ethnic and nationalist identities in different areas, as well as the dynamics of the conflict and refugee
movement itself  (whether refugees are self  settled or in camps,  for  example) certainly affects the
articulations and power dynamics of a refugee/host relationship. It is important, however, not to push
forward a framework, no matter how applicable in some situations, that could prove an undesirable
self-fulfilling prophesy in others.  Regardless of its merits, the “fuzzy lens” adopted by Bakewell, while
arguably  more  accurate  in  the  case  of  Loulouni,  is  another  place  of  clear  intersection  with
decentralisation processes, which already involve a lack of clarity in mandate.
These are not the only goals of decentralisation that could be affected by the transformative
influence  of  refugees.   By  bringing  the  decentralisation  literature  and  forced  migration  literature
together, this study initially hypothesised that the social goals of decentralisation such as increased
collective action and increased interaction with government officials would be helped by the refugee
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presence, because it would introduce an “other” around which to mobilise, building and consolidating
a  sense  of  community.   Political  goals,  however,  such  as  increased  accountability,  resource
mobilisation, and responsiveness to the needs of the community would be harmed by the introduction
of resources outside the control of the government.  
Upon analysing the data, however, this was found not to be the case in Loulouni. This points to
certain  important  gaps  in  the  decentralisation  literature.   It  is  no  less  true  that  perceptions  and
expectations of the government are shifted by the refugee presence.  While it will be discussed in
more detail in later chapters, the refugee influx in Loulouni did not bring in an “other” around which all
citizens could mobilise.  Instead, refugees integrated very well with the majority of the population,
causing tension only with the wealthy elite with whom the Ivorian refugees competed for certain kinds
of employment and resources.  While this can, to an extent, be attributed to the history of migration
and class expression in Mali and Cote d'Ivoire, it is also reflecting a tension between the mayor and
sous prefet, local political authorities who use the refugee influx as a battlefield for their own power
struggles.   
Regardless of other dynamics finding expression in the arrival of the relief effort, the fact that
the  integration  of  Ivorian  refugees  took  place  largely  along  class  lines  has  implications  for  the
implementation of decentralisation  Specifically, the wealthy are more likely than other sectors of the
population  to  turn  to  governmental  authorities  with  their  concerns.   With  responsiveness  to  the
community being central to the mandate of the newly created political authorities in Loulouni, the elite
bias already acknowledged as part  of  the decentralisation process is  increased by the arrival  of
refugees.  
This study has found that  when the refugees arrived, accompanied by relief  resources and
services, access to, rather than the establishment of infrastructure and services became the priority
of those interacting with local government.  This means that the host population effectively changed
demands of  local  government  officials  from those related to service provision to those related to
service management and conflict resolution.  The evidence for and implications of this are discussed
in Chapter 4.  
These  empirical  findings  have  implications  for  both  decentralisation  literature  and  forced
migration literature.  Most significantly, the intersection of these two literatures currently suggests that
the injection of resources by the humanitarian intervention, often for the provision of public services
and  yet  outside  the  control  of  state  officials,  should  have  the  most  significant  impact  on
decentralisation.   This  study found  that  this  is  not  the  case.   First,  the state  has never  had the
capacity to be responsible for most service provision in practice, so the arrival of the humanitarian
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intervention does not  mark  a change from the norm in that  respect,  nor  did it  have a significant
transformative affect  on decentralisation.   It  was actually the control  state officials  did have over
refugee  influx  related  resources  that  shaped  the  administrative  decentralisation  process.
Administrative roles at  a  local  level  are  already poorly  defined under  decentralisation.   Tensions
existed,  but  for  the  most  part,  a working balance had been established before the  arrival  of  the
refugees.  The refugee influx introduced new resources, and therefore the power to control them, into
the local administrative system.  Because these powers were not clearly defined, as they are not
almost  by  definition  in  emergency  situations,  significant  barriers  to  successful  administrative
decentralisation were created.  
The support the refugee influx offered to the political decentralisation process, however, has
many lessons for the empirical literature on decentralisation.  Greater collaboration and community
involvement in the political process was an outcome of the refugee influx.  In the case of Loulouni,
this was not,  as the literature suggested,  because a collective enemy was brought  in uniting the
community.  Rather, it was caused by the very same poorly defined powers and access to resources
that  posed  a  barrier  to  the  administrative  decentralisation  process.    This  ambiguity  changed
community demands on the local government from those of service provision to conflict resolution.
The  local  government  was  largely  unable  to  fulfil  requests  for  service  provision  due  to  lack  of
resources.   Resolving  conflicts  is  something  local  government  was much  better  equipped to  do.
Because of its success responding to these new demands relative to its failures in its former service
delivery  role,  relationships  with  the  community  were  strengthened,  and  participation  in  local
governance increased.  
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Research Design
As stated in the introduction, the objectives of this study are threefold.  The first is to contribute
to  the  current  literature  linking  forced  migration  to  state  transformation  in  the  specific  case  of
decentralisation.   The  second  is  to  add  to  the  growing  empirical  decentralisation  literature  by
understanding how one specific factor – a refugee influx – can shape the decentralisation process.
The third objective is to use an understanding of the forced migration context to link decentralisation
to broader issues of state transformation.  Developing a methodology that could serve all of these
objectives was particularly challenging since they include both normative and empirical questions,
demanding both enough quantitative data to provide a reliable description of both decentralisation
and refugee influx-related issues,  and enough qualitative data to contextualise these phenomena
accurately and suggest  causal  linkages in the correlations.   While  these challenges are certainly
formidable,  this  study had the advantages  of  a great  deal  of  time and access.   As such,  it  was
possible to take an inductive approach, using multiple stages of inquiry that built on each other to put
together as complete a picture as possible.  
Answering  the  research  question  of  this  study  required  identifying  the  impact  the  refugee
presence had on decentralisation.  The first thing this requires is an assessment of the state of the
decentralisation process.  This was done first by examining Malian legislation on decentralisation, and
then  drawing  heavily  on  the  literature  introduced  earlier  in  this  chapter  to  identify  the  goals  of
decentralisation in Mali, and the indicators of their success (appendix 4).  First, information about the
status of these goals both before and after the refugee influx was needed.  Then, the impact of the
humanitarian  influx  needed  to  be  measured  by  comparing  the  two,  and  then  including  concrete
examples of any way refugees may have impacted on the achievement on the goals. 
One further  tool  was used to  measure  the  impact  of  the humanitarian  influx.   Geographic,
historic, economic, and political information about Loulouni and Mali more generally was gathered,
and brought to the decentralisation literature, which suggests a likely path for the decentralisation
process given the generic information.   After the empirical data on the decentralisation process was
gathered, this picture was compared back to what the literature indicated.  Places of divergence were
flagged as possibly impacted by the influx, to be explored in greater detail.  
Ideally such a question would be answered by a comparative study of Loulouni, and a Loulouni
existing in a parallel  universe that  experienced no refugee influx (King,  et.  Al  1994).   Finding an
alternative methodological approach to answer the research question was preferable to looking for
such  a  parallel  universe.   Comparative  studies  with  a  location  of  similar  geographic/  economic/
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demographic  characteristics  often  provide such an alternative,  but  this  was inappropriate  for  this
study two reasons.  The first  was simply logistical – no appropriate control  town existed within a
reasonable distance from Loulouni, and arranging for a similar study further afield was impractical.
The second problem, however, eliminated a comparative study from consideration.  Because of the
nature of decentralisation, “micro”-level studies of decentralisation processes such as this simply do
not lend themselves to comparative analysis.  Local political dynamics are by definition shaped by
individuals, local trends and events.  Furthermore, because of the geographic,  cultural, etc., diversity
in Mali, any reasonably comparable town to Loulouni would have had so many intervening differences
such an approach would have been futile.  
Another likely choice would have been to create a comparison between Loulouni and various
national averages or trends, derived from census and other secondary data.   Unfortunately,  such
data  proved  inadequate  in  both  quality  and  quantity  to  provide  for  any  real  comparative  study.
Additionally,  the  problems  of  diversity  in  Mali  and  subsequent  intervening  variables  would  be
exacerbated rather than solved by such an approach.  Longitudinal studies that looked at Loulouni
before  and  after  decentralisation  and  the  refugee  influx  were  also  out,  since  both  had  already
happened, and little  extensive or reliable data on Loulouni before the refugee influx existed.  
Reaching  the  best  compromise  available,  a  case study approach  was taken,  incorporating
longitudinal  elements,  as  well  as  archival  data  for  some  level  of  contextualisation,  if  not  quite
comparison.  A longitudinal element was incorporated into both surveys and interviews by having
many questions looked not only at the current situation, but whether it had changed in the past five
years, and, in the opinion of the respondent, why.   This allowed for information on the perceptions of
change, if not the change itself.  Because of the large number of interviews conducted with a wide
range of community leaders, and this was combined with archival data, it was possible to construct a
reasonable picture of “real” changes, common perceptions, etc.  Finally, in making causal inferences,
instead of looking exclusively at relationships within the data, certain “smoking guns” were identified
in the interviews and open ended questions – places where the refugee influx had a direct impact on
some element of decentralisation.  Survey data was then called upon to investigate the extent of the
suggested relationship.  
King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) argue that theoretical leverage is maximised when multiple
measures and methodologies are used over multiple data sets.  While no one method employed by
this study would alone be adequate to uncover the impact refugees have on decentralisation, each
analysis reinforces the other on a number of different levels of analysis, across all methodologies.
This approach does not allow for generalisability beyond what is happening in Loulouni, but it does
gaurantee a high level of accuracy of the overall claim.  Additionally, that does not mean it holds no
24
Caitlin Blaser 1 September 2007
value for those with no specific interest in southern Mali.  By providing a comprehensive description of
the Loulouni case, certain assertions and assumptions in the literature are challenged.  It is because
of this that this study has a value that extends beyond its degree of generalisability.  
For  the  eighteen  month  period between February  2005 and September  2006,  I  conducted
research  in  Loulouni  to  interrogate  issues at  the intersection of  decentralisation and the refugee
presence.  This research roughly took the six following forms, although at times there was overlap: 
•  Structured and semi structured individual interviews with seventy-five community
leaders,  selected  based  on  their  exposure  to  and  role  in  the  decentralisation
process,  their  interaction  with  the  refugee  presence,  and  their  ability  to  place
Loulouni in either a spatial  or temporal comparative context;  eighteen additional
individuals  from Sikasso,  Bamako,  or  Faragouaran were interviewed who could
speak to the situation in Loulouni.  When 'interview' is cited, it is in reference to
these ninety-three interactions.  Since interviewees were selected on the basis of
their professional capacity, anonymity was not expected unless specific comments
were designated as 'off the record.'  Despite this, interviewees are referred to by
their position rather than their name.  This is first in an effort not to 'personalise'
any issues, but also to contextualise responses as much as possible, and to avoid
the  confusion  that  would  be  caused by repeated  names  (six  Madou Ouattaras
count among those interviewed, as do four Maryam Traores).   These interviews
allowed for a deep exploration of the political, social, and economic transformations
Loulouni has experienced, as well as a more theoretical  approach to topics like
decentralisation and social  transformation.   About half  the interviews took place
before the community survey, which allowed me to identify certain key issues to
focus  on  in  the  survey.   The  other  half  took  place  after  the  survey had  been
conducted, so I could use the interviews to address certain questions raised by the
data.  Key individuals, such as the mayor and former mayors,  were interviewed
several times throughout the research period.  
•  A  survey  of  100  community  members  including  both  open  and  closed  ended
questions covering a variety of topics including a profile of the respondent,  their
views  on  issues  surrounding  decentralisation  and  the  refugee  presence,  their
political  involvement,  and more general  issues about  the economic,  social,  and
political  life  in  Loulouni.   When  the  survey  was  finished,  many  respondents
expressed  an  interest  in  continuing  the  conversation,  and  the  interaction  then
developed into  a  semi  structured  interview borrowing  from issues raised in the
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survey and previously conducted interviews.  The sample was selected randomly
from a residential map of  Loulouni drawn by a Peace Corps volunteer in 2003.
Responses were anonymous, and are cited by number.  Surveys were conducted
either at the respondent's house or place of work (depending on their preference),
with the respondent  and myself  being the only individuals present.  Occasionally
during the open-ended responses at the end of the survey, respondents asked to
invite friends or family into informal  discussions prompted by the questions.   In
such a case, contributions by friends or family outside the sample are taken as
casual discussions (see point 6). When 'respondent' is cited, it is in reference to
these 100 surveys.    
•  Over the duration of this research, fifty members of the community of Loulouni
asked to participate upon hearing the topic of  research,  usually on the basis of
specific information they had to contribute.  The majority, although not all of these
individuals had been migrant  workers in Cote d'Ivoire,  many of  whose return to
Loulouni was prompted by the fighting that caused the refugee influx.  As this is an
important point of view for this study, this information has been included. However,
because they do not fit into the random sample they are excluded from statistics
cited, and their contributions are considered informal discussions.  
• Structured  interviews  with  sixty-five  refugees  at  the  camp.   This  was  initially
planned to be a survey comparable to that of the community members, but pre-
testing  proved  a  survey  format  inappropriate,  and  information  could  be  more
suitably  gathered  from  interviews.   Sampling  the  refugee  population  proved
challenging, due to the high rate of migration; errors were minimised as much as
possible  by conducting  all  of  the interviews in  an intense two week period.   A
random sample of fifty individuals was chosen based on a map drawn up by AVNU
officials, but over the course of the study fifteen additional individuals were added
to  the  sample  using  semi-structured  interviews  because  they  themselves
requested to take part based on either positions of leadership in the community or
specific interactions with residents or the government in Loulouni.  When 'refugee
interview' is cited, it is in reference to these sixty-five interactions.  When statistics
about refugee opinions or practices are cited, the fifteen individuals are omitted in
order to maintain the random sample.   
• Archival research conducted at the levels of Loulouni, Sikasso, and Bamako both
at official government archives, and through inquiries at the offices of technical line
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ministries.   Information  includes  decentralisation legislation,  tax records,  rainfall
changes, court cases, country- and region-wide economic trends, national public
sector expenditure, etc.  In this case, sources are cited individually.  
• Unstructured,  informal  interactions  with  acquaintances  and  friends  in  both
surrounding villages in the commune of Loulouni, and Ivorians or Malians originally
from the commune of  Loulouni living in Sikasso.  These people were often in a
position to offer a different perspective on local government and the refugee influx
than was available  in  Loulouni.   They frequently  served as test  groups  for  my
survey and interview questions,  discussed cultural and linguistic differences that
could cause bias in my responses, suggested new lines of inquiry, and explained
power dynamics and interpersonal relationships in Loulouni from the safe distance
of relative uninvolvement.  While not a part of the original project design, and not
subject to any rigorous methodological framework, these individuals still ended up
providing anecdotes and information useful to this study.  
Interviews and surveys were conducted in either Jula (a dialect of Bambara),  French, or Samago.
They represent the first language of a majority of individuals involved, and I have functional fluency in
all three.  While there were respondents whose first language was not represented, fluency in Jula by
all  members  of  the  community  meant  that  translation  difficulties  were  not  encountered.   All
translations are my own, unless otherwise noted.  Because of the number and linguistic variety of
surveys and interview guides used, they have not been included as an appendix.  For copies of any of
the surveys or data, contact me.
It  is  important  to  mention  that  I  served  as  Peace  Corps  volunteer  for  the  duration  of  the
research period in Sieouba, a village on the periphery of the commune of Loulouni, approximately
twenty-five  kilometres  from  the  town  itself.   Conventional  wisdom  recommends  against  doing
research while simultaneously serving as a 'development'  worker.   My experience doing fieldwork
while serving in the  Peace Corps challenges this assumption.  To begin with, the first two goals of
Peace Corps are related to cultural exchange, with the development of human resources being only
the  third  goal  on  the  Peace  Corps  agenda.   While  Peace  Corps  does  have  an  element  of
development work to it, it also has a long history of sending volunteers to Mali, and it is generally
recognised in communities that have historically hosted a volunteer (including Loulouni and various
surrounding communities) that far less success is achieved towards its development aspirations than
the elements of cultural exchange.  
  The focus on integration into the host community allowed me a cultural and linguistic level of
fluency that informed my research immensely in terms of contextualisation, as well ensuring support
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of my research by all relevant authorities.  Living in an area similar to, and yet separate from the town
of  Loulouni allowed me to maintain a great  deal of independence from the authorities of Loulouni
through whom it would normally be necessary to work for reasons of logistics and protocol,  but a
dependence upon whom would have created a bias in responses.   Additionally,  the emphasis of
Peace Corps on development work based on education and human resource capacity building rather
than funding and external financial support meant that I did not face the same perceptions of wealth
of a traditional development worker, or even possibly a traditional researcher.  This was supported by
the fact that for the entirety of my research I lived in a village considered remote and economically
marginal by residents of Loulouni, at a standard in certain ways more modest than they themselves.   
This is not to imply that power dynamics were absent from my interactions with participants in
the research process.  The response of one woman to the question “Are you involved in politics?”
sums it up:
I am not a member of a political party, no.  I have never voted.  You
will not see me at the mayor's office when he holds meetings, and I
am  not  interested  in  decentralisation.   But  my  child,  we  are  all
involved in politics.  When my son goes to Cote d'Ivoire to work and
sends money back to me, that is politics.  When my husband talks to
me about a new idea he has, that is politics.  When I served you
lunch just now, that was also politics.  
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“IF YOUR NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE IS ON FIRE, YOU BETTER HELP IN PUTTING IT 
OUT. IF NOT, WHEN HIS HOUSE HAS BEEN RAZED, BE SURE THAT YOURS WILL BE THE 
NEXT TO GO UP IN FLAMES.” 
GNASSINGBE EYADEMA
2. Setting the Stage
As the title suggests, this chapter provides the background information necessary to apply the
theoretical information of the previous chapter to the case of Loulouni.  Because this is a case study,
and as such delves deeply into one particular place, a substantial amount of background information
about Loulouni is necessary to apply the above theory in the most appropriate way given the context.
The first three sections situate the refugee influx in Loulouni, while the last three sections discuss the
decentralisation  process  in  Mali  more  generally,  for  understanding  of  the  context  in  which  the
decentralisation process in Loulouni is taking place.  
The chapter begins with a brief history of the migration between Mali and Cote d'Ivoire.  The
relevance of this might not be immediately apparent.  However, the nature of these strong historical
ties  proves  very  formative  of  the  relationship  Ivorian  refugees  developed with  the  community  of
Loulouni.  A policy promoting Malian migration to work on plantations in Cote d'Ivoire was promoted
under  French  colonial  rule.   This  widespread  labour  migration  was  central  to  the  economic
development  of  Cote d'Ivoire,  both before and after independence.  It  also forged close ties with
southern  Mali,  since  many  migrant  labourers  settled  in  northern  Cote  d'Ivoire  for  generations.
Understanding these dynamics is crucial to understanding the relationship displaced Ivorians have
with their host community.  
The  next  section  gives a  brief  overview of  Loulouni,  the  host  community.   In  the  previous
chapter,  various demographic,  geographic,  and economic factors  are  pointed out  as shaping  the
decentralisation process; this section looks at which of these factors are present in Loulouni to get an
idea of what challenges to decentralisation the literature predicts.  It also compares Loulouni to the
rest of Mali to get an idea of how this commune fits into the national decentralisation agenda.  
The  third  section looks at  the  formation of  the refugee  camp in Loulouni.   Building  on the
overview of Loulouni, this section is a very practical summary of the demography and other main
features of the camp, and provides a discussion of the role players involved in the relief effort and
their primary interests.
The forth section changes gears to give an historical overview of the decentralisation process in
Mali.   Like a history of  migration,  if  the relevance of  colonial  policies  is not  obvious,  it  will  soon
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become  clear  that  these  structures  have  undeniably  had  a  lasting  impact.   The  current
decentralisation process has been heavily shaped by former political configurations, whether it is by
adopting their ideas, or opposing their failures.  Understanding the evolution of public offices also
helps explain how certain power dynamics now either hold back or move forward ongoing political
transformation.  
The fifth  section of  this chapter  will  discuss the current  decentralisation  process in Mali.   It
explicitly  ties  this  concrete  situation  back  to  the  decentralisation  literature  discussed  in  the  first
chapter in order to provide a theoretical context for the case of Mali.  Because of the implications the
decentralisation literature has for Mali, contextualising the national process in this way will allow for a
comparison when evaluating the state of decentralisation in Loulouni.  It is particularly important to get
a nation-wide view of the decentralisation process when discussing Loulouni for two reasons.  First, it
allows for a clear idea of the main shaping factors of  the decentralisation process in other areas.
Second, Loulouni was a pioneer commune in the decentralisation process.  Because of this, it was
more heavily influenced by national rhetoric, approaches, and political climates than communes that
decentralised later.  
The final section ties together all of these snapshots by focussing specifically on the actors at
play in the contemporary decentralisation process in Loulouni.  Initially this may seem redundant, as
actors have been a part of every discussion up to this point.  However, looking at them explicitly is
important.  As mentioned in the first chapter, this study adopts Ribot's framework for understanding
decentralisation as a method of analysis, and this focuses on actors, power, and accountability.  All
discussions of the structural elements of the decentralisation process address changes in power and
accountability, but in order to recognise the importance of this, it is essential to be clear about exactly
who all the actors are, and what their primary interests are.  This chapter covers a lot of territory, and
may seem like a bit of a pastiche.  However, the integration of these elements will be solidified in
following chapters, when an analysis of the decentralisation process in the context of a refugee influx
draws heavily from all of this background information at once.    
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A brief history of Malian – Ivorian migration
One  of  the  most  notable  trends  in  the  data  gathered  in  this  study  was  the  link  between
economic class and perceptions of Ivorian refugees.  Specifically, the wealthier the respondent, the
more likely they were to feel negatively about the Ivorian refugees and their impact on Loulouni (see
the table in the last section of Chapter 4).  This is crucial for understanding the impact the refugee
influx had on the decentralisation process,  since,  among other reasons,  wealthier  residents were
more  likely  to  interact  with  local  government  officials.   In  depth  interviews provided two primary
explanations for this.  This first is that wealthy residents of Loulouni were more likely to have spent
time  in  Cote  d'Ivoire,  and  had  negative  experiences  of  xenophobia  and  racism.   The  second
explanation is that because Cote d'Ivoire has a higher level of development by most indicators than
Mali, the Ivorian refugees were more likely to be “competing” with the wealthier residents of Loulouni
for skilled employment, luxury goods, medical care, places in school, etc.  Poorer residents were in
that  respect  less affected by the influx.   For  a more  nuanced understanding  of  the  class-based
dynamics between refugees and residents of Loulouni, it is necessary to draw a picture of the history
of migration and economic ties between Cote d'Ivoire and Southern Mali.  
Cote d'Ivoire has been a centre of trade and migration in West Africa for centuries (Toure et. al
1992).  When much of West Africa was colonised by the French, an explicit policy of promoting (and
at  various  times  forcing)  migrant  labour  to  Cote  d'Ivoire  was  pursued  to  develop  the  plantation
economy at the expense of areas seen as having less potential for economic exploitation.  As Cooper
(1996) states, French colonial policy was not designed “for the ‘total development’ of French West
Africa but would concentrate on ‘islands of prosperity,’ well situated for exporting produce.”  This has
had numerous lasting effects that will be expounded upon throughout this thesis, including defining
many of the contemporary social dynamics that exist between Cote d'Ivoire and Mali.
The little interest the French showed towards Mali was nearly entirely geared towards exploiting
its labour force.  This found expression through policies such as relocating entire villages to main
transportation routes so labour would be more easily accessible, and imposing head taxes to be paid
in cash, demanding an increase in the pursuit of wage labour.  These policies failed to promote large-
scale migration in the early 20th century because of  numerous factors,  including the comparative
economic  equality  of  the  two  countries  at  that  time,  a  neglect  of  food  crops  in  Cote  d'Ivoire,
depressed wages partly stemming from forced labour regimes, and resistance as a form of political
protest (Cooper, 1996; Amin, 1973).  Changes in policy in the mid 20th century, however, brought
significant changes in migration patterns. The abolishment of forced labour in 1946 increased wages
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tenfold.   This,  combined  with  creation  of  a  workers  syndicate,  Syndicat  Interprofessional
d’Acheminement de la Main d’Ouevre (SIAMO) which provided transportation subsidies and health
care to migrant workers created a flood of migrants from Mali to Cote d'Ivoire, and largely sparked
the boom in Cote d'Ivoire's economy in the years to come (Cordell, et all 1996).  
After independence, there were significant changes in policy, but ironically their outcomes were
remarkably similar to the colonial era, as they continued to marginalise and impoverish rural areas.
Open  trade  and  migration  combined  with  a  large  wealth  disparity  maintained  migration  to  Cote
d'Ivoire.  This was reinforced initially by political tensions with Senegal leaving Abidjan as the only
accessible port, and later by poor internal economic policies that both encouraged elicit trade over the
border, and further impoverished the countryside, making emigration an important livelihood strategy.
Attempts were made by Houphouet-Boigny (the president of Cote d'Ivoire), Keita and Traore (both
former presidents of Mali), to utilise migration to promote growth of the public sector, but in practice
they simply drove migration underground, and undocumented migration remains the primary form of
migration between Mali and Cote d'Ivoire today (Domba, 2003).
This migration was a huge driving factor in the economic growth in Cote d'Ivoire, widely claimed
to  be  a  West  African  miracle.   This  growth  was largely  built  by the  hands of  Malian labourers,
however, and the Malian economy “paid for this in almost total stagnation” (Amin, 1973: 140).  The
miracle was turning to mirage in the 1980s, when much of West Africa was hit with economic crisis.
Structural  adjustment  programs on the  heals  of  a  devastating  drought  caused a  collapse of  the
Ivorian labour market, which in turn led to a rise in xenophobia.  This was not an unforeseen process;
as early as 1970, Efrem Sigel noted:
Much of the actual or potential political tension stems from that fact
that  Ivorians do not  know if  the wealth of  their  country belongs to
them or  to foreigners.  Not  that  the actual  fact  of  ownership is so
important; in politics it is appearances which count. And as long as
there  are...foreign  Africans  who seem to  be profiting  from Ivorian
prosperity  more  than  the  Ivorians  themselves,  the  potential  for
trouble exists (1970: 18).
Despite the onset of economic hardship in Cote d'Ivoire, significant disparity remained in the
level of development between Mali and Cote d'Ivoire, with the GNP in pre-conflict Cote d'Ivoire over
twice  that  of  Mali  (Skeldon,  1997  p212).  As  long  as  this  imbalance  was  also  reflected  in  the
infrastructure, availability of services, and levels of human development, migration continued.  As the
tide of xenophobia rose, policies began to reflect it, such as the institution of identity cards, seen by
many Malians as a precursor of the expulsion of immigrants, many of whom had been in Cote d'Ivoire
for generations (Toure et al., 1992).  
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This  xenophobic  movement  gained  momentum  when  Houphouet-Boigny,  a  long-time
supporter of Malian migration, died in 1993, and a heated struggle for leadership dominated the next
six years of  Ivorian politics.   The culminated in a coup d'etat  in December  of  1999,  and military
clashes soon after.  While the political, economic, and social roots of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire are
complex,5 they eventually found articulation in anti-immigrant sentiments, expressed through various
forms of identity, including religion (southern Cote d'Ivoire is predominantly Christian, whereas much
of the north shares its Muslim faith with Mali), ethnicity (because of arbitrarily drawn colonial lines,
northern Cote d'Ivoirians share ethnic ties with southern Malians and Burkinabes), language, place of
residence, and national origin.  The expulsion of immigrants came to be seen as the only way to
restore Cote d'Ivoire to its former economic glory (BBC News, 10/07/02).  
It is this conflict, which is fundamentally about citizenship rights, and the relationship between
Mali and Cote d'Ivoire, that caused the refugee influx.  When the dynamics between residents of
Loulouni and refugees are discussed, a reflection on this migration context often explains the source
of various perceptions.  For example, Malians who were themselves migrant workers in Cote d'Ivoire
were very likely to have a negative view of the refugees, because they had experienced xenophobia
and discrimintation while in Cote d'Ivoire.  Others who had a negative opinion of the refugees cited
the fact  that  they were just  taking advantage of  aid, because they were in fact  Malians.  This is
understandable given the history of  migration,  and politics of  identity in Cote d'Ivoire.   Still  other
aspects of the relationship between Ivorian refugees and their Malian hosts stem from the relative
wealth of Cote d'Ivoire, and the fact that Malians participated in creating this (without often sharing in
the fruits).   How refugees and hosts frame the rights and responsibilities of the other is very much
embedded in how they interpret these historical migration ties.  
5 For a more in depth account, see Akindes, 2004.  
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Introduction to Loulouni
Loulouni lies at the heart of these migration ties in a number of ways.  It is the capital of a
rural commune in the south east corner of Mali, in the region of Sikasso (see appendix 3).  Located
on the main road between Sikasso and Cote d'Ivoire, it has always played a very important role in
regional trade and migration.  Even under French colonial rule, it was the seat of the chef du cannon.
As mentioned in the first chapter, numerous geographic, economic, and demographic factors have
implications for the decentralisation process.  Furthermore, the refugee influx did not happen in a
political void.  This section will begin with a simple introduction to Loulouni and the surrounding area
before the discussion on the humanitarian intervention or the decentralisation process can begin.
Information was selected with Manor's laundry list of helpful conditions for decentralisation in mind, to
see  how decentralisation  theory  suggests  the  process  will  unroll.   This  will  be  drawn on  in  the
following chapter, where the evidence gathered in this study will point to similarities to and differences
from the theoretical path, and suggest reasons for any divergences.  
The Sikasso region has many economic and institutional ties to Bamako, in a large part due to
its reliance on cotton production, a nationalised industry only now taking steps towards privatisation.
While  subsistence  agriculture  is  still  central  to  the  economy  of  the  Sikasso  region,  cash  crops
(particularly cotton) have a stronger hold on the economy than in other regions in Mali, due to its
higher rainfall.  As a result, the region has more net wealth than other parts of the country, but is also
marked by greater inequality.  Per capita income is higher than in any other region of the country, but
it lags behind in human development indicators such as maternal and infant mortality, literacy rates,
and life expectancy.  
While still weak, Sikasso has better transportation infrastructure than the rest of the country.
With Abidjan being Bamako's most accessible port, most of the country's imports and exports pass
through Sikasso.   Its  relative accessibility combined with low human development  indicators  help
explain the high presence of NGOs and humanitarian organisations; there are more working in the
Sikasso region than any other part of Mali outside of Bamako.
There  is  only  one  paved  road  between  Sikasso  and  Abidjan,  and  Loulouni,  with  3000
residents, is the largest town between Sikasso and the border.6  Equidistant from Sikasso and the
border town of Zegoua, Loulouni is a commune capital and significant trade centre in its own right.  In
addition to a large weekly market, it hosts a number of businesses and several services for the region
including a second cycle school, health centre, and bank.  While no NGOs actually have offices in
6 See appendix 3
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Loulouni, there are numerous extension agents working in both the town and commune, including
representatives  of  agricultural  development  organisations  and literacy trainers.   There  is  a large
wealth gap between urban and rural communes in Mali, but Loulouni is one of the wealthier rural
communes not adjacent to an urban commune.  Because the road through Loulouni goes only to the
border and does not connect two major Malian cities, it has lagged behind comparable communes in
services like telecommunication and electrification.  
Subsistence  agriculture  forms  the  foundation  of  Loulouni's  economy,  but  there  is  a  high
degree of economic diversity.  Maise is the staple crop, but since a World Bank funded project planed
a substantial area of farmland adjacent to a river on the outskirts of town in 2005, rice cultivation is
increasing.  More tropical crops like cassava and oil palms were central only a decade ago, but a
drastic  drop  in  rainfall  affecting  the  region  over  the  past  two  decades  means  that  agricultural
production has seen substantial changes in recent years.7  Cotton is the most important cash crop
cultivated,  but  as  prices  have  dropped,  it  is  being  replaced  by  garden  produce.   Loulouni's
advantageous location along the main road makes it possible to grow more profitable, quick spoiling
produce, like mangoes and tomatoes for sale in Bamako and Mopti.  
In  addition  to  trade,  migration  is  an important  feature  on Loulouni's  economic  landscape.
Much like the rest of Mali and the region of Sikasso particularly, the population of Loulouni is very
mobile.  Given the lack of economic opportunities in Loulouni, many people migrate as a livelihood
strategy.   Mali is rapidly urbanising, and with the closest high school being in Sikasso, promising
students often go on to study and look for  work in either Sikasso or Bamako.   The substantially
wealthier  Cote d'Ivoire  is  the primary destination of  migrant  labourers.  Southern  Mali  has a long
history of  migration to Cote d'Ivoire,  and many Malians permanently settled on cocoa and coffee
plantations in northern Cote d'Ivoire generations ago.8  
In 2000, Malian migrant workers were bearing the brunt of political tensions in Cote d'Ivoire.
Many migrants from Loulouni and the surrounding areas returned during this period.  When these
tensions escalated to a full-scale civil war in 2002, the impact was felt in Loulouni.  Not only did many
Malian workers and refugees come to Loulouni, the transport route between Sikasso and Abidjan was
closed.  When traffic was diverted east of Sikasso, bound for Lome, the economic lifeline of Loulouni
was strangled.
According  to Manor's  Promises and Limits  of  Decentralisation,  Loulouni  is  not  a  textbook
example of the best place to implement decentralisation.  However, it also has some things working
7 See appendix 2
8 For more reading on migration patterns in West Africa, see Cooper, 1996; Cordell, et. Al 1996 and Diarrah,
1991.  
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in  its  favor.   There  is  very  little  history  of  democracy  in  Loulouni,  which  make  successfully
decentralising  very  difficult,  as  the  accountability  structures  that  are  so  crucial  to  democratic
decentralisation must be created.   However,  Loulouni does have actors (to be discussed in more
depth in the final section of this chapter) that act in some democratic ways, which could potentially
mitigate this drawback.  Similarly, Loulouni is quite poor by most standards, and a lack of resources
and infrastructure at the local level is another obstacle to decentralisation.   However,  Loulouni is
developed in comparison to other rural communes in Mali, and as such is well placed to enjoy many
advantages in terms of the national decentralisation process.  There are low levels of inequality in
Loulouni, which is an asset to the decentralisation process.  From demographic information alone, it
is  impossible to judge whether  or  not  decentralisation is likely to  succeed in Mali.   Keeping this
information  in  mind,  however,  a  much  more  educated  guess  can  be  formulated  by  placing  the
decentralisation process in an historical and national context.  
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Establishment of the refugee camp in Loulouni
As the previous section did with migration, this section aims to give a brief  overview of  the
refugee camp in Loulouni.  Upcoming chapters will go into a great deal of detail about the nature of
the relationships between refugees and residents of Loulouni, and how the refugee camp affected
the political, economic, and social landscape of Loulouni.  Before this analysis begins, however, it is
useful to keep in mind a broad picture of the refugee camp.  To draw this picture, this section will
outline  the  establishment  of  the  camp,  and  its  main  demographic  features  and  administrative
structures.  
Sporadic fighting broke out in Cote d'Ivoire beginning in 2000, and escalated to full scale civil
war by September of 2002.  Tens of thousands of the estimated three million Malian citizens living
and  working  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  returned  to  Mali,  both  through  government  assisted  emergency
repatriation efforts, and of their own accord.  Numerous Cote d'Ivoirian citizens also came to Mali as
refugees.  There are two significant roads between Cote d'Ivoire and Mali; the paved road to Sikasso
through Loulouni, and an unpaved yet major transportation route to Bougouni through Faragouaran in
the  west.   When  fighting  first  broke  out,  many  people  fled  to  the  border  towns  of  Zegoua  and
Yanfolila (on the eastern and western roads respectively), but they were both unequipped to host so
many people, and not safe themselves due to the possibility of fighting spilling over the border.  A
transit centre was opened in Faragouaran, and a camp was opened in Loulouni (see map, appendix
3).  
From the  beginning,  the  government  of  Mali  saw the  crisis  in  Cote  d'Ivoire  as  having  the
potential of a tremendous impact on the Malian economy. Almost immediately after the escalation of
violence, ATT went to Guinea to discuss transportation and access options to the port in Conakry.
As a landlocked country,  Mali is dependent on its neighbours for all imports and exports,  and the
majority of them were routed through Cote d'Ivoire before the war.  With a closure of the border, the
prices of consumer goods shot up.  Technical line ministries were asked to do evaluations of the
expected impact the crisis would have on their work.  It was widely acknowledged that 
as many of the Malian nationals living in Cote d'Ivoire have remitted
significant  amounts  of  money  to  their  families  remaining  in  Mali,
many  Malian  families  that  were  dependent  on  these  remittances
would  be  negatively  affected....The  possible  return  of  all  or  a
significant amount of Malians living and working in Cote d'Ivoire will
put tremendous pressure on the economic and social fabric in Mali
(OCHA, 2002).
With an official evacuation of its nationals begun by the Malian government, the question in Bamako
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was no longer whether this pressure would be applied, but rather where it would be applied, and how
best to respond to it.  
On the international front, an InterAgency appeal by UN organisations was issued, and by the
end of November, a full scale relief effort was in the works.  The African Union deployed a mission to
Mali to evaluate the situation of refugees, UNDP and IOM sent fact finding missions to Sikasso, and
many planning meetings and donor briefings were held.  While the UNHCR office in Bamako closed
in 2001, a staff member was deployed from Cote d'Ivoire, and implementation partners including the
National Commission in Charge of Refugees (CNCR) and the Association of former United Nations
Volunteers  (AAVNU) were called on to assist  in refugee management.   Nation-wide,  the biggest
concern was related to food security.  Food production decreased in Mali in the first years of the
second millennium, and in 2002, Mali was already going to be dependent on imports to meet its food
needs.  The food security stock was at an all time low, and a drought had set it that was affecting
November harvests, and causing concern about the prospects for food security in 2003.  On a local
level, however, concerns varied.  
Loulouni, while not a border town, was generally the first point in Mali refugees and returned
migrants came to fleeing the conflict.  The initial population of the refugee camp was a mix of people
from  numerous  nationalities  (including  Burkinabe,  Togolese,  Nigerian,  Guinean,  Senegalese,
Ghanaian,  and Iraqi),  although predominantly Cote d'Ivoirian.   Rapid migration through the camp
meant a substantial fluctuation in the number of people housed, but it remained between 500 and
800 from 2002-2004.9  The Malian Red Cross was the first humanitarian organisation to provide direct
assistance to  the refugees,  meeting people as soon as they crossed the border  in Zegoua,  and
providing various food and non-food items, such as rice, cooking oil, sugar, soap, and sleeping mats.
When it was agreed that the refugees would be moved to Loulouni, the Red Cross worked with the
former mayor to distribute initial supplies.  They were eventually followed by an impressive host of
acronyms.  AAVNU, UNICEF, WFP, CARE Mali, and Islamic Relief partnered to run the camp itself,
although many other organisations (discussed below) provided assistance in other capacities.  
When the camp was opened, a wide variety of people were staying in Loulouni, both inside
and outside the camp.  While  official  statistics  are unavailable or  unreliable,  there is widespread
consensus that the biggest population of new arrivals were returned Malian migrants and their friends
or  relatives,  who had friends or  relatives in Loulouni  to stay with.   A smaller  number  were Cote
d'Ivoirians or returned migrants with no previous connections to Loulouni, some of whom arrived on
9 During the years this research was conducted, 2005-2006, the population was significantly lower, around 1/2
that figure, as a closure of the camp began in mid 2006, and refugees were encouraged to relocate to
Faragouaran.  
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their own while others moved up from Zegoua with the opening of the camp. 
 OCHA estimates that fewer than 20% of non-Malians coming through Loulouni due to the
conflict in Cote d'Ivoire attempted to register for asylum.   Estimates by local government officials and
business  people  confirm  that  for  the  800  registered  refugees,  there  were  approximately  3,000
Malians and Ivorians staying on a temporary basis. Most people used the camp as a stopping-over
point to meet their basic needs until they could arrange to go to Sikasso, Bamako, or anywhere else
offering  better  economic  prospects,  rather  than  a  place  of  long  term  or  potentially  permanent
settlement.  The majority of the camp population, and the people who stayed at the camp longest
were youths (about 65% were under 18), with males outnumbering females in both the child and adult
populations (interview, camp manager 8 April 2006; interview, former mayor 29 March 2005).   
The  initial  situation  in  Loulouni  left  many  critical  needs  unmet.   The  Government  of  Mali
established  coordination  services  on  both  a  territorial  level  (with  local,  communal,  regional,  and
national components), and a sectoral level (with groupings for food security, protection, education,
shelter,  water and sanitation, health, HIV/AIDS, and Information Management).  The planning and
coordination needs were substantial to say the least, with partners including CARE, DWHH, ICRC,
IOM, AAVNU, CNCR, Handicap International, UNESCO, OXFAM-UK, Islamic Relief, SCF (US), MSF,
SDC, UNAIDS, ADAC, UNFPA, UNDP, UNHCR, WHO, UNICEF in addition to local NGOs, CBOs,
and government agencies and services (OCHA, 2002).  These role players met fortnightly to discuss
all issues that required multi-sectoral coordination, including access, security, conflict management,
advocacy, and emergency response.  The crisis committee at the regional level in Sikasso met on a
daily basis (where temporary sites were also set up to assist refugees and returnees), and provided
briefings from each meeting for consideration at national level stakeholder meetings.  
The  crisis  committee  set  up  in  Loulouni  included  local  government  officials  and  relevant
community leaders such as the gens d'armerie, school director and doctor.  It was led by the sous
prefet.  Under its guidance, tents were set up,10 latrines were constructed, and potable water was
regularly bussed in.  A distribution regular of essential food and other items was started through the
office  of  the  sous prefet.   Soon after  the  arrival  of  refugees,  many of  the  Sphere  Humanitarian
Standards were being adhered to, but there were notable exceptions, primarily with water/ sanitation
and health care.  
The biggest difficulty at the camp and for the town of Loulouni as a whole was that of potable
water; in 2002, there was only one borehole pump in Loulouni, located at the health centre.  When
funds were located, organisations supporting the refugees (led primarily by UNICEF) had two more
10 More permanent housing was eventually built as well
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boreholes drilled and installed pumps near the refugee camp.  The camp itself was located in a newly
developing part of town, behind the weekly market. It was separated from the main residential area
by a cluster of businesses and office buildings, including the offices of the mayor and sous prefet, the
health centre, the second cycle school, and a row of artisans.  There were, however, a few houses on
the same side of town as the camp, primarily belonging to extension workers, or representatives of
various services (the gens d'arms camp, school director, etc.).  Not only had there been no source of
potable water within 500m of the market, there were no wells on this newly developing side of town
either.  One of the new boreholes was installed near the school with a tap, while the other one was
covered with a hand pump behind the market, at the camp itself.  This new pump at the camp was
the market's only source of water potable water.  
The challenge of water is inseparable from that of sanitation, and latrines were in demand as
soon as the camp was constructed.  This is an example of the residents of Loulouni offering a hand
during a time of crisis by donating their time, labour, and supplies.  The women's association dug
eleven provisional latrines that were used by initial residents of the camp.  UNICEF then supported
their  efforts  through  the  provision  of  construction  materials  to  make  them permanent  and more
sanitary. 
On  the  health  front,  there  were  many  concerns.   The  health  centre  in  Loulouni,  while
sizeable for a rural commune-level health clinic in Mali, is only equipped to deal with primary health
needs.  There is a small pharmacy that is adequate for first aid and primary care, but not sufficient for
comprehensive care.  Given that many refugees and returnees had travelled long distances under
difficult circumstances, demand for health care went beyond the capacity of the clinic.  It does have a
gas-powered refrigerator for vaccines and other medicines requiring refrigeration, and is staffed by
only a midwife, doctor, and secretary to serve the entire commune of more than 35,000 people.   At
the time of  the influx, there was a two way radio with which an ambulance could be called from
Sikasso  if  necessary.   This  was replaced in  August  of  2006  when  a  telephone line was run  to
Loulouni, greatly improving communications.  
The most immediate health concern articulated by refugees was for anti-venoms, as there
was a  problem with  vipers  in  the  initial  days  of  the  camp.   The  second  priority  area identified,
however, was HIV/AIDS.  The spread of HIV/AIDS was identified at the national level as a potential
consequence of  the conflict  in Cote d'Ivoire.   Mali has a relatively low infection rate, around 2%
(UNAIDS, 2004), and it is mostly restricted to high-risk populations such as prostitutes, truck drivers,
and mine workers.  The spread of HIV outside these populations has been very limited, but there is a
great  concern among the Malian authorities  as should this  happen,  Mali has many features that
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would  encourage  the  spread  of  the  virus,  including  widely  practiced  polygamy,  high  levels  of
migration, and non-use of condoms.  Cote d'Ivoire, on the other hand, has the highest prevalence
rate in the region (approximately 12% [UNAIDS, 2004]).  
The urgency of an intervention targeting the spread of HIV/AIDS was made clear when a
Red Cross fact finding mission to Loulouni reported “the presence of a large number of young, idle,
sexually active teenagers,” with “cases of prostitution becoming rampant (International Federation of
Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2002).”  This report came out almost simultaneously to an
interview  with  the  camp  manager  who  confirmed  that  there  was  a  refugee  dying  of  AIDS
(International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2002).  The Malian Red Cross
began weekly awareness sessions, and distributed condoms.   
A number of other diseases prevalent in the dry season in Loulouni were exacerbated by
displacement, and there were problems of malaria and respiratory diseases, including meningitis.  A
packet  of  pharmaceutical  supplies  was  integrated  with  the  food  distributions,  and  this  was
accompanied by various health related trainings.  Because the high demand for minor, first-aid type
treatment, between two and four Red Cross volunteers remained in Loulouni at all times to help the
health centre cope with consultations, treating minor illnesses, and handling referrals.  
Schooling was another service provision challenge, given the large number of refugees that
were in school, and the already overcrowded classrooms in Loulouni.  Some children, generally those
who had no immediate  plans to leave Loulouni,  chose to integrate  into the school  system.  The
majority,  however,  due  to  uncertain  time  horizons  or  other  considerations  attended  a  temporary
school established by UNICEF that  offered flexibility from the rigid Malian curriculum.  Given the
relative  strength  of  the  Ivorian  school  system,  as  well  as  the  fact  that  French,  the  medium  of
instruction, is more widely used in Cote d'Ivoire than in Mali, the top student in nearly every grade in
Loulouni has been Ivorian since 2002 (Interview, school director, 2 April, 2006).  
Because the focus of this study is on the impact of the refugee presence on decentralisation,
which is by definition a formal,  institutionalised transformation,  discussions of  the relief  effort  and
refugee presence in general will focus on the 'official' sphere, and largely leave out discussions of, for
example, the large number of Malian migrant workers in Cote d'Ivoire who came to Loulouni at the
same time, and generally under the same conditions as the refugees, but who did not stay in the
camp.  However, note should be made of the extent to which the “relief effort” existed outside of the
traditional food and supplies rations from the office of the sous prefet, and international organisations
working in the community.  
During the period of greatest influx, in late 2002 and early 2003, 90% of survey respondents
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reported some kind of personal involvement in the informal relief  effort,  generally through hosting
displaced people for periods ranging from a night to a year, but also by helping to raise funds for
return or onward passage for migrants, providing meals, etc.  While most of this took place on the
individual level as acts of charity, there was also institutional engagement.  One example of this is
when the women's association convinced two chauffeurs to donate their time and vehicles, and in
partnership  with businesses  in  the  community,  pooled  funds  to  transport  stranded  refugees  and
returnees to Sikasso  where assistance efforts  were generally better  equipped,  and many people
expected to meet family or acquaintances.  
Many  other  individual  acts  are  widely  praised  in  the  community,  such  as  one  retired
businessman  who  hosted  three  Ivorian  families,  amounting  to  more  than  twenty  people,  in  his
concession for a span of months,  providing them with all they needed during this time, and even
constructing an extra house.  While stereotypes of African hospitality may or may not apply, cultural
beliefs and values were often brought up in discussions about the refugees.  The story of Sundiata
Keita, one of the rulers of the Empire of Mali who began life with many hardships, was often evoked
to  illustrate that people in hardship one day may be powerful the next, and vice versa.  
In  considering  both  the  refugee  influx  and  decentralisation  in  Loulouni,  one  of  the  most
important  things  to  keep  in  mind  is  that  neither  happened  in  a  void.   The  history  of  migration
dynamics affected the reception Ivorian refugees received in Loulouni, and national and international
economic trends have impacted the process of political transformation on the local level.  It is only
through understanding how the current social and political context evolved that it will be possible to
discuss how the current transformation is unrolling.  
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Historical Overview of Decentralisation Movements in Mali 
Decentralisation  has  a  long  history  in  Mali.   Looking  at  the  post-independence  waves  of
decentralisation will first define the trajectory of political transformation in Mali, but will also allow the
case of decentralisation in Mali to be tied to the general literature on decentralisation discussed in the
introduction.  Understanding the different articulations of decentralisation that are present in Mali has
a bearing  on the places  a refugee  influx will  interact  most  with the process.   It  also provides a
stronger justification for the measures of success chosen in this study, and helps in explaining the
perceptions of local government in Loulouni.  Furthermore, understanding the evolution of the current
decentralisation process will  tie the  political  transformation in Mali  in  several  clear ways to other
decentralisation movements particularly in Africa, but also throughout the world.  
Mali gained its independence from French colonial rule in 1960.  In the first  half of 1960, it
chose to unite with the wealthier, coastal nation of Senegal to form the Mali Federation.  In only a
matter of months, however, differences between Senegal and Mali seemed irreconcilable.  While Mali
held radical stances on the Africanisation of the administration, relations with France, and economic
control, Senegal had a more accomodationist outlook.  These differences threatened armed struggle,
but were peacefully resolved in August of 1960, when each nation declared unilateral independence.
While outright fighting was averted, the tension between Mali and Senegal was not only detrimental
to the Malian economy, but was central to shaping the Malian political landscape.
Modibo Keita had dominated independence struggle politics, and led the first Republic of Mali
as a one party state.  He sought close ties with the soviet bloc, in part to distinguish himself from
Leopold Senghor,  the French educated President  of  Senegal.   He was heavily influenced by the
socialist,  Africanist  political ideology that were then prevelant among development philosophies on
the  continent.   The  first  goal  of  this  nascent  state  was  economic  decolonisation,  which  meant
severing ties from French commercial monopolies (Clark in Bingen, 1999).  To do this, rural socialism
through village collectives were established to encourage the mobilisation of rural resources.
While new party committees established throughout the countryside were supposed to breathe
life back into rural political leadership, in practice the few structures that offered the potential of a civil
society were either pushed away from the government or demolished by this push for organisational
conformity  (Rawson  in  Bingen,  1999).   For  example,  commandants  de  cercle had  always  been
centrally appointed officials, but under French rule they remained for years in the same area, growing
increasingly familiar with the local context.  These were replaced by Party officials with no knowledge
of  the  local  situation.   Additionally,  the  position  of  canton  chief,  which  formerly  provided  a
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counterbalance to the representative of the central administration, was abolished.  
A certain  degree of  administrative decentralisation  was implemented.   Territorial  collectives
were to “administer themselves freely by elected councils and under conditions foreseen in the law.”
However, “the delegate of the Government has charge of the interests of the Republic, administrative
control and respect of laws.” (Republique du Mali quoted in Rawson in Bingen, 1999)  This theoretical
commitment to local government while balanced against the centralised “interests of the Republic”
clearly reflects the French colonial institution of tutelle in which local administrators are given decision
making power, but only with the close oversight and tutelage of the colonial authorities.  This spectre
of tutelle will continue to appear in later decentralisation efforts.  
The key to Keita's decentralisation vision was the mobilisation of  the rural economy for  the
state's benefit.   The consequences of this were multi-fold.  First, this created a tension within the
administration, where the Ministry for Plan and Rural Development was disproportionately powerful,
and secondly, there were splits within the party between the conservative commercial class and the
progressive socialists.  To move beyond these divisions, instruments of supervision and control were
simply  multiplied,  magnifying  the  problems  of  inefficiency  without  solving  problems  of  marketing
(Diarrah, 1986).    All the while, the state-run marketing systems were inefficient, and devastating to
rural farmers.  Official produce prices were held well below market levels, creating a thriving black
market  and illicit  trade with Senegal  and Cote d'Ivoire.   Production  stagnated,  to  say nothing  of
economic growth.  While economic deconolonisation was to a degree achieved, it  was at a great
cost.   The economic policies of  the Keita regime were increasingly harmful,  with ineffective rural
development programs being funded by printing more money.  When faced with popular resistance,
Keita's regime turned to increasingly authoritarian pressures of  extracting  resources from already
impoverished rural areas.  
In response to the increasing oppression of President Keita, a military coup in 1968 installed
Moussa Traore as president. Traore initially pushed towards regional integration, improving relations
with neighbouring states  and joining the CFA franc zone.  In the countryside,  the Traore regime
instituted  a  new  form  of  cooperation,  creating  Tons  villageois,  political  and  economic  entities
modelled after  pre-colonial  social  security organisations.   While the rhetoric for  collaboration with
farmers was positive, the actions of the regime never moved beyond talk of engagement with the
long marginalised rural  areas.   Despite a rhetoric  of  liberation,  these new development initiatives
amounted to little more than further attempts of economic control by the state.  While there were
superficial economic reforms, the economy of Mali did not see improvements during the initial years
of  Traore's  leadership,  and  the  longer  he  stayed  in  power,  the  more  the  poverty  of  the  nation
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contrasted to the decadent opulence of the clearly corrupt regime.  Popular demonstrations began to
occur regularly, but were crushed with increasingly repressive measures.  
There  was  much  talk  of  return  to  civilian  rule  and  reform,  but  there  was  no  meaningful
implementation.   In  the  early  1970s,  a  devasting  drought  combined  with  internal  and  external
pressures necessitated some action on the talk of reform.  A new constitution was ratified by popular
vote in 1974, but it didn't take effect until 1979.  When this centrist form of democracy was finally
instituted in theory, Traore received 99% of the votes as the head of the unopposed UDPM (Union
Democratique des Peuple Malien)  party.   The cosmetic  changes made did include a widespread
implementation of  administrative decentralisation.   Illustrative of  the non-democratic nature of  this
initiative, the reform came not from parliament, but from a military decree (Ordonnance 77-44).  This
decree cancelled all local governance institutions of the Keita regime, and set up yet another system
of territorial administration.  Village chiefs were once more elected according to French colonial law,
and had an official role in the local administration.  However, they were subject to the tutelle of the
arrondissement councils, which were upwardly accountable.  
Much  of  the  motivation  for  this  new wave of  decentralisation  stemmed from internal  and
international  pressures  for  the  central  government  to  cut  spending  drastically  through  Structural
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs).   Emphasising decentralised structures,  privatisation and market
liberalisation drew popular attention away from the growing dissatisfaction with one party rule. There
was also the recognition that the central government would no longer be able to deliver the same
services  with  a  smaller  budget,  and  would  need  to  mobilise  local  institutions  and  resources  to
maintain what little legitimacy it still had (Ribot, 1999).  In this way, decentralisation was “intended to
increase  efficiency  of  central  government  administration  rather  than  promote  local  autonomy  or
popular participation” (Conyers, 2000:28).11  As such, the central government created elected local
councils, but did not give them any meaningful power (Diallo, 1994 p1).
At this point, decentralisation was largely reactionary in nature.  For most of the latter half of the
twentieth century, the central state in Mali had been continually growing, first spurred by the political
imperative of creating a national identity after shedding colonialism, then by attempts at using the
state as a strong tool to guide economic development.  This centralisation of policy formulation and
economic production led to corruption and clientelism.  Decentralisation was employed as a way to
fight the ills that came with centralisation, but its own merits or disadvantages were rarely examined
explicitly. As Fageut (1997 p3) points out, “Before boarding the decentralisation train, it would seem
prudent  to  establish  stronger  reasons  for  embracing  it  than  the  fact  that  it  is  the  opposite  of  a
11 Conyers is writing about decentralisation in Kenya's 1983 “district focus” plan.  Decentralisation was used as
a tool by many central governments in Africa at this time.  
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previous, failed strategy.” 
Some scholars argued in favour of  this application of  decentralisation on the basis that  in
large, centralised states that lacked capacity, many services had been locally managed by default in
areas  far  from  the  capital  (Alfonso,  1999).   Shaping  policies  to  reflect  this  reality  could  offer
institutional support to these local management institutions. It is important to point out, however, that
this  is  the  cause of  many power  struggles  on the local  level.   In  Mali,  services  that  the  central
government  had  neglected  or  been  unable  to  provide  were  under  the  default  jurisdiction  of
“traditional” authorities.  These authorities constitute part of the complex and dynamic political scene
that constitutes contemporary Mali.  Associations based on age, gender, or profession, village chiefs,
religious leaders, workers unions, private businesses, family members who emigrated to find cash
labour, and civil society organisations and NGOs all play a role in service provision, and vary greatly
in their efficiency, power, and the democraticness of their makeup. By “decentralising,” powers that
were previously de facto privatised or controlled by traditional authorities were given to newly created
local government authorities.  This led to the governmentalisation of these services, since jurisdiction
for  them  was  effectively  removed  from  other  organisations.   Non-state  authorities  often  rightly
perceive this shift as a government takeover of their powers (Ribot, 2002).  As Ribot simultaneously
points out,  traditional authorities are not inherently democratic,  so nothing in this move inherently
undermines  the  democratic  process.   However,  there  is  a  predictable  power  struggle  that  is
overlooked by the implementors of decentralisation who may not be in a position to recognise the de
facto transfer of powers that took place due to limited government capacity.
Others argued that SAPs strengthened one party governments, and through decentralisation
local institutions that had formerly operated autonomously due to lack of central government capacity
were  penetrated  by  malicious  central  governments  (Conyers,  2001).  Furthermore,  there  is  an
underlying  assumption  that  corruption  and  lack  of  accountability  are  natural  by-products  of
centralism, which is not necessarily backed by evidence (Manor, 1997).  
Regardless of  the practical  advantages or disadvantages,  this articulation of decentralisation
ties it theoretically to the broader process of privatisation and market liberalisation (Platteau, 1995).
With  the  emergence  of  empirical  evidence  demonstrating  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of
decentralisation,  this framing is often criticised by proponents of  decentralisation. Decentralisation
has proved unsuccessful at reducing overall government expenditure, and advocates argue that by
tying it to SAPs, the true benefits decentralisation may offer  are being overlooked (Manor, 1997).
However, it does introduce accountability and transparency, efficiency, and the mobilisation of rural
resources  as  key  goals  of  decentralisation.   It  also  speaks  to  those  who  argue  against
decentralisation  on the  basis  that  it  has  been  poorly  implemented.   The  United  Nations  Capital
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Development Fund (2004 p2) condemningly says that “by the end of the 1970s, it was clear that the
state institutional apparatus for decentralised development had neither promoted participation, nor
promoted any meaningful  economic and social advancement.”  However, this is not necessarily a
reflection of anything inherent to decentralisation.  Rather, one West African survey “could not find
any local government with control over its budget or any with autonomous policy making powers”
(quoted in Oyugi, 2000 p17).  
By the end of the 1980s, there was increasing criticism of President Traore from students and
even civil servants in Bamako as well as in the international community, because he was clearly not
practicing  the  economic  and  political  reform  he  had  long  promised.   Funds  set  aside  for  rural
development  were  either  caught  up  in  struggles  between  different  levels  of  administrative
bureaucracy that inhibited their distribution, or went to fund party offices at local levels rather than
contribute meaningfully to development.  Eventually, even nods in the direction of participation were
abandoned  when  Traore  abolished  the  elected  community  authorities,  and  replaced  them  with
appointed  military  officials.   Decentralisation  was  once  again  used  not  as  a  tool  for  popular
participation, but as a way of consolidating power in the centre and undermining individual rights.
Furthermore,  motions  towards  economic  liberalisation  did  not  correspond  to  better  financial
management  on the part  of  the government.   The CFA was overvalued,  damaging  exports,  and
eventually  even  public  employees were  unpaid,  both  due to  general  economic  deterioration  and
outright corruption by the ruling elite.  
This popular dissatisfaction with Traore's government came to a head in 1991, with widespread
protests and rioting led by students but often supported by government and military officials.  Under
intense pressure, a national conference was held to draft a new constitution.  The inclusiveness of
the national  conference,  its  commitment  to  democratic  principles,  and most  of  all  its  success in
bringing all stakeholders on board in a commitment to move the country forward was a remarkable
success,  and speaks  volumes of  the potential  in  Mali  for  good  governance.   Decentralisation is
enshrined in the constitution, declaring that “all territorial authorities in the Republic of Mali shall be
freely administered by elected bodies (Republique du Mali, translated by SNV 2004).”
This section has primarily used the historical overview of decentralisation in Mali to situate the
current  process  in  a  theoretically  relevant  way.   However,  it  is  important  for  a number  of  other
reasons as well.   As the next section will emphasise,  the political  history of  Mali has a very real
bearing on many aspects of the current decentralisation process.  Many of the challenges this study
found the decentralisation process in Loulouni was facing have roots as deep as the colonial political
systems.  Many of the institutions developed for systematic tax evasion, for example, were clearly a
response to historical economic policies that empoverished the rural areas (Diarrah, 1986).  Similarly,
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much of the lack of legitimacy current local government officials face stems from the frequent rebirth
of decentralisation without real changes in the distribution of powers or resources (Bingen, 1999).
After looking at the contemporary status of the decentralisation process in Mali at the national level,
and keeping in mind the historical context, the next chapter will be in a position to discuss in much
more depth the local governance structures in Loulouni, and how the process of transformation has
taken place.  
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FOR MALI, DEMOCRATIC DECENTRALISATION IS A MATTER OF POLITICAL SURVIVAL.
USAID, 2004
Contemporary Decentralisation in Mali
This  section looks at  the status of  Mali's  decentralisation process at  a national  level.   The
measurements of success of decentralisation (appendix 4) and its theoretical implications  have been
pulled out in the last two chapters.  This chapter will end by looking at how implementation has taken
place  at  the  national  level.   It  will  first  provide  general  information  about  the  powers  and
responsibilities  of  many actors  in  Loulouni.   However,  it  will  also  demonstrate  how some of  the
conclusions drawn from the case of  Loulouni may be applied either to the rest of  the country, or
different contexts more broadly.  Furthermore, an understanding of decentralisation throughout the
country  is  important  for  measuring  the  impact  of  the  humanitarian  influx.   When  Loulouni's
decentralisation process diverges greatly from the national agenda, and such a divergence cannot be
explained by demography, geography, etc.,  the humanitarian influx is then a possible explanatory
factor to be explored when discussing Loulouni.  
The current  decentralisation framework in Mali was established with National Conference in
1991, which readopted the 1960 Constitution's formula for territorial organisation, with local structures
being collectives freely administered through elected councils.  However, while there are structural
similarities,  there  are  also  fundamental  differences  in  the  logic  behind  these  structures.   Earlier
constitutions begin with a commitment to socialism and establishing the Party was the first institution
of the state, while the 1991 Constitution uses a human rights based vocabulary, talking of individual
rights, private property ownership, and freedom of enterprise.  This time, decentralisation is a tool for
the promotion of the development of rural populations, rather than a more ambiguous national good.
In fact, the documentation coming out of the National Conference repeatedly underscores concern
for  the development of  rural areas,  and explicitly links this development to decentralisation.   The
interim President  during  the  Conference,  Abdoulaye Toumani  Toure  (ATT)  gave  a  “State  of  the
Nation” report claiming that “the economic and social crisis which Mali has known for the last thirty
years has been felt most heavily by the rural populations.”  Furthermore, he advocates a “policy of
decentralisation” to ameliorate the situation (Diarrah, 1991, translated by Rawson in Bingen).  
Decentralisation reforms swept across West  Africa in the 1990s, but  the reform in Mali has
been unique.  It has demonstrated a strong political decentralisation, rather than approaching it as a
technical exercise in administrative reform to please donors (SNV, 2004).  Emphasis has been placed
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on involving the community in decision making (and to a lesser extent resource mobilisation), and
enforcing accountability to the population.  Community empowerment has been a key goal  of  this
framing  of  decentralisation,  and  in  practice  has  been  coupled  with  emphasising  government
responsiveness  to  the  community,  downward  accountability,  and  transparency  (Balogun,  2000;
Sharma, 2000).
Recent critics of this decentralisation literature have called into question whether or not locally
accountable  representation  necessarily  means  equitable  representation  in  heterogeneous
communities  (Nejhuis,  2003).  Basically,  in  an effort  to  apply  democracy to  rural  areas lacking  a
history of democratic participation, there is a risk that power will be given to the majority (desirable in
a  place where  the  entire  rural  majority  has a history  of  disempowerment),  but  without  adequate
considerations  for  minority  protection.  Even more  dangerously,  power could  be given to  the few
speaking for,  but not necessarily acting in the best interests of  the majority.   Somebody may be
empowered by democratic decentralisation,  but it is likely not the heterogeneous community as a
whole.
While decentralisation was central to Mali's development agenda, it was simultaneously brought
to the country to respond to a different need. It was seen by many African countries as a political tool
capable of  enhancing political stability and strengthening democratic institutions at  the grassroots
level in countries facing instability from separatist  movements or ethnic tensions.  Colonialism left
many countries with a legacy of  politicised ethnicity,  and while there was an initial  optimism that
socialism could promote unity, the hopes quickly faded. Years later, decentralisation was seen as a
way to  promote  unity  in  the  face  of  occasionally  hostile  diversity.  Giving  local  populations  more
autonomy was an attractive way of avoiding any political tension ethnic diversity could cause (Ribot,
2002). 
Since independence, the majority of Mali has enjoyed a remarkably low level of ethnic tension.
The one exception to this rule is the Tuareg separatist movement in the North of the country. Sharing
a different history from the sub-Saharan citizens of Mali, and lacking the access to services sedentary
citizens in the South enjoyed,  Tuaregs had long opposed the central  government,  and in 1990s,
fighting broke out in the north of the country. In 1992 a peace deal was brokered that was widely
heralded as brilliant diplomacy from both the government and Tuareg separatists. The peace deal
was based around allowing greater autonomy to the north in a large part through the implementation
of decentralisation that had been provided for in theory before, but never implemented. This peace
agreement began concretely defining elements of decentralisation.   While the actual devolution of
authority was slowed by those with vested interests in the south, the agreement makes the “regional
autonomy” articulation of decentralisation crucial to Mali, as it was one of the driving forces behind
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implementing  decentralisation  in  practice,  and  is  the  basis  for  much  of  the  Mali-specific
decentralisation literature and policy. 
This  articulation  of  decentralisation  is  somewhat  less  reactionary  than  those  previously
discussed.  In  Mali,  it  has  been  applied  to  solve  a  problem of  regional  tensions,  while  previous
articulations simply applied decentralisation to solve problems caused by a highly centralised system
of government. This articulation introduces more democratically oriented goals of decentralisation,
stemming  from  allowing  local  authorities  powers  of  resource  distribution.   This  connects
decentralisation to the government's responsiveness to the community, collective grassroots action,
and the nature of the relationship between citizens and government officials.  It introduces the idea of
political  participation and ownership of  political  power as a right;  this rights  based approach was
conspicuously absent from discussions of governance in Mali before the 1990s.  
The current decentralisation process in Mali, while stemming from this regional autonomy, rights
based root, is now responding to a different political context.  Providing a higher level of autonomy for
the  troubled  northern  region  through  decentralisation  was  seen  as  an  overall  win-win  situation.
Implementing  this  strategy  was  stalled  by  the  fact  that  it  implied  the  implementation  of
decentralisation in the rest  of  the country  as well.   In  the more  densely populated,  resource-rich
south,  there  were  far  more  vested  interests  in  holding  onto  power  by  upwardly  accountable
authorities.   
When  decentralisation's  focus  shifted  from  peace-making  in  the  North  of  the  country  to
economic and social development in the South, the architects were faced with a far more complex
task  than  they  initially  imagined.   The  five  years  from  1994-1999  were  spent  eliciting  public
commitment to the process, drafting legislation, collecting data, conducting outreach programs, and
culminating finally in local elections.  The first steps of implementation, in the context of the  Pacte
National with the north, were taken as defining the initial parameters of decentralised governance.  It
was problematic,  however,  in that  it  came with precise timelines  that  were not  matched by clear
legislation.  The result was that concrete definition and implementation of the guarantees had to await
yet another round of debate.  
The National Council was clear about its commitment to genuine democratic decentralisation,
but  that is as far  as the clarity went - seven years of legislating began to offer  substance to the
Constitution's  stated decentralisation.  Slowly, laws have been filling out  a practical  framework of
decentralisation.  The first National Assembly bill established that “the Region, the District of Bamako,
the Cercle and the urban and rural commune are endowed with a corporate personality and financial
autonomy (quoted in Rawson, in Bingen 1999).”  Later legislation determined that collectives have a
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set of responsibilities for the conception, programming, and implementation of social, economic and
cultural  development  in  a  manner  that  will  be  established  by  subsequent  law.   However,  State
oversight  when  necessary  and  appropriate  was  also  provided  for,  meaning  that  tutelle,  while
envisioned as more limited in scope than before, has not been eliminated.  Most importantly, it was
legislated that the state is to pass down the resources, means, and assets necessary for the exercise
of those responsibilities.  
The  first  step  in  this  olympian  process  of  implementation  was  to  define  the  decentralised
territories, now called communes.  Beginning in 1993, the government began an ambitious plan to
wipe the cercles and arrondissements from the map, since they were linked to the predatory regimes
of  the past,  and entirely redraw the administrative lines in the country.   Village councils including
traditional leaders, women’s groups, heads of associations and other stakeholders were called on to
form their own political associations with surrounding villages based on various criteria presented by
the decentralisation  mission,  such as collective will,  shared  resources,  geographic  cohesion,  and
most importantly, economic viability.  The eventual result  of  this process was the creation of  703
communes.  These communes were to be governed by elected mayors and municipal councils, which
were voted on and therefore effectively established between 1998 and 2000.  However, much work
remains in consolidating these communes as effective political  entities,  and they lack  capacity in
almost every sphere of functionality.  One donor report says “these new local government structures
face an uphill task in learning how to carry out their duties, clarify their mandates, and find resources,”
(Toulmin, 2000).  
Subsequent  legislation  has  gone  on  to  make  substantial  progress  in  defining  how
decentralised structures  will  operate  in Mali.   While  a comprehensive review of  this  legislation is
beyond the scope of this paper,12 an outline of the most central structures will be given to provide
contextualisation for understanding the functioning of the commune of Loulouni.  The  Haut Conseil
des Collectivites Territoriales is the highest authority of decentralisation, and is responsible both for
representing the interests  of  regions and communes in the decentralisation process at  a national
level, and offering advice on the decentralisation process to regional and communal authorities.  A
commune is primarily run by a mayor and communal council,  all  of  whom are directly elected by
universal  suffrage.   The size of  the council  is dependent on the population of  the commune, but
ranges from 10-40 people.  The mayor can appoint a certain number of aides (2-5, again depending
on  the  population),  subject  to  the  approval  of  the  council.   The  mayor  and  council  are  jointly
responsible for most political and administrative activities in the commune, included developing the
12 But available through the Mission de Decentralisation, 1997, updated 2005.  
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budget, maintaining the registry, collecting taxes, and providing services.  
The  sous prefet is the representative of the central government at the commune level.  He is
appointed  and  upwardly  accountable.   Before  2000,  he  performed  virtually  all  the  duties  now
belonging to the mayor and council, and the extent of his involvement now varies substantially by
commune.  With the responsibility for most activities resting now with the council, the primary role of
sous prefets now is that of  tutelle, which usually manifests itself either as an advisory role, offering
assistance with various procedures, or supervisory, ensuring that the mayor and council are operating
within the law.  Separate bodies of  tutelle are specific to certain activities; for example, a regional
treasury is responsible for oversight of communal budgets.  
The decentralisation of  public services is one of  the most  concrete and crucial  changes,  as
service  provision  in  rural  areas  goes  to  the  heart  of  decentralisation's  development  goals.
Unsurprisingly,  different  sectors  have  achieved  very  different  levels  of  success  implementing
decentralisation due to the different  nature of  the service being provided, as well as the different
ministerial  and budgetary structures  of  the service sector  before  decentralisation.   Generally,  the
water sector has made a great deal of progress in transferring powers, while education and health
have both come up against several obstacles decentralising.  Service provision will be discussed at
more length in a later section as it relates to Loulouni specifically.  
Finally, it is often argued that “decentralisation of territorial authority is fundamentally a question
of  land (Rawson in  Bingen,  1999).”   At  the  heart  of  the  issues of  decentralising  land  is  natural
resource management policy.  All land belonged to the state both under colonial law and the socialist
regimes that followed, and it is clear that with decentralisation, this demands redefinition.  The debate
about  the  form new natural  resource  management  structures  will  take  is  dominating  the  current
debate on decentralisation, and is far from legislative clarity.  The extent to which decentralisation has
not yet tackled the critical domain of natural resource management is clear in an SNV report on its
activities  to  support  the  decentralisation  process,  particularly  in  the  domain  of  natural  resource
management.
According  to  the  law,  the  central  State  will  transfer  some  of  its
domains to the local government authorities.  No precise plan has
yet been worked out, as questions relating to exactly what is to be
transferred, at what level, at what pace and on what conditions have
still  not  been settled.   There  is no clear  vision or  shared position
amongst  the  main  stakeholders,  whether  technical  departments,
local government authorities or village structures about the process
of transferring and managing this 'natural heritage.'  Many different
interests,  forces  and powers coexist  in  the  rural  environment  and
controlling access to land and natural resources is vitally important
(SNV, 2004).  
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While the National Conference was provoked by deeply rooted civil society uprisings, external
and international factors in decentralisation still remain very important to the process, and this may be
most  clear  in  the  debate  on  natural  resource  management.   Since  the  National  Conference,  a
substantial  amount  of  decentralisation  related  activities  have  been  led  by  the  “international
development industry” featuring bilateral and multilateral aid agencies and NGOs. 
Natural  resource management  has been a focus of  international donor  involvement,  in part
because  even  before  decentralisation,  rural  resource  mobilisation  has  been  seen  as  a  key  to
development in Mali, and as such, many international donor activities had already been interacting
with rural extension or other aspects relating to natural resource management.  It is also an area that
is particularly contentious in the context of political decentralisation, since lack of capacity or interest
on the part  of  past regimes has meant  that  most  land has been  de facto under local customary
control, subject to various combinations of traditional and religious law.  Because of this, any authority
local governments are granted on these matters are seen as an appropriation of  authority by the
government  rather  than a transfer  of  authority  from the central  state  to  citizens via elected local
authorities.  At the same time, it is clear that commune authorities must have a clearly defined role in
natural resource management, both because it is central to the economic life of the commune and
because it defines so many other relationships and resources over which the local government does
have authority.  
Finally,  control  over natural  resources  in rural  Mali  amounts  to  economic  control,  making  a
focus on the decentralisation of natural resource management central to political transformation.  As
these changes are underpinned by a human rights discourse that emphasises individual economic
rights, natural resource management is seen as the key to rural empowerment, and inexorably linked
to other democratic political and social changes.  
Many  questions  about  the  implementation  of  decentralisation  have  been  answered  by
legislation,  and thus  far,  legislation  has underscored  the commitment  of  the  government  fully  to
implement  true  political  decentralisation.  However,  it  has  not  yet  filled  the  gaps  necessary  for
effective decentralised governance to be practiced on the ground.  Remaining questions are primarily
in  two  categories.   First  is  the  extent  to  which  systems  of  tutelle could  undermine  political
decentralisation.   Real  powers  have  been  vested  in  local  elected  bodies,  but  at  the  same time
legislation provides for oversight by State authorities in several important ways.  While instituting a
system  of  checks  and  balances  to  ensure  that  local  governments  cannot  act  with  impunity  is
desirable, it is still unclear whether the institutions being set up in Mali will serve that function, or will
be abused by central state authorities to reclaim decision making powers theoretically belonging to
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local governments.  Secondly, exactly which “resources, means and assets” will be passed down to
whom is still very much a matter of discussion, and has tremendous implications for the shape and
capacity  of  decentralised  governance.   MATCL  (Ministrere  de  l'administration  territoriale  et  des
collectivites  locales)  set  up  a  working  group  in  2000  to  answer  questions  about  what  resources
should  be  devolved  to  whom,  and  how.   Some  decisions  taken  by  the  working  group  were
aggressively pro-decentralisation, such as the proposition that the State not only transfer financial
resources to communes, but also staff and equipment.  When it came to specifics, however, it is clear
that the door has been left open for abuse by the State.  The working group concluded that because
it  was difficult  to  assess precisely what  amounts  needed to  be transferred to which levels,  each
department  should  be  asked  to  indicate  the  share  of  its  budget  it  was  ready  to  put  towards
appropriation by local authorities.  The mayor of Loulouni pointed out that that was “akin to asking a
cow to indicate which one of its legs should go into the farmer's stew (Interview, 11 June, 2006),” and
makes it unsurprising that local governments are still waiting for promised resources.  
As a final  note, lest these laborious details of the Malian political system seem irrelevant to
broader issues of governance and political transformation, a passage from Whitaker (2002, p340)
describes the political and economic situation in which Tanzania was a refugee hosting community.  
The refugees arrived in Tanzania during a period of transition.  After
nearly thirty years of one-party state socialism, the government was
moving hesitantly along a path of liberalisation that included a shift
toward  capitalist  development  and  the  adoption  of  a  multiparty
system.  The implementation of an economic reform package since
1986 was finally producing results,  with price incentives shifting in
favour of agriculture and per capita income once again increasing.
Still,  adjustment  carried  with  it  inevitable  difficulties,  including  a
decline  in  government  investment  in  social  services,  growth  that
favoured  some  Tanzanians  more  than  others,  and  increasing
dependence on assistance from foreign  donors  (Barkan 1994).  In
western Tanzania, as it will appear, these patterns were to become
further  complicated  by  the  massive  influx  of  refugees  and  relief
resources.
Replacing 'Tanzania'  with 'Mali'  leaves us with a surprisingly  similar  account  of  the political
context in Mali in 2001, when the Ivorian refugees arrived.  The lesson here is two fold.  First, that
refugees are not coming from a complex political conflict and walking into a void, but rather entering
a community that also has a history, with all of the role players and power relations that that provides.
Secondly, the global economic system is characterised by certain political and economic dynamics
that cannot be divorced from refugee creating environments, and this is  often experienced similarly
by different countries.  Much of sub Saharan Africa has a similar history within this economic system,
and as  a  result,  the  interactions  between forced migration  and state  transformation  share many
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features.  This allows for a case study that initially seems limited in scope to find resonance beyond
its specific geographical area.  
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Actors
This  historical  decentralisation  context  has  converged  with  a  history  of  migration  and the
recent  refugee influx  to  create  the situation we now see in Loulouni.   Well  before  the arrival  of
refugees, the political landscape in Loulouni was already a complex one, with many actors exercising
often overlapping powers based on different histories of access to resources, legitimacy, etc.   The
mayor  and  sous  prefet  and  their  respective  roles  have been discussed  in  the  previous  section.
However, there are also traditional leaders, women's associations, village associations, technical line
ministry officials, NGOs, and the private sector, among others.  While Loulouni as a whole does not
have a democratic history, some of these institutions function in democratic ways, which affects the
creation of accountability structures. Understanding the mandates of all of these actors, as well as
how  they  relate  to  each  other,  and  to  local  government  is  necessary  both  to  see  why  the
decentralisation process is taking place the way it is, and to see how interaction with the refugee
community occurs.  
All of these actors have some form of political power, but they differ substantially in terms of
legitimacy,  degree  of  democratic  decision  making,  mandate,  etc.   Traditional  leaders  are  a
particularly interesting case in the Malian political landscape, as they have been moved back and
forth from the formal to the informal by different governing powers.  In many ways, they epitomise the
ambiguity  of  roles  that  characterises  the  decentralised  political  landscape  in  Mali  today.   Under
colonialism, village chiefs were formally recognised,  very much at the exclusion of other authority
figures, such as religious leaders,  griots, hunters, etc.  However, this was mostly done out of the
hope that they would be seen by the population as 'legitimate,' therefore contributing to the legitimacy
of the colonial regime, all while providing important tax collection and other services.  In terms of real
decision  making  power,  they  were  at  various  times  given  a  wide  reign,  to  prevent  the  colonial
authorities from needing to deal with “local issues,” and at other times undermined, such as when
forced labour became a central economic policy. The affect of colonialism on traditional authority is a
well  documented  phenomenon,  and  fundamentally  changed  power  dynamics  in  rural  Mali.   The
result, as Ole Therkildsen (1993, p87) says, is that “traditional political authorities have often been
viewed as the extended arm of the state in the locality, and usually regarded as inefficient, corrupt,
undemocratic and excluding of women.”
Another result is that it very much limited any 'staticness' that existed in authority roles in the
past.  First of all, the French often recognised as “chiefs” individuals with no local legitimacy.  Cooks
in the colonial regimes, or even escaped slaves could be made chiefs over villages they had never
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visited.  A sign of the extent to which power roles had been muddled was visible in the 1950s, when a
group of village chiefs declared themselves to be a trade union (Cooper, 1996).  
The  Keita  and subsequent  Traore  regimes  excluded chiefs  from  their  political  structures,
creating their own parallel village level political institutions.  However, village chiefs continued to be
the  principle  authority  in  most  villages,  and  their  relationship  with  these  new  institutions  varied
tremendously.   Under  decentralisation,  village  chiefs  continue  to  have  a  rather  ambiguous
relationship  to  formal  government  structures,  and the  village  level  political  organisations  created
under Keita and Traore also continue to operate with some unclear level of formalness.  
Throughout the decentralisation initiative, as with other political transitions in Mali, there has
been a tendency to create new political structures rather than transform previously existing ones.  For
example, under previous socialist regimes, education initiatives at the village level were delegated to
the Parent Teacher's Association (PTA).  Widespread dissatisfaction with this has led to the creation
of  another  organisation – the  School  Management  Committee  (SMC).   This  was created  by the
Pedagogical Advisory Commission, a cercle level duplicate of another education organisation created
by Traore.  None of the previous organisations were disbanded.  Instead, yet another organisation
was created to build partnerships and cooperation between the PTA and the SMC.  Grauze (2004)
points out that while their mandates may be clearly separated on paper, in reality this is not the case.
This has led to immobilising power struggles between the two organisations in the case of Loulouni,
where neither function.  In the case of Sieouba, a nearby village, membership in both organisations
was the same, causing frustration, as the amount of time spent in meetings with extension agents
has effectively doubled with no change in capacity.  Similar situations characterise other technical line
ministries.  
Occasionally  these  administrative  changes  are  well  thought  through  on  paper,  but  their
implementation is a completely different story.  There is now a formalised structure for the selection
of village chiefs – they are selected from a village council, which is elected by universal suffrage for a
period of five years.  The list of candidates, however, is selected by an appointed state administrator
at the  cercle level (Republique du Mali, 1995).  Ribot (2002) argues that this leaves village chiefs
largely as appointees of the central government.  This legislation seems to have confused more than
it clarified. Not a single village in the commune of Loulouni had actually carried out such elections,
and every chief was expected to hold the role for his (and it always was a man) entire life.  However,
due to extension agents  and the commune council  having explained the election process,  many
villages were left not without a chief, but with more than one.  For example, one chief would be the
man nominated by the village association, another would be the customary chief (son or nephew of
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the previous chief), and yet a third would be the oldest man in the village.  
As a result,  it  is largely left  to the discretion  of  the  mayor  whether  or not  he chooses to
recognise the village chief as a legitimate, formal political authority or not; even if he chooses to, it is
largely only for advisory purposes.  However, international development agencies doing work “in the
field” nearly always work through village chiefs to establish ties at the village level.  
Essentially, leaders at the village level in many spheres in Mali today largely have legitimacy
based  only  on  the  merit  of  the  individual.   They  are  not,  in  any  meaningful  political  sense,
representative of the local population, although they may act in their interests.  There has been no
meaningful  bureaucratisation  of  the position they hold,  although  there are various  flexible norms
about  different  leadership  positions.   They are  largely seen by central  government  workers  as a
hindrance  to  decentralisation,  because  many  of  the  powers  vested  in  the  mayor,  particularly
regarding natural resource management, were formerly the domain of these village level authorities.
However, because of their continued influence and power at the village level, no actors are willing to
dismiss working with them.  Ribot (2002, p25) sums up the ambiguity of the role of village chiefs by
pointing  out  that  vesting  powers  in  Malian  village  chiefs  could  be  seen  simultaneously  as
centralisation,  if  they  are  to  viewed as an auxiliary  of  the  state  based on the  electoral  process,
decentralisation, if  they are viewed as acting in the interests of the local population as an elected
official, or privatisation, if they are seen as an independent local actor.  
Civil  society  organisations,  however,  are  seen  as  a  pillar  of  decentralisation,  having  the
capacity  and interest  to  hold  elected  authorities  to  accountability,  as  well  as  to  speak  for  large
segments  of  the  village  population.   John  Davis  (in  Bingen,  1999)  took  various  indicators  of
democratic  procedures  and  applied  them  to  civil  society  organisations  in  Mali,  including  village
associations, women's groups, and organisations of hunters.  These organisations are seen by the
international  donor  community  as  the  building  blocks  for  democracy.   For  example,  USAID,  the
leading  funder  in  the  democratic  governance  branch  of  the  decentralisation  process,  had  the
promotion of capacity building among these organisations as the sole focus of its program in the year
Davis  wrote  the  article,  and  it  has  remained  a  central  focus  of  the  program  since.   For  each
organisation,  Davis looked at  factors  such as whether  membership  was ascriptive or  mandatory,
whether leadership selection was inclusive and systematic, whether decisions were autonomous from
outside control, etc., and then looked not only at whether these democratic structures were in place,
but whether democratic values were fostered among members and leaders by these structures.  
What he found is that civil society organisations are not necessarily, as Tocqueville proposed,
“classrooms of democracy.”  In fact, he did not find a high level of inclusiveness in decision making or
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leadership selection in a single one of the associations.  While this will come as no surprise to those
who have long said NGOs do not  necessarily work in democratic or  accountable ways,13 it  does
demand questioning the  validity of  including  these organisations  as central  role  players  in newly
democratic  institutions.   Davis  argues  that  civil  society  is  growing  rapidly  in  the  direction  of
accountability and inclusiveness, meaning the continued support for  civil society institutions is not
unwarranted.   He continues to  argue,  however,  that  because the  rapid  evolution  of  civil  society
institutions towards democratic practices is not yet complete, they are currently unable to play the
role of a counter-weight to the state.  
Another factor worth mentioning for an understanding of the political actors at the local level is
that  they are not  mutually exclusive.  While different organisations tend to attract individuals with
different  profiles,  it  is  not  unusual  for  one individual to  fulfil  many roles in different  organisations
simultaneously.   Particularly  due to  widespread  illiteracy,  it  would  not  be  unusual  to  find  a  well
educated member of the community be the secretary of the village association, the president of the
school board, a member of the commune council, and the vice-president of the youth association.
Elected officials also tend to maintain their functions in other organisations, be they with associations,
private businesses, etc.  It was admitted in an interview (anonymous, 8 April, 2006) that:
sometimes,  it  causes  problems  having  people  in  the  commune
council who also have allegiances in other organisations.  Now it is
not  so serious,  because we rarely have funding for  tenders.   But
when we do, it is difficult.   First,  we all  say that  we can separate
these things from what is best from the commune.  But can we all
the time?  And the second problem is what people will say.  Even if
we act in the best way possible, not everyone will see it that way.
There are always people who are looking for the worst.  But we can't
ask people to drop everything because they have been elected.  The
commune  would  suffer.   First  of  all,  it  is  not  always  possible  to
replace these people.  They are leaders, and not just anyone can do
the work they do.  And secondly, we don't have such a big budget.
Sometimes  councillors  have to  go  for  months  without  being  paid.
We cannot tell them not to cultivate with the village, or to quit finding
small ways to support their families.  
It  is  to  this  complex and ambiguous landscape that  people fled  from the  fighting  in  Cote
d'Ivoire.  In relief efforts,  there are numerous actors working with significantly different mandates,
goals, capacities, etc., and Loulouni was no exception.  While causing damage to the host population
is unlikely to  be a goal  of  any of  these organisations,  ensuring that  this  does not  happen while
carrying out their primary functions is also unlikely to be within their capacity and scope.  There are
countless stories of  problems caused within host  populations because resources are provided to
13 For a discussion on the accountability challenges faced by NGOs, visit the website of the Accountability
charter at www.iangocharter.org  
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refugee  communities  while  hosts  are  neglected  due  to  resource  constraints  (Kibreab,  1996;
Chambers, 1993).  
Relief related actors, like those already in Loulouni, are involved in complex relationships and
do not always have clearly defined mandates.  The crisis committees at the various territorial levels,
for example, were coordination mechanisms to bring all relevant actors together.  At the local level,
however, the crisis committee acted as a decision making body with the sous prefet having exclusive
decision making powers.  With all other actors simply playing advisory roles, the crisis committee can
be seen as an upwardly accountable extension of the central government.  Relief organisations such
as the  Red Cross  and  UNICEF played an  advisory role  on  the  crisis  committee  and  served as
independent service providers, but were constrained by mandates that would not let them act without
approval from both their central  offices and the central government (or at  least the regional crisis
committee).  
The camp manager was a member of the crisis committee, but also acted with a great deal of
autonomy.  While he did not have the mandate to partner directly with service providers without the
approval of government officials, this was largely a formality on the local level, as the sous prefet's
mandate regarding the relief effort was essentially to support the camp manager in all ways.  This
kind of circular system of mandates and power is one that decentralisation theorists warn against as
an easy way to short-cut democratic processes (Ribot, 1999, Prud'homme, 2000). While this was not
necessarily caused by the influx of refugees, the increase of resources and diversity of new powers
that accompanied them certainly created the environment that facilitated the opportuntiy for such a
system to develop.  
This chapter has provided many contextual factors shaping the decentralisation process in
Loulouni,  and introduced the ways in which migration could be shaping both the context and the
process of decentralisation itself.  According to Manor's criteria of the contextual factors helpful to the
decentralisation  process,  Loulouni's  demographic,  geographic,  and  economic  landscape  did  not
make it  a particularly  promising  candidate.   The limited communication and service development
infrastructure is certainly a limiting factor by Manor's international criteria, as is the lack of democratic
experience.  However, putting Loulouni in the context of Mali makes the picture significantly more
promising.  While Mali has not uniformly reaped the benefits promised by decentralisation, on the
whole the transformation in governance has demonstrated many successes, and Loulouni has more
contextual indicators of success than many other parts of the country.  
While  discussing  the  potential  for  decentralisation,  special  mention  should  be  made  of
accountability  structures,  for  two  reasons.   First,  many  decentralisation  theorists  (Manor,  1998;
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Fageut, 1999, Alfonso, 1999) have emphasised clear and effective accountability mechanisms as the
single most important factor in determining the success of decentralisation.  Additionally, this study
has found that  this  is the area migration,  and the refugee influx in particular,  has had the most
impact.   As mentioned at  the beginning of  this  chapter,  the history  of  labour  migration  between
southern  Mali and Cote d'Ivoire played a central  role in shaping the relationship between Malian
citizens, Ivorian citizens, and local government authorities in Mali.  The system of taxation and forced
labor  created  a  high  level  of  vertical  integration  in  the  governance  structures,  particularly  for
economic matters in the form of the  unite de caisse system that decentralisation has struggled to
change.   While  political  decentralisation  has  attempted  to  redistribute  powers,  economic
centralisation has pulled against meaningful change.  In certain circumstances as discussed in this
chapter, it has simply meant the creation of parallel structures at a local level.  Through a delicate
period of negotiation over the past five years, local officials have worked out a balance of powers in
this complicated and occasionaly contradictory environment. 
 A further consequence of Mali's history of state oppression is the precedent of an exploitative
relationship  between  citizens  and  local  government  authorities.   While  decentralisation  aims  to
change this relationship, many of civil society's responses to the oppressive system have remained in
place, further complicating accountability structures. For example, systematic tax evasion as a form
of  protest  led to the creation of  a parallel,  privitised and highly formalised village level system of
money sharing for public service work.  Because a great deal of service provision in Mali has been in
the hands of civil society, decentralisation has struggled with the role of civil society.  On one hand,
there  is  a  push  to  rebuild  the  traditional  accountability  structures  of  civil  society  holding  local
government accountable for public service provision.  However, this same push to strengthen civil
society has undermined the very accountability structures it aims to reinforce.  This is because efforts
that support civil society simultaneously support the service provision for which civil society claimed
responsibility.  This undermines support for the form of decentralisation that would have civil society
holding local government to account for service provision.  
This study has found that the introduction of the refugee camp in Loulouni changed the scene
in which decentralisation unrolled in a number of ways.  The argument will be outlined here in some
detail,  and then expanded on and substantiated  in the subsequent  chapters.   On one hand, the
arrival  of  refugees  helped  to  rebuild  the  relationship  of  trust  between  civil  society  and  local
government authorities by reestablishing, to some degree, accountability structures.  This happened
because  the  requirements  of  civil  society  changed  with  the  introduction  of  resources  from
humanitarian agencies,  from resources for  service provision to conflict  management.   Before the
62
Caitlin Blaser 1 September 2007
influx, citizens were demanding the provision of infrastructure and services from local government
officals, who did not have the resources to deliver.  Citizens were not paying taxes, and much service
delivery was being done by the voters directly.  This was seriously undermining the legitimacy of the
decentralisation process.  
When  refugees  arrived,  and  humanitarian  organisations  supplied  certain  resources  and
services, the demands of the citizens of Loulouni suddenly changed.  Rather than demanding local
government supply goods and services, residences were demanding that the government negotiate
their access to the goods and services brought by the humanitarian agencies.  Local government was
better  prepared  to  provide  conflict  management  services  than  resources,  due  to  the  resource
limitations described earlier in the chapter.  
While the arrival of the refugees helped build the relationship between the citizens and local
government authorities, it aggrevated conflicts between different local government officials.  Just as
the  redistribution  of  powers  between  the  mayor  and  the  sous  prefet had  been  painstakingly
hammered out, the arrival of refugees introduced new resources, and with them came new powers
and responsibilities.  The poorly systematised allocation of these new powers undermined the shift
from  upwardly  to  downwardly  accountable  officials.   This  argument  will  be  developed  and
substantiated in the upcoming chapters which will discuss the process of decentralisation in Loulouni
in detail.  
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DECENTRALISATION IS OFTEN TALKED OF, DESIGNED AND EVEN IMPLEMENTED AS A 
KIND OF THEATRICAL PERFORMANCE FOR DONORS, PRODUCING AN ELABORATE IMAGE 
BUT NOT A CHANGE IN POWER DISTRIBUTION.  SUCH PERFORMANCES CAN INVOLVE, 
FOR EXAMPLE, DOWNWARD TRANSFERS THROUGH ONE NEW LAW BUT RECENTRALISATION 
THROUGH ANOTHER, AS IN THE CASE OF MALI, WHERE THE TRANSFER IS WELL 
CRAFTED BUT NEW STRUCTURES OF TUTELLE ARE BEING BUILT THAT COULD RETURN 
TO CENTRAL AUTHORITIES CONTROL OVER APPROVAL OF EVERY DECISION.  
RIBOT, 2002
IMPLEMENTING DECENTRALISED LOCAL GOVERNANCE: 
A TREACHEROUS ROAD WITH POTHOLES, DETOURS AND ROAD CLOSURES
SHAH AND THOMPSON, 2004
3. Decentralisation in Loulouni: 
Presenting the Data
The decentralisation process in Loulouni shares many of the successes and challenges of the
decentralisation  process  nationally.   For  example,  the  lack  of  clear  legislation  regarding  the
decentralisation  of  resources  remains  a  roadblock  to  effective  local  governance  in  Loulouni.
However,  there  are  certain  trends  in  Loulouni  that  are  clearly  not  in  line  with  the  national
decentralisation process.  This chapter will particularly pick up on these unique aspects.  Loulouni
does  have  specific  economic  and  geographic  characteristics,  personal  dynamics  between  local
officials, etc.  that are important in shaping the decentralisation process.  These will be accounted for
in the following chapter.  In situations where neither these characteristics nor national trends explain
how decentralisation is unfolding, the refugee influx is an additional feature that could be influencing
the process.  This will be explored in more detail in coming chapters.  
The first section of this chapter will describe local governance structures in Loulouni, and the
relationship  the  community  has to  them.   The  existence of  various public  offices  was explained
generally in the last section, and this information will now be concretised, by looking specifically at
which powers belong to which offices, how they are exercised in practice, and the implications this
has  for  the  residents  of  Loulouni.   Residents  of  Loulouni  are  overwhelmingly  positive about  the
relationship they have with the mayor and commune council, a change heralded by decentralisation.
However,  they are less positive about  the capacity of  this  governing body to act  as an agent  of
development.  They also remain sceptical about the ability or willingness of the sous prefet to act in
their interests.  
The next section looks specifically at the accountability and transparency of local government.
It is clear that these concepts still lack saliency in Loulouni.  Respondents clearly feel the mayor's
office acts with a degree of transparency that is lacking from the sous prefet, but perhaps more to the
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point, many people problematise the idea of accountability in a place without democratic traditions or
a well educated population.  
The  fiscal  elements  of  decentralisation  are  then  taken  up  in  Loulouni.    Most  notably,
important  fiscal  considerations,  like  the  payment  of  taxes  by  citizens,  are  an  indication  of  the
successes and failures of decentralisation in Loulouni.  Some people cite the government's lack of
capacity to deliver services as the reason for their nonpayment of taxes; the government, of course,
cites the nonpayment of taxes as the reason for their lack of capacity to deliver services.  It is here
that both the national and historical decentralisation processes are felt most clearly in Loulouni.
The final section of this chapter deals with service provision.  Drawing from both empirical
evidence and interviews with employees of the relevant line ministries, this section looks at the extent
to which decentralisation has been achieved in each service sector, and why.  Sectors have achieved
widely  differing  levels  of  decentralisation,  largely  due  to  the  functioning  of  national-level  line
ministries.  Understanding this process, however, will be important for the discussion in the following
chapter about access to services and allocation of public resources in a refugee context.  
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Local government and governance structures
Decentralisation  has  featured  prominently  in  Loulouni's  development  plan  since  1999.
Loulouni was chosen as a pilot commune for decentralisation in Sikasso, and as such, held mayoral
and council elections in 1999 (whereas other communes observed the elections in Loulouni and other
pilot communes, and held their own in 2000).  Many concrete steps have been taken to implement
the national decentralisation strategy, particularly on an administrative level.  Since the mayor and
communal council have been installed, many powers have been devolved to them.  The responsibility
for service provision and planning (for example, formulating the budget and plan de developpement)
as well as tax collection have been passed from the sous prefet's office to that of the mayor.  Registry
functions are shared between the two offices, with the mayor issueing ID cards and birth certificates,
while  the  sous  prefet issueing  marriage  licences  and  various  permits,  such  as  motorcycle
registrations, and also holding the commune's archives. 
 This  localisation  of  registry  functions  was  widely  applauded  by  those  surveyed.   It  was
mentioned by sixty-eight respondents as a positive element of decentralisation, both by supporters of
decentralisation and those who had an overall negative view of the process.  Before decentralisation,
most routine registry functions had to be done in Sikasso.  Of the survey respondents, only sixty
percent had ever been to Sikasso before, indicating that it is quite a journey for routine activities such
as renewing an expired ID card, or registering a marriage.  As one chauffeur explained in an informal
discussion, 
Before if I wanted to register my car, it had to be done in Bamako.
And the registration would expire every year.  I can't go to Bamako
every year, and if my registration is outdated I have to pay double at
every  checkpoint.   Now,  I  can  register  it  in  Sikasso.   It  is  still
expensive  to  keep  the  registration  up  to  date,  but  at  least  it  is
possible.  Before it was impossible.
Since 1999, there have been two new sous prefets and one mayoral election, held in 2005.
While  initially  there  was a great  deal  of  tension between the mayor  and the  sous prefet,  largely
attributed to a lack of clarity of roles, with each individual turnover, this has decreased.  Now both the
mayor and  sous prefet report a generally cooperative relationship between them.  While they both
indicate a current clarity of roles in carrying out their day-to-day tasks, they also both expressed an
uncertainty in how future legislative developments in Bamako will change this.  Just a small amount
of  reading between the lines,  however,  indicates that  this lack of  articulation of  tension does not
mean  that  the  tension  is  entirely  absent.   Numerous  trainings  conducted  by  NGOs  and  the
government for mayors and  sous prefets have addressed a naturally contentious relationship, and
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there has been a great deal of emphasis on reframing the relationship as a cooperative one.  The
sous prefet largely articulates his role in the community as assisting and advising the mayor and
council  in their  work,  creating linkages between them and ministerial  authorities,  supporting their
human  resource  development,  etc.   He  has  articulated  this  practically,  however,  by  refusing  to
endorse the commune's plan de developpement for years due to various technical flaws, not allowing
a transfer  of  the  archives  to  the  office  of  the  mayor  citing  inadequate  staff  capacity to  properly
maintain the documents, and other such actions that suggest the reported relationship of cooperation
and support, while not entirely untrue, is an incomplete description of the dynamics at hand.  
Measuring  the  extent  to  which  the  political  aspects  of  decentralisation's  goals  have  been
achieved in Loulouni is a difficult task.   There is both too much and too little information available
about  the  current  status  of  decentralisation in  Mali.   With  a  dizzying myriad  of  NGOs and other
organisations involved in support for decentralisation, there is no lack of status reports.  However,
these are often arbitrarily limited in scope or focus depending on the goals of  the organisation in
question,  and  use  very  different  frameworks  for  analysis  and  even  different  vocabulary,  making
meaningful  comparisons  virtually  impossible.   Many  of  them  also  use  dubious  methodologies
themselves.   In  one  Management  Systems  International  report  (2004),  which  was  contracted  to
review all USAID country activities, 64% of communes with USAID sponsored governance activities
are reported to have included community based organisations in their budgeting processes, and yet
only 20% of the same communes are reported to have sought any kind of community participation in
the  very  same  processes.   The  only  information  offered  by  methodological  explanation  of  this
seeming  paradox  is  that  “one  possible  explanation  for  the  44  point  spread  is  criteria  and
measurement (p83).”
As  discussed  in  the  discussion  on  methodology,  this  study  has  not  had  the  luxury  of  a
comparative case, or a long enough span of time to measure changes over time.  However, through
mixed  methods  including  archival  information,  a  survey  with  a  relatively  large,  random  sample,
interviews with a wide range of community leaders, some of whom were able to comment on changes
in Loulouni  over  the years,  it  has been possible both  to  differentiate  between administrative and
political  implementation  of  decentralisation,  and examine  the  extent  to  which  both  are  genuinely
taking place and accomplishing their goals.  
Most indications show that decentralisation is achieving success in increasing local government's
responsiveness to the needs of the community.  Lest this sound congratulatory, it must be noted that
the starting point was quite dismal.  As mentioned above, before decentralisation, Mali was not a
democracy, and the only government representatives at a local level were  sous prefets brought in
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from far corners of the country with no incentive to listen to the needs of the community, let along act
on them.  The introduction of the position of a mayor, who is a member of the community elected by
the commune and is downwardly accountable, has changed the situation entirely.  One of the most
important factors noted by citizens surveyed about decentralisation is their change in relationship with
local government authorities.  Before decentralisation, nearly all (86) respondents characterised this
relationship as one of intimidation and fear.  Now, they overwhelmingly cite open communication.
When asked whether they felt able to talk to the mayor about issues facing the community, ninety-
nine out of 100 respondents answered yes.  The 100th respondent was the mayor's sister, who said
that the mayor did not like to talk about work at home.  As one respondent says,
Now anyone can talk to government officials.  I can explain to them my
problems, even though I'm not a powerful man, and they will listen.  They
don't help me each time, but at least we can talk to each other.  Maybe
they will know things that I don't.  This exchange of ideas is important.
When asked about the situation ten years ago, only two respondents claimed communication
between government officials and the community was open.  The problem now, it seems, comes with
implementation.  When asked if the government can respond to the needs of the community, or help
people with their problems, the response was less positive.  Fifty-one percent said yes, forty-nine said
no.  Many people talked about the meetings and lack of action.  As one respondent said,
Of course the mayor listens to us; he lives here and we elected him.  But
he spends all  his time in meetings.   He calls us for  meetings to learn
about  the  problems of  the  people  in  Loulouni,  he goes  to  Sikasso  to
explain our problems there.  That's all.  Is that helping us?  His work may
be important, but I can't eat his meetings yet.
One former mayor (interview, 11 April, 2006) explained, 
People here are poor.  They wanted me to give them cattle and fertiliser.
I couldn't do that, I didn't have the resources.  What I could do was help
people to use the resources that they had better, in a way they would get
more from.  I could bring people together, and by listening to one another,
sometimes they could find real benefits.   Whether or not that's helping
people, I don't  know, but it was all I could do.  If  I did nothing else as
mayor,  perhaps I built peoples confidence in the development they can
achieve themselves.  
Interaction between the community and local government officials in itself is an explicit goal of
decentralisation, and there is little doubt that this has been a success.  Again, this is starting from a
baseline near zero.  Before democratisation, meetings with local government representatives were
rarely held.  In fact, the representative was rarely there.  Interactions with the mayor, on the other
hand, are overwhelmingly reported by all groups of respondents to be strong.  
A wide variety of people take advantage of the ability to interact with local government officials.
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Interaction, while linked to economic status, does not seem to be exclusively a tool of the powerful.
While most “key role players” were men, and exclusively wealthy ones at that, women were more
likely than men to be “very engaged” in local politics, and engagement of women was less linked to
economic status.  Registers show women attend meetings at the mayor's office slightly more often
than men.  There was slight but significant correlation to age as well, with the extremely old and
young  slightly  less  likely  to  be  involved  in  politics  than  the  middle  aged.   Ethnicity  showed no
correlation at all to interaction with local government.  Not a single respondent who did not interact
with the local government claimed either a lack of opportunity or the threat of a negative response
from the government officials; the only reasons cited were either a lack of utility in the interactions, or
a lack of interest.  
It is telling, however, that many respondents who did not interact with local government cited
the lack of resources or ability to contribute to development.  Many expressed very clearly how the
lack  of  capacity  for  development  in  the  mayor's  office  was  undermining  their  buy-in  to  the
decentralisation process.  One respondent (14) illustrated this very well, saying
I have a house by the river, and for the last three years, the rains have
flooded it.  There are about fifteen of us in this position.  Some of them
went to the mayor for help.  After  months of pleading their  case, the
government officials in Sikasso sent some money to help them rebuild.
They did not see one cent of this.14  I went to the hunters.  I knew the
community would listen to them, and I know that the people in Loulouni
are good; if I ask them for help, they listen.  The first week of the dry
season, I had a new house on the hill above the river. One man had
given up some of his land so my house could be built, a group of youth
had agreed to  make the bricks,  the women's  association  carried the
water; that is how development happens here.  When I can go to the
mayors  office  and see him ask  the community  for  help,  and get  the
results the hunters got, I can say decentralisation has succeeded.  Until
then,  you won't  see me wasting my time at  meetings  at  the mayor's
office.  He talks to us, yes, but what does he do?  
When  asked  about  interaction  with  local  government  officials  before  decentralisation,
responses were overwhelmingly negative.  Ninety respondents never approached local government
authorities before decentralisation, and two respondents were jailed for doing so.  Most of the rest of
the respondents were too young for the question to be relevant.  Nearly half of the respondents – too
many  to  list  here  –  had  specific  stories  about  the  predatory  nature  of  the  government  before
decentralisation, and how it affected their lives.  The negative views held by the community about
local government before decentralisation were so obvious that it is unnecessary to dwell on them.  
Back in the post-decentralisation era, reviews on interactions with the  sous prefet were much
14 This incidence of corruption was cited by 6 different respondents for different reasons; it was a scandal
tarnishing the first mayor's time in office.  
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less positive than interactions with the mayor.  The  sous prefet's office does not keep attendance
records, but only held two open meetings during the two year period of this research.  He was rarely
in his office, and often criticised for shirking his responsibilities.  As one respondent said, 
There are a lot of hardworking people here.  ACOD,15 they do a tour of
Loulouni commune each week.  We know the rotation of Red Cross staff
coming from Bamako, they do a tour,  and the Canadian and American
volunteer  agencies.   Every  village  in  Loulouni  commune  knows  these
vehicles.  We understand what they do.  Loulouni's own  sous prefet, if
you don't  live in the town of  Loulouni,  if  you don't  come to the market
here, I  promise you have never seen him.  It's in his contract  to travel
throughout the commune twice a month.  He'll say, who's going to pay for
my petrol?  His colleagues in Sikasso have money, but in his position, if
the money isn't passed down, he does nothing (respondent 2). 
While many sous prefets are enthusiastic individuals with a great deal of commitment to their
post and the development of the country, the nature of their position requires that they be imposed
from  outside,  upwardly  accountable,  and  distant  from  local  decision  making  institutions.
Furthermore, because decision making processes are less participatory, resource allocation runs the
risk of being less efficient.  As one respondent (16) pointed out
The  sous prefet means well, but he doesn't  understand us.  He is like
another NGO; many of his projects are a waste.  He built a big youth
center for the town a few years ago.  Anyone from Loulouni knows the
youth club hasn't  met in years; nobody will use it.   What we need are
pumps, and a larger health centre.  He has good ideas, but they never
help us eat.  
The introduction of the mayor established a position within the local government with both
significant executive powers and strong ties to the community.  While this has offered a solution to
many of the governance challenges caused by the top-down system of government Mali has had the
past,  political institutions don't  change overnight, and the  sous prefet and mayor of Loulouni face
huge challenges separating their powers and responsibilities.  While on most daily issues a balance
has been achieved, even slight shifts in available resources or processes to acquire them reignites
the debate.  
The real shift of powers and responsibilities has fundamentally changed the way residents of
Loulouni interact with local government officials.  While they are overwhelmingly positive about the
relationship they have with the mayor and the commune council, the lack of resources in the mayor's
office has undermined their trust in his capacity to contribute to development in the commune.  While
the sous prefet has more administrative support and access to certain resources, they are aware that
he is not well positioned to act in their best interests.  As a result, there is still no system at the
15 An NGO based in Sikasso that does governance related extension work
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community level to call for accountability of local government officials.  Until powers and resources
have all  been devolved in a transparent,  comprehensive way,  there is  little  incentive for  such a
system to develop.  Furthermore, each change to the balance of powers currently established, be it
through the introduction of new resources, or new legislation changing the delineation of powers,
stalls the process further.  
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Accountability and transparency
In  decentralisation  theory,  there  is  a  clear  link  between  communication,  participation,  and
accountability and transparency.  When citizens are involved in the processes of local government,
the logic goes, they are better informed about how resources are spent and also more likely to hold
local  officials  accountable.   Conversely,  local  officials,  being  accountable  through  democratic
elections, have an incentive to share their challenges with the community and act transparently.  In
Loulouni,  however,  there is a marked difference between open interaction with local government,
which  respondents  widely  acknowledge  exists,  and  transparency,  which  is  much  less  widely
acknowledged.  
For the many reasons discussed, pinning down accountability and transparency at the local
level is challenging.  At the beginning of this study, accountability and transparency were selected
from  the  literature  to  become  two  of  the  prime  indicators  of  the  success  of  decentralisation.
However, pilot studies of the survey proved these particularly difficult concepts to operationalise.  As
stated in the introduction,  this  study adopted Ribot's  (2002)  framework  of  resources,  power,  and
accountability.  Establishing the resources and powers in Loulouni was a relatively straightforward
process.  However, there was a gap found between the rhetoric and practice of accountability.  This
gap  was  particularly  apparent  when  soundly  designed  survey  questions  designed  to  pinpoint
accountability missed the target completely.  Instead, it has been most useful to look at the 'powers'
element of decentralisation using a two-pronged approach.  The first consideration when looking at
power is that of legitimacy.  It must be established who has the legitimacy to hold various powers,
and  where  this  legitimacy  came  from  –  whether  it  was  through  legislation,  self-appointment,
traditional  rights,  etc.   Then,  exactly  who  exercises  these  powers  must  be  looked  at  carefully.
Examining how this differs from the powers laid out in decentralisation legislation seems to be the
most  accurate  way  of  getting  at  the  accountability  structures  or  gaps  in  place  in  Loulouni.   A
substantial amount of this was done in the previous section on local government structures.  This
section looks more at the impression the community has of these structures, which is also important
for the building of accountability.  
Only eight survey respondents report having tried to find out information from local government
officials.  All eight were also very engaged in local politics, and reported that this information was
easily acquired.   Of  the ninety-two who had not  tried to find information,  seventy-eight  thought  it
would be difficult to find.  As one respondent put it,
It's  not  that  the  mayor  is  trying  to  hide  things,  we  just  don't
understand each other.  I want to know how my taxes are spent.  If I
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asked,  he  would  give  me  flip  charts  with  lots  of  numbers,  and
information about  who is  responsible for  what.   That's  not  what  I
want.  If  my neighbourhood doesn't  have a pump, I want to know
why not.  If you don't speak his language, you can't know anything. 
There are certain  transparency requirements  put  forward  by law,  and not  all  of  them were
adhered to in Loulouni.  For example, the commune's planned budget must be posted publicly in the
mayor's  office,  as  must  the  five year  development  plan for  the commune.   The  budget  was not
posted,  although  was  available  on  request  (this  study was  apparently  the  first  time  it  had  been
requested), and the five year development plan was 'under negotiation' for the entire two year period
of this study.  
As  for  accountability,  there  was  a  huge  gap  between  the  perceptions  of  the  downwardly-
accountable mayor, and that of the sous prefet.  Only six respondents claimed that the sous prefet
was adequately supervised by his superiors.  One man said,
He is not controlled.  He says that he is, because once a month, he goes
to Sikasso to meet with his boss.  In these meetings, all the powerful men
just sit in nice air conditioned rooms, earning big per-diems, talking about
how difficult it is to stay in rural areas.  They call that control.  What can
we do?  We aren't educated enough to control him.  It is the role of the
sous prefet to explain the laws and represent the central government in
Loulouni.  If we understood more, maybe we could hold him accountable,
but he is here precisely because we don't understand.  It is not a system
that works.
The situation with the mayor was much less clear.  Nobody seemed to know to whom the
mayor was supposed to be accountable.  Not a single respondent said the mayor was responsible to
the  electorate,  or  the  people  of  the  commune  of  Loulouni.   However,  only  thirty-five  percent  of
respondents thought that there was inadequate accountability in the mayor's office.  Each of these
people had specific stories of corruption.  
Many  people  (sixty-two  of  those  surveyed),  however,  replied  that  they  didn't  understand
decentralisation well enough to know what accountability meant.   To some extent,  the confusion
inherent in such a fundamental change in government structure could itself be seen as an inhibitor to
transparency, and it is strongly compounded by a lack of clear mandates and inadequate education
about the process.  Interviews shed further light on the matter, when seven people interviewed linked
decentralisation  to  a  lack  of  capacity  with  implications  for  accountability.   The  president  of  the
women's association said:
The  decentralisation  mission  came  and  told  us  all  about
decentralisation.  Many people liked it.  They said, 'it is a chance for
us each to have control over our own lives.  Nobody can say that is a
bad thing.' Well, I say it is a bad thing.  There are many things the
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government is supposed to do.  It needs to have leadership, and an
understanding of the way to solve problems.  That is why we have
governments, and law, so we are not just running around each man
on his own.  If decentralisation tells us to solve our own problems, it
is not doing the job a government should.  It is unfair to the mayor,
what is expected of him.  He is just a member of the community, who
is now told he is a leader, without knowing anything.  It is unfair to
us, we are also told that we are all our own leaders.  Without anyone
to follow, how can we know we are moving ahead?  So many people
think  they  know,  and  they can  help  the  mayor  move  in  the  right
direction.  I have been to meetings at the mayor's office, and I can
tell you, nobody knows the right direction.  Everyone wants to say
“this is right” or “this is wrong,” but what he really means is “this is
good for me” or “this is bad for me.”  
The beginning of the above quotation brings up a point that many extension workers and donor
reports  focus  on.   When  asked  about  decentralisation,  many  citizens  start  by  saying  “the
decentralisation mission has taught us that....(Rawson in Bingen, 1999).”  While decentralisation is
supposed to create a sense of political ownership by civil society, it is still the case that this political
ownership is being created by someone other than civil society, which says a good deal about the
political environment in which decentralisation is being implemented.  As one donor report (USAID,
2002) explains,
The PGP16 implementing partners and field agents have encountered
difficulties in obtaining the support and sense of ownership that are
needed,  which  are  essential  to  PGP’s  success.  To  develop  this
ownership, the agents have often conducted an intense campaign on
ownership,  facilitated  the  creation  of  local  mechanisms,  such  as
steering  and  monitoring  committees  (comités  de  pilotage  and
comités de suivi), in each commune and trained the members in the
discharge of their duties.
Many of  the  efforts  of  decentralisation  are  being  frustrated  by  the  paradox  inherent  in  bringing
decentralisation from the central  government,  and creating grassroots empowerment from above.
Accountability is no exception.  Decentralisation will continue to fail to provide strong accountability
structures if the process is not led by those who must hold the government to account.  This is in
addition to the challenges of  allocating resources and power that were discussed in the previous
section.  Some of the specifics of these challenges can be seen by looking at the status of fiscal
decentralisation.  
16 Participatory Governance Program, which is the largest governance element in the larger decentralisation
project 
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Fiscal Elements
In the discussion of resources, powers, and accountability that has taken place so far, the issue
of local tax base and budget creation has been briefly touched on, but not explicitly addressed.  This
section  will  spell  out  the  financial  situation  of  the  commune  of  Loulouni.   This  is  a  particularly
important discussion, because it represents, very concrete ways, the convergence of a number of
issues at the heart of the decentralisation literature.  The ability of the local government to raise taxes
can reflect  both the capacity for  collective action and the participatory nature of the development
process  at  the  community  level.   The  creation  of  the commune budget  illustrates  the conflict  of
interest  between  the  sous  prefet and  the  mayor.  And  finally,  the  national  restrictions  on  fiscal
decentralisation are a manifestation of challenges Mali has had mustering legislative support for a
real decentralisation of powers.  
Budgetary limitations are frequently brought into the discussion by both the office of the sous
prefet and that of the mayor, leading us to look at the commune's finances.   There is no question
that the mayor takes the community's decisions into account when drawing up the annual budget; it is
an inclusive process that is almost continuously ongoing.  The problem is, the budget assumes 100%
collection of taxes, and several times more resources coming in from Bamako than turns out to be
the reality.  In  practice,  the  budget  rarely  covers  more  than  the salaries  of  those  working  at  the
mayor's office, with line item loans from different funds maintaining a minimum of activity.  
In  fact,  to  the  extent  that  payment  of  taxes  is  an  indication  of  resource  mobilisation,
decentralisation has achieved little success in this area.  According to the records of the sous prefet,
payment of taxes in the commune of Loulouni has actually decreased since the implementation of
decentralisation, down from about 40% in the early 1990s to the low 30%s in recent years.  Most of
what is collected comes from the town of Loulouni.  The mayor's secretary (interview, 7 July, 2006)
blames a lack of resources.  
In  order  to  collect  taxes  from  the  rural  areas,  the  commune  is
responsible for paying a tax collector to come from Kadiolo.  Tell me,
what money are we supposed to use when taxes have not yet been
collected?  Before, they would send someone to collect the money
and go.  Either way, there has been no change.  We don't see the
money.
The  former  mayor  (interview,  7  July,  2006),  however,  blames  a  lack  of  understanding  of  the
decentralisation process.
Right now, the population is not aware of the situation.  There has
been an  unwillingness  to  pay taxes,  especially  since  1992.   Just
before the 1992 elections, candidates said there would be no more
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taxes.  This mentality has entered people's heads.  You can say they
don't  understand  democracy,  or  perhaps  you  can  say  they  have
understood too much.  Extensions agents come, and explain that the
decision making power rests with the population now.  That nobody
comes from above and controls their money and resources.  This is
supposed  to  be  empowering.   But  now so  many  people  tell  the
commune, 'this is a democracy,  I  can keep my money to myself.'
There are even sons who are disobeying their fathers, and saying,
'now Mali is a democracy, each person makes his own decisions.'
Democracy here means that people think what they want, say what
they want, and do what they want....  
This  is  worsened  because  we  don't  have  any  power  of
enforcement.   Even people who do understand  that  they need to
participate in decentralisation for  it  to succeed, if  they don't  see a
benefit in it for them, they won't adhere do it.      
Many citizens,  however (32% of  those surveyed),  and farmers in particular,  blame a lack of  rain.
citizens claim that it is not a lack of civic engagement preventing them from paying their taxes, but
poverty that,  due to climactic  changes,  has reached new heights.   This does seem to be largely
supported  by  statistics;  percentage  of  tax  payment  closely  follows  rainfall  patterns  each  year
(Association des paysans, Loulouni archives, 2004).  
Only  one  respondent  put  a  different  explanation  on  the  table.   This  explanation  was  also
brought up in many informal discussions.  In his words,
Look, I only have a certain amount of money, and I am going to do
what is best for my family.  My brothers always pay their taxes.  They
criticise me a lot, and say I am doing the wrong thing.  But I have
used my eyes.  These people who pay taxes every year, what do
they get from it?  Nothing.  Do we have pumps because we pay our
taxes?  No.  And before an NGO comes in to install a pump, do they
look  at  what  village  pays  taxes  to  decide  where  to  go?   Never.
Everyone  here  pays  their  taxes,  but  we have  no  development  to
show for it.   I'm tired of it;  I  will keep my money.  Every year the
mayor comes and says he will put me in jail, and every year I say 'go
ahead,'  but he never does.  When I see the advantage of it,  I will
happily pay taxes.  
While this could possibly be explained as a classic case of free-riding, the case of tax paying in
rural  Mali  is  in  fact  much  more  complicated.   When  looking  at  taxes  as  a  form  of  resource
mobilisation, the history of taxes in Mali is an important consideration.  Taxing the rural areas was a
strong  tool  employed  by  the  French  colonial  system  to  mould  Mali  under  colonial  rule.   By
impoverishing the countryside in certain specific  ways, colonial administrators controlled important
areas of  economic,  and by extension social  life.   Tax evasion,  through  hiding taxable resources,
altering migration patterns, collusion with traditional authorities to deceive colonial employees, and
other  acts  that  have become institutionalised,  was a form of  protest  against  colonial  oppression.
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When  the  'development  tax'  was instituted  under  the  new socialist  regimes,  promising  to  return
financial  resources  to  the  local  communities  but  never  delivering,  these  methods  of  tax  evasion
became even more  deeply  rooted  in  the  rural  lifestyle.   Non-payment  of  taxes  is  often  used by
communities as a tool if a constituency is unhappy with the actions of the political elite.  For example,
Sieouba, a village in the commune of Loulouni, had not paid its taxes for two years.  When queried,
the story emerged that a representative of the council had passed through the village two years ago,
and killed a goat  with his motorcycle.  It  was demanded that he replace the goat,  but never did,
claiming it was not his motorcycle that hit the goat.  When, two years later, another representative of
the council replaced the goat,  the community came together to pay over three million CFA (about
USD 6,000) of taxes that were in arrears.  
As this anecdote demonstrates, the evasion of taxes by no means indicates a lack of collective
action.  On the contrary, many resource are being mobilised outside the public sphere to be used as
strategically as possible.  With the large number of NGO extension projects requiring a monetary
community contribution to partake in a project, village and association  caisses are, in some ways,
more important than government resources for community development.  The women's association,
two different farming associations, a livestock association, and an association of businessmen had
more resources available for activities than the mayor's office.  Additionally, the two most active NGO
extension activities operating in the commune, one providing grain grinders and the other providing
grants and loans to start up small businesses, only worked through community based organisations,
not local government.   
Complicated partnerships  are  formed to  match up the mobilisation  of  resources  by some
actors  to  the  availability  of  resources  to  others,  with  associations  often  paying  the  mayor's
contribution  of  a  service  available  through  the  government,  or  one  association  using  funds  to
systematically buy the goods or services from another association so the first would have access to
credit  or  other  services later.   Decentralisation  has substantially  increased the number  of  NGOs
operating in the Sikasso region (CEID, 1997), making a larger array of services available if resources
are mobilised in certain ways.  This all indicates that this influx of  NGOs has more affect  on the
patterns of resource mobilisation than any political changes brought by decentralisation.  While the
phenomena are interconnected, it simply underscores the fact that local government is just another
actor in a complex arena with many interests vying for resources and power.  
When asked about impediments to resource mobilisation, residents overwhelmingly cited two
reasons.  The first was a lack of adequate banking institutions.  This was at least in part due to the
timing of the research.  There was a widely respected savings association with a branch in Loulouni,
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but just before the study began, the president and vice president stole the savings and left town,
leaving many quite wealthy associations penniless.  The second impediment cited was an uncertainty
when dealing with NGOs and government projects, whose agendas change rapidly.  Forty-six people
mentioned the large number of organisations that came through and made promises of services if
contributions were made, but then never delivered.  This was also linked to arbitrariness in all aspects
of  NGO activities,  from the topic  of  the intervention to  the  selection  of  participants.   There  was
essentially  a  call  on  the  part  of  the  community  for  NGOs  to  develop  a  Weberian  rationalised
bureaucracy, because without it, it was impossible to mobilise resources effectively.  
A  similar  sentiment  has  been  expressed  by  those  working  with  the  fiscal  elements  of
decentralisation, but rather than being articulated as a resource mobilisation problem, it is expressed
in terms of planning. There is no question that fiscal decentralisation has lagged in Mali, and this can
be attributed greatly to the way in which the decentralisation process has been structured.  There has
been a constant tension between planning and implementation.  Local governments bemoan a lack
of  planning on the national level.   A former secretary of the  sous prefet (interview, 7 July,  2006)
pointed out that 
one of the biggest sources of trouble we have with decentralisation is
that it was implemented without adequate planning.  We are here at
a commune level, and so is the mayor and his council, before we
have  been  told  who is  supposed  to  do  what.  We  wait  while  the
decentralisation mission explains things to us one way, and then as
we are doing what they say, they tell  us it  must  be done another
way.17  First they say our funding comes in this way for this, then that
way for  that.   Our budgets  are never done properly because they
themselves haven't  decided what a proper budget looks like.  And
then the community blames us for a lack of action, but our hands are
tied.
NGOs  working  in  Bamako,  however,  complain  that  just  the  opposite  situation  is  paralysing  a
functioning decentralised system.
There is a real risk in putting too much effort into exhaustive, detailed
planning if the link with implementation is tenuous.  In Mali, there are
already innumerable national and regional schemes and plans, both
sector-based  and  integrated,  but....they  are  not  always  put  into
practice.   Too  often  these essentially  administrative exercises  are
unconnected with any real demand. (SNV, 2004)
 A structured  decentralising  of  the  financial  system,  however,  is  particularly  challenging  not  only
because of the number of individuals and organisations who have a vested interest in maintaining the
17 Here, he was referring specifically to the changes made in the electoral code, which involved a 'recentralising'
of many electoral functions that had been placed in the hands of the mayor, without adequate consideration
for the fact that he was an interested party.  
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status  quo,  but  also  because  of  the  French  colonial  institution  of  unité de  caisse.   A  system
implemented in theory to  promote equitable development of  all  regions of  the country,   unité de
caisse  brings all of  the regional resources to a centralised fund in the capital,  to be disbursed to
regions  and  technical  ministries  by the  central  government.   There  are  endless  features  of  the
entrenched accounting and allocation system that present obstacles to decentralisation.  Just to take
one example, the education ministry before 1999 did not maintain separate records of primary and
secondary school expenditure.  Under decentralisation, primary schools are funded on a village level,
while  secondary  schools  are  funded  at  the  commune  level.   It  is  very  difficult  to  determine  an
appropriate allocation of funds in such circumstances.  
A representative of  the  Haut  Conseil  des Collectivites Territoriales (interview, 8 May, 2005)
noted that a more modern version of  unite de caisse was also an impediment to implementing the
fiscal side of decentralisation.  
An ideal decentralised political system would be easier in a country
whose government is financially self sufficient.  A local government
would collect taxes, and keep most of them at the local level for its
needs,  only  passing  a  small  percentage  to  the  national  level  to
finance  projects  of  concern  to  the  whole  country.   Mali  is  very
dependent on aid, however; something like 85% of our public sector
is financed by foreign aid.  Even though we are working with partners
on best practices of coordination for support, that does not change
the  fact  that  only  the  central  government  can  engage  in  foreign
relations.   It  would be impossible  for  the  local  government  of  the
commune of Loulouni to have a bilateral agreement with the United
States government.  So, all foreign aid must be channelled through
Bamako.  Yes, we can gave a system to pass this money on to the
communes,  but  no  matter  what  it  requires  some  planning  and
distribution to take place at the central level, which is not ideal.
While  there  are  many reasons  for  it,  the  hesitation  of  the  central  government  to  produce
coherent  legislation  on  the  fiscal  elements  of  decentralisation  clearly  remains  one  of  the  most
significant  impediments  to  its  implementation  at  the  local  level.   This  will  be  illustrated  in  the
upcoming sections by looking at service provision, and the decentralisation efforts of technical line
ministries.
This  section has simply underscored  the number  of  factors  that  affect  every aspect  of  the
decentralisation  process.   Orchestrating  them  all  effectively  is  necessary  for  the  successful
implementation of decentralisation.  The nation wide system that had been in place in Loulouni was
altered  in  several  ways  by  the  arrival  of  refugees.   The  system  in  place  first  emphasised  the
devolution  of  powers  to  downwardly  accountable authorities,  and is  only  now going  back  to  the
devolution of resources.  In some ways, the arrival of humanitarian aid turned this system on its head.
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Humanitarian  organisations  brought  significant  resources  to  Loulouni  in  a  way  that  the  lengthy
decentralisation process had never managed to do, though it still aims to.  However, the power over
these resources were never brought into the downwardly accountable governance structures.  They
were  controlled  primarily  in  partnership  between  the  upwardly  accountable  sous  prefet,  and
humanitarian agencies that are outside the government's system of accountability entirely.  
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Service Provision
Similar  to  the  fiscal  decentralisation  process  discussed  in  the  previous  section,  service
provision is not so much an isolated phenomenon within the broader decentralisation process that
can  be  analysed  alone.   It  is  one  of  the  goals  of  decentralisation,  and  as  such,  is  a  concrete
manifestation of many converging factors.  How services are provided is often a concrete indication of
how powers are exercised regardless of who is theoretically holding them.  This section will also look
at which services are provided to whom, and the processes for deciding this.  This is essential to
determine the extent to which the allocative efficiency goal of decentralisation has been achieved.
These processes are also indicative of how accountability structures work in Loulouni, and where they
are failing.  
The  record  of  decentralisation  on  service  provision  in  Loulouni  offers  a  mixed  picture.
Perhaps the most notable thing about service provision is that it is certainly not foremost in the minds
of  Loulouni  residence  when  discussing  local  government.   Like  other  areas  in  the  focus  of  the
international  humanitarian  industry,  citizens  were  more  familiar  with  international  NGOs  and  UN
agencies than government agencies or departments.18 This is particularly striking given that service
provision  is  the  goal  around  which  much  of  the  extension  work  related  to  decentralisation  has
centred.   Any  observer  will  note  that  “seemingly  everywhere  in  Mali,  colourful  posters  in  public
buildings,  businesses,  and  stores  advertise  the  government  program  to  shift  authority  and
responsibility to the local  level (CEID,  1997),”  and almost  all  of  these involve a flow chart  or  list
explaining which level is responsible for which service (see appendix 1).   
Despite  this,  when  asked  to  name  five  responsibilities  of  government,  only  two  of  100
respondents  mentioned a single service.   Both of  these made reference to  security.   Education,
health, electrification, judicial services, etc. were not mentioned a single time, despite the fact that
one of the schools and the health centre are under the charge of Loulouni's mayor and council, even
if indirectly through an appointed board.  The most commonly cited responsibility was that of dispute
resolution,  mentioned  by  seventy-three  respondents,  followed  by  holding  meetings  in  Loulouni,
mentioned by 48%, and going to meetings in Sikasso, 41%.  The fourth most common response was
finding and coordinating with NGOs that come to develop the community,  mentioned by thirty-six
respondents.   This  was  followed  by  “nothing”  or  “drink  tea,”  with  twenty-four  responses,  and
“paperwork” with twenty-three responses.  
While many respondents were pleased with the openness of communication with the mayor's
18 See residents of Kasulu in Landau, 2000
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office, many people did not think this meant an improvement in government behaviour.  One woman
thought that
It was better before.  The government was not as friendly, but it was more
effective.   Now,  the  mayor  holds  meetings  all  the  time,  but  he  does
nothing.  There were no meetings before, people came from above, and
told us what to do.  But at least something got done.  There were good
teachers in our schools then.  Students could get scholarships to study in
Sikasso if they were bright.  If you had a high school degree, it used to
mean something.  Now, you have people who have passed their BAC but
they can hardly read and write (respondent 13).  
The  deterioration  of  higher  level  education  is  a  widely  acknowledged  phenomenon,  with  many
professional training institutes throughout the country creating an equivalence by adding three years
of study to the qualifications of anyone who completed their studies before 1995.   
Primary  education  is  often  cited  as  a  feather  in  the  hat  of  decentralisation  (SNV,  2004;
UNCDF, 2000), with primary school enrolment having increased from 20% to 38% in just the decade
1990-2000 (UNDP, 2003).   Attributing this to decentralisation, however, might not be accurate.  The
number  of  primary schools  in  the  commune of  Loulouni  increased  from five  to  eight  in  the  last
decade,  with  all  three  additions  being  privately  funded  (as  opposed  to  government  supported).
Although rarely mentioned, the quality of these new private schools is also questionable.  Not one of
the new community schools has classrooms and teachers for each grade offered, and many of the
teachers are virtually illiterate themselves.  Far more problematic, however, is the fact that education
in Mali, modelled after the French system, is highly centralised, and decentralisation has demanded a
complete reworking of the country's approach to education.  This is combined with other substantial
changes, including a shift from primary education instruction in French to local languages.  Because
of  these  and  other  (primarily  budgetary)  challenges,  the  department  of  education  did  not  even
develop a framework for decentralising until 2002, and the operational programme it outlines is still
years away from being operational.  It seems clear that changes in the education sector are more
closely linked to donor funding priorities than the decentralisation policy, and once more highlights a
need for synthesis among actors throughout the decentralisation process.  
Changes in service provision seem more closely linked to changes in donor funding priorities
than the decentralisation policy.  The profusion of community schools is more likely to be explained
by  the  prioritisation  of  education  by  a  number  of  large  funders  than  decentralisation.   The
decentralisation campaign certainly may have played a role, through its involvement in awareness
raising throughout the country; many community mobilisation efforts,  including those on education
issues, are related to the interactions sparked by this exercise, but attributing the service provision
itself to decentralisation is inaccurate.  
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Administratively, the water sector has made the most progress decentralising its powers and
resources, and is held up as a model for other technical line ministries.  By 2000, the ministry had
developed contracts relating to the transfer of powers and resources between levels of government,
and the delegation of management, with particular attention being paid to fiscal structures not only
once the transfer had taken place, but throughout the implementation phase.  Additionally, it drew up
a contract for the responsibility for technical and financial monitoring, which remains the most clear
definition  of  tutelle in  practice,  effectively  limiting  any  leeway  the  central  government  has  to
recentralise through its supervisory powers.  From 2003 on, instruments for transferring water supply
infrastructure were tested, trainings were conducted, and by now local management of water related
infrastructure is entirely functional.  Its success may just serve to underline the importance of donor
funding, as despite the success in administrative decentralisation, the number of boreholes drilled in
Sikasso has remained unchanged despite a large increase in demand related to changes in rainfall
that have left many seasonal rivers dry.19  That indicates that a gap remains in the political control of
service provision related resources.  
The experience of  the health sector  supports this  as well.   While  demand throughout  the
commune is for village-level health structures, such as maternities, extension workers trained in first
aid, and other initiatives that would make at least a basic level of primary health care available on the
village level, spending tends to focus on the CESCOM (Centre de sante commmunautaire), because,
as  the  current  mayor  points  out  (interview,  11  June,  2006)  and  the  health  committee  confirms
(interview, 26 July, 2006), “that is where the fiscal structures direct the resources at the moment.”
This is a clear case of a lack of fiscal decentralisation inhibiting true political decentralisation.  
The health sector was rarely singled out by residents of Loulouni at any stage in the interview
of survey process, with the exception of those individuals who were directly involved in it.  Only thirty
survey respondents said they or someone in their family had accessed health services in the past five
years.  Because this is a service that is so rarely accessed, many citizens have not built up a track
record of expectations from the health center.  As there has been little community involvement, issues
of health are better understood at a higher-than commune level for the sake of the decentralisation
process.  
The first mayor of Loulouni (interview, 8 June, 2006) explains the situation he found himself in
regarding service provision.  
Education, health, the judiciary, all of these are now the domain of
the commune, meaning they are under the charge of the mayor.  But
what has happened is a transfer of responsibility.  It has not been
19 Department d'hydraulique demandes des pompes, 2004.  
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accompanied by a transfer of resources.  They acknowledge this on
a  national  level,  but  it  makes  things  very  difficult  for  we mayors.
When the decentralisation mission came to explain things to people,
they  said  that  the  taxes  raised  by  the  commune  will  stay  in  the
commune.  But now, I am faced with a situation where even if people
pay  their  taxes,  resources  for  services  are  still  in  Bamako.   The
authorities  say  they  mayor  must  now provide  education,  but  the
money to  construct  classrooms is  in  the hands of  the  ministry  of
education in Bamako.  What am I supposed to use to build these
classrooms?  According to the legislation, now it is the mayor who
must  supply  water  to  the  population,  it  is  the  mayor  who  must
construct  health centres, build schools, equip the teachers and so
on.  But with what?  Without support,  without resources.  The law
says that responsibility is not to be transferred without the required
resources.  You can say now that the central state is acting outside
the law.  But who will hold them accountable?  The population of
Loulouni can't; they can only vote for a new mayor.  
The  state  and  perception  of  service  provision  in  Loulouni  says  a  lot  about  the  status  of
decentralisation as a whole.  In fact, service provision might well be the key indicator of other aspects
of decentralisation.  First, it reflects many of the challenges of a lack of resources faced by local
governments.  However, it also demonstrates how a lack of autonomy in funding allocation can inhibit
true political  decentralisation.   Fageut  found in Bolivia that  service provision patterns significantly
changed  under  decentralisation,  and  this  has  been  used  to  demonstrate  the  success  of
decentralisation, because resources are then used according to each community's need, increasing
effectiveness.  In Loulouni, this change does not seem to have taken place.  This can be attributed to
two things – the fiscal structures of decentralisation that still require resources be transferred from
Bamako  streamline  funds  in  certain  directions,  undermining  any  local  decision  making  power.
Additionally,  the amount of  control  donors have in setting funding priorities also undermines local
control of resources.  
There  is  a  strong  reason  to  believe  that  decentralisation  has  moved  many  aspects  of
governance in the direction of participatory democracy.  Survey respondents were very supportive of
the openness of the mayor's office, and agreed across the spectrum of respondents that the mayor
was more accountable and responsive to their needs than previous governing bodies.  Additionally,
the level of interaction between all members of the community, regardless of class and gender, and
local government officials, increased substantially.  However, structural aspects of the administrative
decentralisation process including the role of the  sous prefet in oversight and regulation have the
possibility to threaten these nascent  supports  for  democracy.   Additionally,  the limits the state  of
fiscal  decentralisation  places on local  control  of  resources could undermine the relationship built
between the mayor's office and the local community, if local government continues to be unable to
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deliver on the concrete development needs of  the community.   The next chapter will explore the
impact the refugee influx has had on Loulouni to determine how this is shaping the decentralisation
process.  
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4. The refugee experience
“HELP NEVER COMES AS SWIFTLY AS NEED, AND IT RARELY STAYS TO DRINK THE THIRD ROUND OF TEA, 
WHICH IS WEAK AND BITTER FROM A LACK OF SUGAR.”
BOUBACAR SANOGO
“THESE REFUGEES ARE FROM WEST AFRICA, BUT THE MAJORITY OF THEM 
ARE NOT USED TO THE HARSH CONDITIONS IN LOULOUNI”
CAMP MANAGER
Trends in the data
The experience of the Ivorian refugees in Loulouni, and therefore the influence they have had
on  the  local  political  situation,  has  been  defined  primarily  by  two  factors.   First,  the  history  of
migration between Mali and Cote d'Ivoire,  which played a large role in shaping the integration of
refugees  in  Loulouni.   Secondly,  the  decentralisation  process  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter
defines the political stage onto which the refugees entered.  To explain the impact these factors have
had,  this  chapter  is  divided  into  sections  on  refugee-community  relations,  access  to  common
resources and public services, economic patterns, and identity and social perceptions.  
In very general terms, the relationship between the refugees and the community of Loulouni
was good, with many hosts citing the positive contributions refugees have made to the community
and many refugees pointing out the warm hospitality the community of Loulouni has offered them.
However, certain tensions were underlying this positive relationship.  Looking at how the relationship
was defined by both refugees and hosts,  and the patterns that tensions followed, uncovers many
aspects of how the refugee influx has impacted citizen-state interactions.  
The most common source of tension between refugees and hosts in Loulouni was regarding
access to common pool resources and public services.  Conflicts around refugee access to these
became  the  leading  source  of  interaction  between  citizens  and  local  government  officials.   The
refugee influx had very clear, tangible impacts on water, health, and education in Loulouni.  These
impacts were both positive and negative,  and were instrumental in changing the trajectory of  the
decentralisation process in Loulouni.  
Economic  differences  between  refugees  and  hosts  also  had  numerous  implications  for
decentralisation.  Because of different economic access, refugees integrated into specific social and
economic  areas.   This  naturally  affected  which  issues  were  brought  to  the  attention  of  local
government, and by whom.  It also altered the needs of the local population, in terms of both public
services and governance.  
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The final section on perceptions and identity brings together the social and economic factors
in the previous sections, to look at how those measurable elements of refugee integration are actually
experienced  by  the  individuals  living  the  process.   The  way various  trends  are  perceived  is  as
important for the decentralisation process as the trends themselves, since it is the perceptions that
will prompt citizens to act and interact with local government.  This section also offers an opportunity
to reconnect with the literature on refugee integration, which deals heavily with not only identity, but
social and economic integration.  It  will provide a foundation both in the literature and in the data
gathered in Loulouni on which to build the following chapter's argument about the transformative role
the refugee presence has had on political transformation.  
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Community - refugee relations
The relationship between the community of Loulouni and refugees was generally good.  This
was observed by many of the role-players involved in the relief effort.  The Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (2002), for example, claims that “the relation between host communities and
refugees/evacuees  is  good.   Host  communities  have  been  very  forthcoming  in  their  support  to
refugees in the Sikasso region.”  This is supported by the findings of the survey, in which 81% of
respondents say the refugees have had an “overall  positive” impact on the community,  and 87%
claiming the relationship between refugees and the community could be described as having “no
conflict  whatsoever.”   However, the tension that was found follows certain patterns, and exploring
these patterns will help draw conclusions about changes in governance or citizen-state relationships
that could be connected to the refugee presence.  
Because the refugee influx was so large, virtually everyone in the community reported a great
deal  of  interaction  with  Ivorians  fleeing  the  conflict.   Understandably,  few  people  distinguished
between Ivorians with official refugee status and those without, or even Malians who had been living
in Cote d'Ivoire.  In terms of quantity of interaction, 97% of respondents reported having interacted
with refugees in the marketplace,  and businessmen reported more interactions with Ivorians than
other  professions.   This  is  most  understandable  because  the  refugee  camp  was located  at  the
doorstep of the marketplace.  Upon initial inspection of the data, quantity of interaction with refugees
seems  strongly  correlated  to  economic  status.   However,  closer  inspection  reveals  that  this  is
explained completely by neighborhood of residence, since the closest neighborhood to the refugee
camp is also the wealthiest, while the farthest away is the poorest. 
The following sections will break down the issues on which residents and refugees interacted,
disaggregating both populations by profession,  age,  economic status,  gender,  etc.  as appropriate
given the topic of analysis.  Among the most important trends are that conflicts between hosts and
refugees tended to be about public services.  Wealthier hosts were both most likely to access these
services  and  most  likely  to  describe  the  relationship  with  the  refugee  community  as  conflictual.
Furthermore, they were most likely to interact with local government officials regarding the conflict.
Evidence of this, as well as interpretations and consequences, follow.  
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Access to common pool resources and services
Much of the refugee studies literature dealing with the impact refugees are having on their
hosts concentrates on competition for resources or services.  A modest amount of research indicates
that refugees use a disproportionate amount of common pool resources (Whitaker, 2002; Stonjanov,
2004; UNHCR 2004).  Numerous scholars have asserted that when strain is being put on common
pool  resources  by  refugees,  it  is  the  poorest  of  the  poor  hosts,  who  depend  on  common  pool
resources  for  their  livelihood,  who  are  further  marginalised  (Kibreab,  2001;  Whitaker,  2000;
Chambers, 1993).  This does not seem to describe fully the situation in Loulouni.  One explanatory
factor is that Cote d'Ivoire generally enjoys a higher level of economic development than Mali.  While
the assumption that  refugees are comparable  to  'poor'  in  host  communities is  being  challenged,
Loulouni is a clear case of the inverse scenario – refugees accustomed to a significantly higher level
of development and standard of living than the host community.  It is clear that economic patters are
different  for  refugees than for  the rest  of  the population,  although this study did not venture into
comparing the wealth of refugees to that of the local population.
The supposition that refugees use more common pool resources than the host community is
to a small extent true in Loulouni.  This statement, however, does not come without qualifications.
Refugees use only slightly more firewood than their local counterparts.  Other studies assert that this
is due to the fact that the food rations given to refugees are based on dry food that requires longer
cooking times (UNHCR, 2004).  The fact that this has proven to be less the case in Loulouni than has
been observed in other refugee situations could be explained by the fact that food rations in Loulouni
were rice-based, whereas the staple diet in Loulouni is dried maize, which, as it is normally prepared,
requires slightly more fuel to cook than rice.  
Most other common pool resources, such as grass for thatching roofs, resins and gums, fibres
for basket weaving, etc. were scarcely used by the refugees at all.  While firewood is arguably more
important than the others in aggregate, in that more people spend more hours per day devoted to its
collection than other materials, it is also true that extra strain will be felt by people nearly regardless
of their income category, as nearly all residents of Loulouni across the economic spectrum cook with
wood.  Those whose livelihoods depend on these other common pool resources, on the other hand,
often have specific trades or areas of expertise,  and the refugees are clearly not in a position to
compete with them and thus displace them in their livelihoods.  One refugee specifically addressed
this issue, saying:
While I was in the bush once collecting wood, I met an herbalist who
was looking for medicine.  He was upset to see me there, and said
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that  I  should watch out collecting these barks and roots.   He said
they were for his work.  I told him that I was just collecting firewood,
and explained that I was from far away, and didn't know the plants
and  trees  that  grew  here  anyway.   He  was  satisfied.  (refugee
interview 14). 
While many respondents (thirty-six, mostly women, and disproportionately poorer respondents)
noted an increased scarcity in the past several years of common pool resources, particularly firewood
and thatch,  it  is significant  that  not a single one cited the arrival  of  refugees as a source of  the
scarcity.   The most common reason cited was a sustained lack of adequate rainfall  affecting the
growth  of  vegetation  around  Loulouni,  followed  by  general  population  growth,  and  the
commercialisation  of  the  firewood  sector  (often  attributed  to  various  causes,  such  as  increased
transportation  to  Sikasso,  and  a  growing  need  for  access  to  cash),  which  meant  commercial
exploiters would chop firewood to sell in cities or make charcoal.  
Access to services was the source of  far  more tension between refugees and residents of
Loulouni than access to common pool resources.  The impact of refugee youths on the education
system was widely cited, although interpreted differently by different people.  To begin with, over half
of those at the refugee camp were under twenty-five, meaning the school systems were particularly
affected by the influx.  Refugees and returnees had benefited from Cote d'Ivoire's superior education
system, and as such, had on overall advantage over Malian students.  This was compounded by the
fact that French, the medium of instruction, is more widely spoken in Cote d'Ivoire than in Mali, since
Bambara, the local trade language that most Malians speak in addition to their mother tongue, does
not have an equivalent in Cote d'Ivoire.  Some parents saw it as a blessing.  In one discussion, the
mother of a secondary school boy was encouraged by the arrival of the new students.
My son is a smart boy, but before the Ivorians came, he was bored at
school.  The level of education is not very high; the teachers don't
expect much from the students.   If  the work has been completed,
they are satisfied.  Now he is not doing that much better in school,
but I can see the change.  He has something pushing him now.  You
know how boys are, he is competitive, and now he has someone to
compete with.  I have much more hope for his education than I had
before.  He is seeing students continuing on to Sikasso, benefiting
from education; this wasn't the case before.  
Another parent, however, did not see the developments so positively.
My daughter is in second cycle now, and she has always been very
good at school.  If she did not come in at the top of her class, she
was always in the top 3, ever since her first year.  Before the Ivorians
came, she was first in her class for two years running.  When the
conflict started in Cote d'Ivoire, the school in Loulouni has taken on
many different kinds of students.  The system that we have isn't in
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place any more;  we don't  know who is studying what.   There are
students who did 9th standard in Cote d'Ivoire,  now in standard 7.
Some even lie about their ages.  Now the top student in every grade
is  an  Ivorian,  and  my  daughter  is  discouraged.   It's  a  matter  of
discipline in the system.  If we don't regain it, I'm afraid my daughter
will lose interest in school (respondent 16).
An interview with the school director (19 March, 2006) revealed a mixed opinion of the new students.
There is no doubt that the Ivorian students had a better foundation
than  students  here  who  come  in  from  remote  villages  to  go  to
second cycle.  Many of them are smart, although some of them have
trouble adjusting, since there are some differences in our curriculum.
Overall, though, I think the standard of education has been pushed
slightly higher since they have come.  They have brought with them
a problem of discipline, though, that has really been challenging.  I
can't only blame it on the Ivorians; sometimes it is caused by local
students too, but there isn't the same respect for authority that there
used  to  be,  that  is  clear.   The  culture  at  school  has  definitely
changed, but I can't say where it is a positive or a negative change.
While  there  were  temporary  alternative  educational  facilities  provided  by  UNICEF,  it  was  never
suggested by anyone that the refugee youth should not be permitted to attend the mainstream school
at Loulouni.  While the right to access this service was not a source of conflict, as later analysis will
explain, related conflicts found articulation in the school setting.  
Health services were slightly more contentious than education, though the conflict did not stem
from the host community as a whole, but only the local health centre.  It is widely recognised that
refugees sell a large portion of their aid disbursements (Landau, 2002).  In the months after medical
kits were included in the disbursements, however, the pharmacy almost went out of business due to
the availability of pharmaceuticals being sold at cheap prices by the refugees.  An interview with the
chef de post (18 January, 2006) does a good job of explaining the dynamics in the health sector.  
Of  course,  the biggest problem we as health workers experienced
with the refugees was the problem with the pharmacy.  That was not
a conflict per se, but a logistical problem.  It was poor planning by
those helping the refugees.  They didn't  consider that we are also
here selling medicines, and that the budget of many of our activities
is connected to the pharmacy.  We were not trying to make a profit,
but  running  effectively  is  not  free.   It's  necessary  to  have  a
refrigerator  for  vaccinations, but how can it  run without money for
petrol?  We suffered from the medical supplies from Bamako, and
we  tried  to  reach  an  agreement  with  the  decision  makers,  but
everything  was  too  far  above  our  heads.  There  was  no
consultation.....[Other  interactions]  were  generally  positive.   When
people  first  started  to  arrive,  we  had  too  much  work.   The  new
arrivals were tired,  and many of  them weren't  healthy.   We  were
already busy here, serving people from many villages around.  The
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Red Cross came with volunteers, though, and that helped us a lot.
There were good dynamics here, we worked together well.  Nobody
ever mentioned that refugees must go here for service, and people
from Loulouni  must  go  here.   In  this  health  centre,  we are  care
givers, and anyone who is sick is our patient.  This is not a police
service,  and  we  are  not  interested  in  seeing  identity  documents.
There were some challenges; the Red Cross workers had their way
of  doing  things  and  we  had  our  way,  and  sometimes  it  was  a
challenge to synthesise these differences.  It was good to exchange
these ideas.  I was on the crisis committee, and I gathered from my
experience there that  some people in Loulouni  suffered when the
refugees came.  But  speaking for  myself,  I  can't  say that  was the
case with the health centre.  The situation wasn't ideal, but we came
out stronger because of any hardships.  I think now we are better
organised and coordinated than we were before.   Sometimes it is
good when you have to do things differently, you learn.  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, residents of Loulouni were generally so far  removed
from health services that they had little stake in this service at a local level.  Refugees also had little
to say about the health sector, other than pointing out that the facilities available were sub-standard
to what was available in Cote d'Ivoire; refugees with serious health problems were immediately sent
to Sikasso.  These two things meant that issues of health are better understood at a higher-than
commune level, as there has been little community involvement.  
The most conflictual service provision issue was that of water.  As previously noted, water was
one of the biggest problems in Loulouni before the arrival of the refugees, and even after the two
borehole hand pumps were installed at the site of the camp, Loulouni remains far below the Sphere
Project Humanitarian Standards minimum criteria of 250 people per tap, 500 per hand pump, or 400
people per well to allow everyone 15 litres of  water  daily.   Given its population of  3,000 without
counting  refugees,  evacuees,  and  returnees,  there  should  be  at  least  six  hand  pumps  (Sphere
Project, 2004).  As it is, the vast majority of residents drink primarily untreated water from uncovered
wells, and for activities that require large amounts of water, such as washing clothes, they go to a
seasonal  river  that  skirts  the town (Site log,  2000).   The installation of  the two water  sources in
Loulouni  serving  750 people (a  hand pump serving  500  people  and  a  tap  serving  250 people),
approximately covered the population of the camp as per the standards mentioned above, but without
consideration for the host population.  
When UNICEF installed the two new water sources, there was a lack of clarity about usage
rights of the pump and tap.  Nearly all members of the community assumed that they had free use of
both water sources, while nearly all refugees assumed that they had exclusive usage rights.  The tap
at the school was not terribly contentious.   It was further from the camp and therefore used less
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frequently  by  the  refugees  not  attending  school,  and  few  members  of  the  community  besides
students went to take water there.  It was locked outside school hours, and conflict was kept to a
minimum.  The tap near the market, however, was a constant source of conflict.  It was reported by
both members of the host community and refugees that for a period of several weeks in 2003, fights
broke out at the pump daily.  
The crisis committee took up the issue of the pump, and concluded that while the tap at the
school would be shared equally by the school and the refugee camp, refugees would have exclusive
use of the pump near the market.  It still took several weeks to hammer down specifics, such as who
could be responsible for locking the pump at certain times, and whether fees could be charged for
pump usage and who would be responsible for managing them, but agreeing on this system did not
immediately reduce conflict with the community.  This can be attributed to three things.  Firstly, a lack
of communication of the decision of the crisis committee to the community meant that many people
were  unaware  of  the  decision,  and  continued  to  think  the  refugees  were  being  unfairly  selfish.
Secondly, there was a lack of acceptance of the decision on the part of many women, who perceived
it  as unfair,  and imposed by the  sous prefet.   Thirdly, because the market  attracted vendors and
merchants from as far afield as Bamako, Mopti, and Cote d'Ivoire, and conflicts pertaining to pump
usage were most frequent on Wednesdays and Thursdays (Thursday being the day of the market,
but  people travelling long distances tended to arrive on Wednesday to set  up),  it  was difficult  to
communicate to non-members of  the host  community the details of  the pump usage regime, and
even more difficult  to induce them to respect it,  given the lack of incentive they have to maintain
community relationships.  
When asked about the impact refugees had had on the economic situation in Loulouni, eighty-
three respondents made reference to the new water sources as being a positive contribution to the
community.  The former mayor (interview, 11 June, 2006), however, refused to attribute this service
to the arrival of the refugees.
The  Ivorians have had a very  negative  impact  on services in  the
town.  UNICEF has been working in the commune for many years.
Some people say they put in pumps because of the Ivorians, but that
is not the case.  They have been working to support education, and
they  put  a  pump  at  the  school.    They  have  done  this  in  other
communes  as  well.   The  second  pump  was  installed  by  the
department  of  waterworks.   UNICEF  helped  with  the  commune
percentage  of  the  funding,  and  encouraged  the  department  in
Sikasso  to  contribute  the  rest.   That  is  normally  the  work  of  the
department.  Are we supposed to congratulate the Ivorians because
our  government  department  is  doing  its  job?   Then  the  camp
manager came and said that that pump must be for the Ivorians, and
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the sous prefet agreed.  This is taking away the service development
from Loulouni.   They did the same damage to our health service,
overloading the doctor, and then coming in with their own medicines
to put our pharmacy out of business.  
Other people with a negative view of the refugee influx, however, generally allowed that the refugee
relief effort was responsible for the water points, even if they created problems of access, or conflict
relating to them.  As one respondent demonstrates, 
Some organisations brought the pumps for the refugees, so that was
a big benefit for the community, since there is a problem of water
here.  The refugees created many problems with the water, though;
for  months,  we were fighting  about  using  the pumps.   Every day
some would go to the mayor,  some would go to the village chief,
some would go to the manager  of  the camp,  saying how can we
reach agreement about the water?  Eventually, we were just quiet,
because we knew some day the Ivorians would leave, and we would
be left with the pumps.  That is worth any trouble we had, it has been
a great benefit for the town.  
Sanitation is an issue closely connected to water, and while it was somewhat less contentious
than the question of pump access, there were all the same many sanitation problems raised in the
community and at the refugee camp, and the task force dealing with water was also responsible for
sanitation.  Sanitation issues came to the forefront early on, while the camp was still being installed;
however, they were more reflecting existing power struggles than a problem of sanitation per se.  At a
crisis committee meeting, the sous prefet called on the youth association to require that its members
sweep and tidy the camp area once weekly, as a gesture of good will towards the refugees.  The
mayor  was  opposed  to  the  idea,  reflecting  many  of  the  historical  dynamics  between  the  sous
prefet and the mayor.  In his words (interview, 19 March, 2006)
At the crisis committee meeting, the government said that the youth
association would be required to volunteer their labour to clean that
refugee camp.  I  said that was something I could never agree to.
This should not be required, unpaid work.  Mali is no longer at a time
of forced labour; the government cannot exploit the population at will.
If we find that the community is willing to do this work freely, of their
own accord, that is fine and they have my blessing, but nobody can
say that it is work they are required to do.  
Perhaps equally significantly, the youth association in Loulouni had not been functioning for nearly a
decade due to certain long standing disputes in the community, making the issue moot.  
The second sanitation issue that came up was related to the sweeping of the market area.
Beginning in 2002 before the arrival of the refugees, the mayor's office contracted out the sweeping
of the market area every Friday to the women's association.  They were paid through a nominal stall
fee paid by each vendor at the market.  This was very much a case of public service on the part of
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the  association,  as  they  did  a  great  deal  of  work  at  a  reduced  rate.   In  2003,  however,  the
arrangement was cancelled.  The president of the women's association (interview, 14 January 2006)
cited  mismanagement  of  funds  on  the  part  of  the  mayor's  office.   Other  women  in  informal
discussions, however, suggested that it was motivated by a dissatisfaction with the way the water
conflict with the refugee camp was being handled.  
The final sanitation issue of debate at the camp was that of latrines.  This again was closely
tied to the proximity of the camp to the market place.  In construction of the camp, eleven latrines
were dug.  The Sphere Project Humanitarian Standards (2004) recommend a maximum of twenty
people per latrine, and given that the camp population was an average of around 800, this is only a
quarter  of  the  recommended  number  of  latrines.   The  hygienic  level  of  the  latrines  was also  a
concern.  The Sphere Project asserts that latrines are “more likely to be kept clean if users have a
sense of ownership (2004 p75).” This was difficult to promote given the lack of latrines in the market
area.  Residents around the market area had called for the construction of latrines at the market in
the past, citing hygienic concerns.  With the number of market-goers using the latrines, the refugees
refused responsibility for  their  upkeep.   The eventual result  is that  they were rarely used.   While
repairs were occasionally made by NGOs on an ad hoc basis, the sanitary concerns of the refugees
were never adequately resolved.  
Residents  of  Loulouni  and  Ivorian  refugees  generally  had  positive  relationships.   However,
looking at service provision points to some tensions.  First, the experience of the pharmacy is a clear
case  of  unintended  consequences  on  the  part  of  humanitarian  agencies.   The  water  sector
demonstrates  one  of  the  clearest  cases  of  refugees  bringing  resources  into  the  community  and
changing the demands citizens have of local government officials, which is a key argument in this
thesis.   The  dynamics  around  education  and sanitation  both  underline  the  historical  relationship
between Malians and Ivorians, and the class element that is a part of both the refugee experience,
and the impact the refugees have on the decentralisation process.   
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 Economic patterns
The economic patterns of refugees in Loulouni are in many ways accurate indicators for
their integration into the host community, due to the fact that they reflect a wide range of concerns for
refugee communities, such as social interactions and economic independence.  They also reflect how
the historical dynamics and class differences between Malians and Ivorians express themselves in
the  present  situation.   There  were  various  differences  in  the  economic  habits  of  refugees  and
citizens, and exploring these will shed light on the relationship between refugees and citizens.  
Refugees were less likely to engage in farming as citizens of Loulouni, even though land
was made available to refugees should they have chosen to cultivate it.  This is unsurprising, given
that their time horizons were uncertain, the land set aside was often marginal, and cultivation would
have required substantial capital.  Additionally, the largest influx of refugees was between the months
of September and December – harvest time.  It would be approximately another six months before
refugees could sow their own plots.  Even so, eleven respondents critically mentioned that refugees
did not cultivate their land, often as support for assertions that they were lazy, used to the city life, or
not interested in contributing to the development of Loulouni.  
While refugees were more likely to engage in commerce than citizens, they were less likely
to engage in the least profitable kind of commerce - buying a product in bulk and selling it in smaller
quantities.  Instead, they were more likely to be selling products that they either made or processed,
which is generally more profitable, but also requires more skills and capital.  The most typical of these
activities is making attieke, a fermented cassava dish that is difficult to prepare and a luxury in Mali,
but a staple in Cote d'Ivoire.  One resident of Loulouni knits hats for a living, and she said the refugee
influx had a substantial impact on her work.
Ten years ago, I was the only one in Loulouni who knew how to do this.
My aunt went to Abidjan with her husband, and she learned there.  When
she  came  back  to  visit,  she  taught  me  how  to  do  it,  and  I  had  a
successful business.  It's the kind of thing only people in big cities do.  In
Cote  d'Ivoire,  more  people  learn  these  things.   When  so  many  Cote
d'Ivoirians came, they all knew how to do this knitting.   It's okay, I still
have my clients and now they have theirs, but business was better before
they came (respondent 64).
The cooking of specialised dishes was particularly common among refugee women.  Due to
higher  rainfall  in  Cote  d'Ivoire,  many food  products  common there  are  luxuries  in  Mali,  and  are
generally prepared by Cote d'Ivoirians who have more experience preparing these dishes.  This, in
combination with cultural  norms formed in the relatively wealthier Cote d'Ivoire,  could explain the
charcoal  consumption  among  refugees  being  nearly  double  that  of  residents.   As  one  woman
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explains, 
Some of my [Malian] friends laugh at me, because I use charcoal so
much.  I cook nearly everything on a charcoal furnace.  At home, I
didn't have a mud stove.  I'm not used to cooking with wood.  Some
things I know how to make using a wood fire; rice and corn dishes
are easy.  When I'm cooking plantains, though, I don't know how to
do it correctly using wood.  My friends say that I must be rich; they
must think I'm showing off  money cooking everything on charcoal.
That's not the case; I came here with nothing, and I was not rich,
even before.  I just know a different way of doing things.  I could not
manage cooking only with wood; I need to sell plantains, and if they
were cooked over wood, I can't say how they would turn out, or if
people would buy them (refugee interview, 14 September, 2005).  
Another occupation for which Ivorians were renowned is brewing dollo, a term which applies to
various alcoholic drinks including millet beer and palm wine.  As the vast majority of  residents of
Loulouni are Muslim, alcohol is taboo, and no local residents would openly brew dollo.  Twelve of the
fourteen respondents who thought that the refugee presence was having a generally negative impact
on the community cited  dollo as a factor, causing moral degeneration in the community.  This was
inevitably linked to other  debaucherous,  disrespectful  activities,  such as laziness,  prostitution and
stealing.  
All of the activities mentioned above are primarily “women's jobs,” and it is true that women at
the refugee camp were, on average, more economically active than men.  Some men reported doing
wage labour on farms, but most of the refugees came at a particularly bad time of year for temporary
agricultural work.  The influx took place during harvest, and for the months following, work is almost
completely unavailable.  The following two years both had very poor rainfall, substantially decreasing
the demand for hired workers.   A few individuals worked in the construction sector (the primary dry
season occupation); however, most refugee men cited difficulty doing this work because mud bricks
in Loulouni were a different style than those in Cote d'Ivoire, to suit the drier climate, and thatching
was  also  done  differently.   Others  reported  attempting  to  work  as  artisans,  but  facing  difficulty
primarily due to a lack of access to capital, but also because of either a saturated market, or difficulty
breaking into the existing market (mentioned in eight interviews).  Petty employment available to men
in Loulouni is generally less prestigious than for women.  Many youths were reported to work as
porters or other small jobs on market day, but beyond that and agricultural labour, job prospects were
limited.  
In  terms  of  material  possessions,  refugees  were  less  likely  to  have  access  to  various
material indications of wealth than residents.  For example, relatively few refugee households had
bikes or motos, solar panels, radios, etc.  This is unsurprising again given the context of their arrival
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to Loulouni, and that most do not consider it their permanent place of residence.  These material
indicators do not make a good measurement of economic integration, however, as numerous non-
material indicators suggest a lifestyle considered prestigious by residents of Loulouni.  The use of
charcoal burners mentioned above is once example.  They were also more likely to eat cassava than
local residents, and less likely to eat corn.  A difference in dietary habits was exacerbated by food
distributions, which were based on rice.  Rice is a relatively prestigious food in Loulouni, and not even
the wealthiest residents have a diet based primarily on rice.  
In addition to material possessions, refugees tended to have cultural capital to associate
them with the elite in Loulouni.  They were on average more educated than residents,  from more
urban areas,  and had a far  better  command of  French.   Finally,  through no choice of  their  own,
refugees report more leisure time than their Malian counterparts.  As one young man reports (refugee
interview 34, 1 October, 2005),
People could look at me and say I'm lazy, but that's not it.  It's not
that I don't want to work, but what can I do here?  In Cote d'Ivoire,
there  were more  choices;  here,  there  is  nothing.   I  don't  want  to
spend all my days sitting around drinking tea, but what else can I
do?  I'm sad every time I go to the office of the  sous prefet;  I am
young and fit, I should be working for the food I eat.  I wish the aid
workers would distribute jobs instead of food.  
He goes on to confess
Some  of  my  friends  pass  their  days  drinking  dollo and  chasing
women.  I don't agree with what they're doing, but I also understand
why they do it.  They are bored, their hands are idle, and they have
no power to change their circumstances.  I can't blame them for it.  
The former mayor (interview, 11 June, 2006) also noted his concern about the lack of employment at
the camp, citing that it was creating tensions with the community.  
Right  now,  there are  many refugees staying  here  that  have been
given the  opportunity  to  move to  Faragouaran,  where there  is  an
international mandate for their management.  They have been given
the opportunity to return to Cote d'Ivoire since the security situation is
better.  They chose to stay here.  This is worrisome for us, because
we don't know what work they are doing, we don't understand what
they  are  doing  here.   When  someone is  working,  we understand
there  role  in  the  community.   But  a  stranger  who comes  without
work, who stays without work, and who doesn't want to leave for a
place that may have opportunities, how can the community trust such
a person?
The  economic  aspects  of  the  refugee  camp  are  both  a  cause  and  a  consequence  of  the
interaction between the camp and the decentralisation process.  While certain economic indicators
(staple food, for example) are less an indicator of economic class than geography and  planning by
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relief agencies.  However, the history of classism and discrimination between Cote d'Ivoire and Mali
means that all these factors influence the way refugees interact with the community, and how the
community  perceives  the  rights  and  powers  of  refugees.   These  interactions  then  shape  the
discussions that take place between citizens and local government officials, particularly in the arena
of access to resources.  This, as we saw in the introduction, and will be emphasised in the following
chapter, is a key element in shaping the decentralisation process.  
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Perceptions, Identity, and trends
It  is often the case in refugee contexts that  refugees are seen as outsiders,  and identities
differentiating refugees and the host community serve as polarising factors (see Chapter 2; Bakewell,
2000;  Whitaker,  1999).   This  has not  been the  case in  Loulouni  for  a  number  of  reasons.   An
extensive  history  of  migration  as  well  as  a  shared  language,  culture,  religion,  and  ethnicity  all
contribute to the inclusive nature of refugee-host identities.  This does not necessarily imply a lack of
tension, however, and some conflicts were actually framed around this sameness of identity.  It was
mentioned in four interviews and by two respondents that there were Malians passing themselves off
as refugees.  
The former mayor (interview, 11 June, 2006), who had very negative opinions of the refugee
presence, posited the following view:
People are using the camp as a hiding place.  These are Malians –
not second, third generation Malian immigrants, but Malians born in
Mali, who once had Malian ID cards – at the camp, receiving aid,
claiming to be from Cote d'Ivoire.  They've looked at other returned
migrants, who are staying with their extended family in Loulouni, and
they've seen that life is difficult for them.  So they're trying to take a
different path.  They are just taking what they can get.  
Are more commonly  expressed view,  however,  was to  take pride in the identity shared with the
refugee community.  One man said
You can't come here and say there are the refugees, and these are
people from Loulouni.  We're all the same.  You can see the truth in
what I'm saying by watching the young people interact.  Whenever
there are functions, playing football, and even if there is work to be
done, the young people are all together.   They are even marrying
each other, and we adults are happy with it, because once, we made
a distinction, and we have seen that it is wrong.  
Still  others shared the above respondent's observation about young people interacting, but took a
very different view on the matter.  Previous quotes have alluded to stereotypes in the community of
the refugee camp as a den of sin – a source of alcohol, prostitution, etc.  
Some of these accusations have truth to them.  Even respondents who had generally positive
views of the refugee presence tacitly acknowledged the presence of alcohol and prostitution.  As one
respondent (16) said,
Many of the refugees are from cities, where they are used to things
we are not used to, and we don't accept all of the views they bring
with them.  A lot of them drink, they aren't Muslim.  It is something
we don't like, and they are used to doing things with girls that people
here don't accept.  Despite this, they come with a lot of new ideas
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that we are interested in hearing; many of them have travelled, and
seen  things  we  haven't  seen.   That  is  an  important  asset.   Like
everything, we have to learn to take the good, and leave the bad.  If
they have some bad ways of  doing things, we must move on and
forget  them.   Their  new ideas  are  giving  us  many  opportunities;
when we use them, we can't forget that.  
Another negative stereotype of refugees that was expressed in Loulouni and other refugee hosting
situations (Landau, 2002) is that they are responsible for increased crime in host communities.  This
seems to have little basis in evidence in Loulouni.  While many people who had a negative view of
refugees accused them of being criminals, there was no substantial increase in reported crime upon
the arrival of the refugees and returned migrants (interview, Kadiolo chief of police, 15 August, 2006).
While there was one case of rioting that resulted in the police being called, it was due to perceived
corruption of the sous prefet, and did not involve the general population of the host community at all.  
An additional accusation often levelled against refugees is that they erode social structures, for
example, undermining traditional authorities or family structures.  This, like crime, is something those
with an already negative opinion of refugees evoked to strengthen their case, and the majority of
respondents acknowledged, and yet attribute to different sources.  Seventy-six respondents brought
up a change in traditional structures of  authority as a change Loulouni has seen in the past five
years; every single older man mentioned it.  However, only four linked it to the presence of refugees.
That is the same number of respondents who linked the same phenomenon to decentralisation.  The
majority of respondents linked it to changes with roots in economic patterns, such as more young
people migrating, working for cash, or no longer depending on their families for paying bride prices.
This is very much in line with what academia suggests, as various studies have found that 
where  agricultural  decline  and  urbanisation  lead  to  high  mobility
among  youth  and  a  concentration  of  elderly  people  in  rural
communities....older  people  often  lose  control  over  important
productive resources and traditional support structures become less
effective (Whitaker, 2002 p 374, citing Baker, 1995; Sommers, 1995
and Parkin, 1972).  
While these negative stereotypes that are frequently dealt with in the refugee studies literature
could be found in Loulouni, they were not descriptive of the average host perception of the refugee
community.  
Perceptions both by refugees and hosts overwhelmingly centred on the economic differences
between Mali and Cote d'Ivoire.  The refugees, while not seen as rich during their sojourn in Loulouni,
were  seen as  coming  from a  place  of  economic  privilege,  not  accustomed to  the  difficult  living
conditions in Loulouni.  This defined many levels of engagement between hosts and the community,
and was certainly the centre of how other perceptions were articulated.  For example, many of the
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hosts who cited the refugees as a source of social degradation linked this to the “urban way of life” in
Cote d'Ivoire.  These articulations were widely shared by refugees as well.  One refugee woman
demonstrated this view discussing the water conflict.
Women  from  Loulouni  say  it's  not  fair  that  we  have  a  pump  to
ourselves.  It's true that they have a problem of water too, and there
are more of them than us.  But they have been here for a long time,
living like this.  They are used to it.  Staying in Cote d'Ivoire, we are
not used to such things.  We can barely survive with this pump as it
is.  
While this difference of economic background was a source of tension, it was not always seen
negatively.  The most commonly cited affect refugees had on the community was that they brought
new ideas,  mentioned  by  seventy-four  survey respondents.   In  Mali,  travelling  is  considered  an
important  form of  education,  and as such,  anyone coming from far  away is respected as having
knowledge of different places, customs, etc.  The vast majority of respondents' initial framing of their
interactions  with  the  refugee  community  was  based  around  this  exchange  of  ideas.   This  was
particularly emphasised by poorer respondents, and those who had never travelled to Cote d'Ivoire.
One man explained,
Many people in Loulouni have been to Cote d'Ivoire, and come back
with stories about what it is like there.  I have never had the chance
to go, so I must keep quiet.  Now when I talk to the people coming
from Cote  d'Ivoire,  it  is  like  I  have gone  myself.   I  can  come to
understand their way of doing things.  I can also help teach them,
since they are strangers here.  It turns all of us into wiser people.
This has really benefited the town.  Now, the boundaries of Loulouni
don't stop at the river, they stretch all the way to Cote d'Ivoire.  
This  idea  was  also  expressed  through  responses  about  refugees'  economic  activities.   Sixteen
women surveyed cited the Ivorian's superior  attieke-making abilities.  Three even reported working
with them to learn the skill.  
The only two respondents who reported hiring Ivorian agricultural workers also had positive
things to say about the exchange of ideas.  One mentioned
farming in Cote d'Ivoire is not exactly the same as it is here.  There,
the plots are usually bigger, and some of the things we plant are not
the same.   Sometimes it  is a disadvantage,  because the workers
don't  know how to  do everything,  and we must  teach them.   But
sometimes  I  gain  a  lot,  because they  might  know ways of  doing
things that are better, or faster.   
The  strongest  trend  evident  in  the  data,  a  dynamic  which  was  also  evident  in  other
interactions, including the interviews and informal interactions, was that opinions about the impact
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refugees had on the community were strongly correlated to the economic status of the respondent.20
Specifically, the wealthier the respondent, the more likely they were to feel like the refugees had a
negative impact on the community.  See the following crosstabulation:
Refugee Impact * Economic status
Impact of
refugees
Poorest
quarter
2nd quarter 3rd quarter Wealthiest
quarter
Total
Positive
impact
24
96%
22
88%
21
84%
14
56%
81
Negative
impact
1
4%
1
4%
4
16%
8
32%
14
Unsure of
impact
0 2
8%
0 3
12%
5
Total 25 25 25 25 100
Reasons for this were articulated in a number of different ways, and its implications are central to
thinking about transformations in governance in general and decentralisation in particular.  
The most striking articulation stems from the fact that wealthy men were more likely to have
travelled to Cote d'Ivoire themselves to work than any other sector of the population.  Every single
male respondent claiming the refugees were having a negative impact on the community had spent
time working in Cote d'Ivoire, and they all made a link to the discrimination they themselves faced
during their time in Cote d'Ivoire.  
One man said 
We  who  have  worked  in  Cote  d'Ivoire,  we  will  turn  our  backs  to  the
refugees.  We went there and suffered.  I can't describe what it is to be a
Malian  working  in  Cote  d'Ivoire;  the  humiliation  when  you  go  to  pray.
People  take  advantage  of  you,  stealing  because  they know you  are  a
stranger, and you have nowhere to turn.  Now they are trying to turn to
me?   No,  my  eyes  are  closed  to  their  problems  (association  leader
20 Economic status was determined by combining responses to a number of questions.  First, respondents were
asked whether they, or someone in their household, owned each of a list of ten items chosen as indicators of
wealth in Loulouni (examples: bicycle, solar panel, radio, etc.).  Based on this, the respondent earned a score
from one to ten.  They received an additional two points if they attended French school, and an additional one
point if they had any other formal schooling.  They then received between zero and four points based on
whether or not they hired workers (and how many).  Finally, additional points were assigned based on the
respondent's work, the head of household's work, and other sources of income (for example, laborers that
worked on others' farms earned no points, subsistence farmers who owned their own land received one
point, those who hired workers earned two points, and those who owned land that was farmed in a tenement
systems received three points).  
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interview, 18 March, 2006)
Conversely, a wealthy woman who had also spent time in Cote d'Ivoire experienced similar difficulties,
but drew a different conclusion about the impact the refugees were having.  
I am glad the refugees came.  When I went to their doorstep asking for
help, they turned me away.  I slept outside in the cold, hungry.  Now that
they are at my doorstep, they will have a warm bed and a full stomach.  I
used to be angry at the Ivorians, and the way they treated me, but now
that they are here, I have the chance to make peace.  Being a good host
has been a chance for me to regain the respect that I lost when I was in
Cote d'Ivoire (merchant interview, 18 July, 2006). 
In the case of women, negativity in seven of the nine cases was expressed primarily because of the
problem of water in the community.  As one woman said,
When we learned that the Ivorians were getting pumps installed, we were
very happy.  We  had also been obliged to walk far  to the river to get
water,  and then it  is  not  always clean.   But  then the Ivorians said we
couldn't use their pumps, that they were only for them.  Even if they were
not using them, they would lock them so we couldn't take water.  How can
we accept them as guests if they behave like this (respondent 78)?
The  fact  that  there  is  a  correlation  between  economic  status  and  a  negative  opinion  of
refugees is not on its own important to this study.  It becomes important, however, upon learning that
economic status was correlated to interactions with local government officials.   While the wealthy
were  not  substantially  more  politically  engaged,21 they  were  more  likely  than  their  less  affluent
counterparts to go to the mayor or commune council to help them resolve any disputes they might be
party to in the community.  As wealth decreased, respondents were more likely to consult extended
family members,  religious leaders,  or  the  village  chief.   The consequence of  these two patterns
converging is that local government will be more engaged on issues relating to refugees by those
who feel they have had a negative impact on the community.  The impact of this will be explored in
the following chapter. 
What some of the quotes from this chapter illustrate is that a wide range of members of the
host  community  in  Loulouni  are  making  the same observations about  the impact  of  the refugee
presence in Loulouni, which seem accurate in that they are supported by other kinds of data as well.
The  conclusions they are  drawing,  however,  differ  wildly.   The current  refugee  studies  literature
looking at the impact refugees are having on their hosts explains this by disaggregating the local
population,  and pointing  out  that  different  people  are experiencing different  aspects  of  the  same
21 Political engagement was measured by receiving one point (with a maximum of ten) based on whether or not
the respondent was registered to vote, whether they had voted in the last election, whether they reported
themselves as involved in politics, whether they were members of associations, whether they were on the
board of associations,  whether they reported they were involved in, or felt they could influence, decision
making processes in Loulouni, and whether they were able to list any organisations active in Loulouni.  
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phenomenon.   While  this  is  one  element,  simply  disaggregating  the  population  does  not  go  far
enough.  This study proposes that these differences in articulation can be more accurately explained
as a reflection of the pre-existing power dynamics in the community, and provide important insights
about stakeholders views and involvement in the local political process.
While disaggregation of all populations is important for a robust understanding of social and
political dynamics, this chapter has provided an argument that it is inadequate.  Rather, the historical
political, economic, and social dynamics that make such a process of disaggregation relevant must
be brought into the picture as well.  These played a large role in setting the trajectory for the process
of  integration.   In the case of  Loulouni,  the close historical ties between southern Mali  and Cote
d'Ivoire meant that  refugees were not  seen as outsiders that  the local community could build an
identity in opposition to.  However, because Cote d'Ivoirians were historically wealthier, at times at the
expense of migrant workers from Cote d'Ivoire, discourse over rights and access to resources were
often framed in terms of differences of class, level of education, etc.  This has then been instrumental
in shaping the decentralisation process.  
By  the  beginning  of  this  chapter,  it  was  already  evident  that  the  implementation  of
decentralisation in Loulouni was strengthening many aspects of participatory democracy.  Citizens
were much more likely to interact with local government officials, channels of communication had
opened, and there was a widespread perception that, however serious the problems of capacity may
be,  local  government  valued  consultation,  and  had  become  more  responsive  to  their  needs.
However, from an administrative point of view, the division of powers between the mayor and the
sous prefet was delicately balancing many issues of legitimacy, capacity, and service provision.  This
balance was threatened by limits of fiscal decentralisation, since a lack of resources at the local level
was both undermining the relationship between the mayor and the community,  and between the
mayor and the sous prefet.  
The arrival of refugees to this scene transformed the situation in several important ways.  On
one  hand,  the  refugee  influx  was  accompanied  by  significant  resources  from  humanitarian
organisations.  This had clear benefits for the community, particularly since many of these resources
came  in  the  form  of  infrastructure.   However,  rights  and  access  to  these  resources  had  to  be
negotiated between the refugees and the host community, and these negotiations took place in a
context  of  historical  inequalities.   Additionally,  the  power  to  control  rights  and access  had to  be
negotiated between the mayor and the sous prefet.  The process through which this took place, and
the way this changed the decentralisation process will be developed in the next chapter.  
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WHO REPRESENTS THE LOCAL PEOPLE AND WHO RECEIVES POWERS IN DECENTRALISATION? 
VARIOUS ACTORS, INCLUDING ELECTED BODIES, CUSTOMARY AUTHORITIES, ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTEES, LOCAL REPRESENTATIVES OF
TECHNICAL SERVICES AND MINISTERS, COMMUNITY GROUPS, “DEVELOPMENT” COMMITTEES AND NGOS, 
ARE RECEIVING POWERS IN RURAL AFRICA IN THE NAME OF DECENTRALISATION. 
THE KINDS OF ACTORS WHO ARE EMPOWERED IN DECENTRALISATION SHAPE THE OUTCOMES THAT CAN BE EXPECTED. 
DIFFERENT ACTORS ARE EMBEDDED IN DIFFERENT KINDS OF ACCOUNTABILITY RELATIONS, AND 
THESE RELATIONS SHAPE THE WAYS IN WHICH THEY EXERCISE THEIR POWERS.
RIBOT, 2002
5. Impact of Refugee Arrival on Decentralisation
The previous two chapters have looked at the impact of refugee arrival on decentralisation
first from the point of view of the decentralisation process, and then from the point of view of the
refugee influx.  This chapter will focus specifically on those areas of interaction already indicated in
previous chapters.  It will develop and analyse the most important impacts the refugee influx has on
the decentralisation process in Loulouni.
This  chapter  breaks  down the  impacts  into  three  categories:  political,  administrative,  and
developmental.   While all three are intertwined,  distinguishing between them is useful  not only to
structure the discussion, but also in bringing the analysis to other decentralisation processes, which
may be structurally different from either a political or administrative point of view.  
The impact the refugee influx has had on the administrative aspects of the decentralisation
process have been largely negative.  As previously discussed, lack of clear mandates on all levels
has been a huge challenge to the effective implementation of decentralisation in Mali.  Just as local
government officials were developing a way of working in the face of this challenge, the introduction
of new powers and resources by the refugee influx upset the fragile administrative balance.  Power
struggles were exacerbated, occasionally to the point of limiting the capacity of the local government
to  act.   Additionally,  because  of  the  nature  of  the  relief  operation,  unprecedented  demands  for
coordination  were  made  on  local  government.   This  likely  had  the  positive  affect  of  improving
coordination  across  the  board.   However,  it  is  also  possible  that  such  demands  will  result  in
unintended transformations of local government structures.  The final outcome remains to be seen as
the transformation is very much still work in progress, but evidence from Loulouni suggests that the
relief effort moved local government away from participatory, democratic practices by vesting more
power in upwardly accountable authorities.
The political impact of the refugee influx, however,  is largely positive.  Before the refugee
influx, residents of Loulouni were overwhelmingly frustrated with the inability of local government to
meet their needs with regards to basic public services.  Local government was frustrated with the
demands being made on them from the population while they were unable to access resources to
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respond.  Mirroring the administrative conflicts caused by the humanitarian influx, the introduction of
resources  that  accompanied  the  refugees  created  conflict  in  the  community.   This  changed  the
demands of local government from service provision to conflict resolution.  Local government was
unable to provide services because of a lack of resource.  However, a high degree of success was
possible on the conflict resolution front.  This built a relationship of trust between local governmnet
authorities and the population, bringing the residents of  Loulouni on board in the decentralisation
process.  This confidence is crucial to the success of decentralisation, and without the change in local
government role prompted by the refugee influx, decentralisation would have risked being brushed
aside  as  more  talk  from  the  central  government.   The  only  danger  is  that  ultimately  it  is  local
government that is responsible for service provision under decentralisation, and if the local population
is no longer going to hold the government accountable for services, it will equally be a failure.  
Finally,  the  developmental  aspects  are  briefly  considered.   While  the  political  and
administrative elements fit neatly into the discourse on decentralisation, considering development on
its  own is  useful  as  well  both  because  development  is  an  explicit  goal  of  decentralisation,  and
because a large part of the discussion on refugee influxes surrounds the humanitarian aid involved.
In this case, more questions were found than answers.  There is a discord at present between the
importance  of  nongovernmental  and  international  players  in  development  on  one  hand,  and the
developmental role of decentralised government on the other.  
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Administrative impacts
The arrival of refugees can be seen as impacting the administrative decentralisation process
in three places: coordination, capacity, and clarity.  In terms of coordination, the multi-sectoral relief
effort required a wider variety of stakeholders work together in a way that had ever been demanded
in decentralised Mali.  It  would be difficult  to find another situation in which government from the
national  to  the local  level,  both  upwardly and downwardly accountable,  is  required  to  coordinate
efforts with technical ministries at all levels, and international organisations and NGOs are required to
coordinate their work with government at multiple levels, all to one common end.  This is linked to
clarity, as during the coordinated work, lack of clarity of roles came to the forefront as an obstacle to
effective implementation of the relief effort.  While some roles may have gained clarity as a result, it
is equally true that in some places, ambiguities with which the system had been able to work were no
longer considered acceptable, resulting in conflict.  Finally, issues of capacity were highlighted time
and time again, as new powers and limitations were being tested.  
The refugee influx can seen as trying, perhaps for the first time since they were implemented,
the coordination abilities of decentralised governance structures in Mali, since coordination was at the
heart of the relief effort.  In fact, far more man-hours were spent in coordination than implementation
(interview, Sikasso crisis committee member, 18 February, 2006).  It is clear by the way the relief
effort was coordinated that the sous prefet, rather than the mayor, was at the forefront of the local
government relief effort.   
Because of the political history of  Mali,  sous prefets are very responsive to responsibilities
passed  down  to  them  from  the  hierarchy  of  government.   One  NGO  extension  worker  in  a
neighbouring commune cited a history of conflict with the  sous prefet, as he was seen as working
with the mayor on issues surrounding decentralisation.  When this was discussed in Sikasso at a
planning meeting, he returned to a complete reversal of attitude.  Upon inquiry, he found 
it was really quite simple.  All it took was a letter from the office of
the governor saying 'decentralisation is our project too, give it your
full support.' After that statement was received, the sous prefet was
nothing but helpful (ACOD extension agent interview, June 18).  
From the formation of the crisis committee, it was clear that managing the refugee situation
was being placed in the hands of the sous prefet.  This explains his strong support of the refugees on
so many issues, such as according exclusive use of one pump to the camp, and the encouragement
of the community to clean the camp.  The mayor, however, felt marginalised throughout the process
of the arrival of refugees, and this undoubtedly made already existing tensions with the sous prefet
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worse, and possibly mobilised negative sentiments about the refugees.  Allegiances with the mayor
by certain segments of the population then became articulated as anti-refugee.  
In  an  interview,  (6  March,  2006)  the  mayor  at  the  time  of  the  relief  effort  explains  his
experience.  
The  manager  of  the  camp  didn't  include  the  commune  in  the
management of things.....Even though someone else represents the
state in the commune level, the mayor represents the population.  If
we,  the  host  community,  are  going  to  support  the  refugees,  the
manager also must engage the community.  I was not at all included
in the process.  Okay, if a delegation was going to the camp, I was
invited  along  just  like  that,  but  as  soon  as  something  had  to  be
decided, be it related to protection, services, or resource allocation,
the community is completely overlooked.  We were ready to engage
with the refugees as partners in developing the commune, but  as
soon  as  we  saw  that  the  manager  was  only  looking  to  the
government, and brushing the population aside, we also stood to the
side.  There has always been some rivalry between the commune
population and the state.  That's normal.  You hear all over Mali that
with  decentralisation,  this  is  a problem.   The  legislation says that
mayors and sous prefets are not rivals.  But in practice, it's difficult.
When  I'm  given  power  over  something,  and  it  is  suddenly  taken
away and given to someone else, it's only normal not to be happy
about  it.   We  all  know we must  live and work together,  but  on a
psychological level, things are rocky.  Of course, it depends on the
individuals involved.  There are some communes where the mayor
doesn't  understand  a  process,  and the  sous  prefet will  refuse  to
explain it to him.  In other communes, the sous prefet takes pride in
the  work  the  mayor  does,  and  they  are  partners.   Before  the
refugees came, the  sous prefet and I worked together; not without
problems, but the work got done.  Now, it's much more difficult.  
Throughout the lengthy interview, he mentioned in over ten places the poor relationship between the
central government and the elected local government, and in six cases it was connected to the arrival
of refugees.  The current mayor (interview, 9 June, 2006) did not note substantive changes in the
relationship between he and the  sous prefet, although the element of the refugee presence as an
exacerbating factor was absent.  
You could say that the collaboration is better now, because the initial
jealousy  is  over;  all  government  representatives  now  accept
decentralisation,  even  if  they  don't  like  it.   The  sous  prefet has
changed, and I am a new mayor, so the initial personalities, who had
been hurt  by these changes,  are not involved.  We have all been
sensitised about the importance of working together, so now it would
be hard for us to say that we disagree.  But substantively, nothing
has changed. In fact, now you could say it is worse.  Before, when
there  were arguments,  you could say it  was just  the  people who
didn't get along.  But that is not the problem any more; it is not just
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because things are changing, because decentralisation is new.  We
must  admit  that  the  problems  now  are  institutional.   The
commandant22 and I are friends.   I  drink tea at his house and we
chat,  but  we  have  no  power  over  the  difficulties  at  work.   The
separation of roles is clearer now, but nobody is satisfied with it yet.
As long as resources are not distributed according to legislation, it is
impossible for anyone to say that there is meaningful cooperation.  
Here, the mayor linked the poor relationship to resources and decision making powers.  While he did
not once cite the relief effort (largely over by the time he took office) explicitly as a source of tension,
he cites the institutional nature of the lack of cooperation.  While the relief effort is certainly not the
only cause of this lack of cooperation, it is clearly one factor.  
 Like many survey respondents (see chapter 2), the former mayor cites a lack of consistency
as accompanying a relief effort, and he claims that this is due to a lack of clarity in roles.  This lack of
clarity was at the heart of the power struggle between he and the sous prefet. In his words,
Before  the  refugees  came,  I  knew my work,  and the  sous prefet
knew his.  But when the refugees came, everything was shaken up.
What  it  comes  down  to,  is  that  nobody  knows  exactly  who  is
responsible for the refugees.  And when we started discussing that in
detail,  it  became clear that  nobody knew who was responsible for
many other things as well.  On one hand, you can say the refugees
aren't  the  commune's  problem.   It  is  a  national,  and  even
international issue.  But as long as the community is here, and they
are affected, it is the problem of the commune.  The [central] State
put them here.  International partners are responsible for funding the
refugee effort,  so that  must  be controlled at  the State  level.   But
these funders don't  do work themselves, they leave the resources
and run.  People were all over the place, trying to manage things.
For  the first  5  months,  I  was responsible  for  everything;  sleeping
mats, food, and other disbursements.  Then, there was cooperation
with the Red Cross,  and State  representatives discussed the plan
with me.  But it didn't last.  The State said we must find a place in the
village to host the refugees.  I told them from the beginning that I
was against the refugees coming, because they would cause a big
problem in the community.   But I  could not refuse to find land for
them, because who does the land belong to?  Yes, I am responsible
for  managing it  in the commune.  But  at  the same time,  the land
belongs to the State.  And at the same time, the land is the property
of God.....After I showed them a plot of land for the camp, they went
to  the  sous  prefet,  and  closed  the  door  on  me.   They  weren't
interested in the community any more, they got what they wanted.  
The current sous prefet (interview, 2 August, 2006), while not serving at the time of the influx, had a
different explanation of the same confusion, however, saying
The funders were in a difficult situation.  They want to work with the
22 sous prefet
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mayor, but in a time of crisis, coordination is necessary.  The sous
prefet is  responsible to  the government,  it  only makes sense that
when a government  decision has been taken,  the  sous prefet will
implement  it.   And  this  was  an  international  problem;  it  can't  be
spearheaded locally.  The mayor was included when the population
was affected, but we also must think of the refugees.   They need
protection,  and  this  cannot  be  the  domain  of  the  mayor.   He  is
concerned with the community, but so are the funding partners.  So
everyone went back and forth, trying to figure out if decisions were
supposed to go up or down.  
The overlapping mandates and conflicting definitions are apparent in the case of the pumps installed
by UNICEF.  While the planners of the pump installation were no doubt familiar with common 'best
practices'  in  relief  efforts  that  encourage  resources  benefit  the  community  as  a  whole  (crisis
committee meetings notes, 2002).  The placement of one pump at the school is evidence of this, and
the second being near the market also follows this reasoning.  However, the sous prefet's leadership
in the crisis committee has resulted in a kind of tutelle for international organisations.  While UNICEF
was in a position to determine the placement of the water sources, the sous prefet could determine
usage rights.  
While  the  crisis  committee  in  some  ways  played  a  recentralising  role,  it  also  had  a
coordinating and capacity building role that deserves mention.  In three different interviews, members
of the crisis committee mention the positive coordination affect the experience had on their sector.
The chef de post (interview, 6 June 2006) says
These meetings were important.  There has never been a problem
with communication in Loulouni, the population here is not that big,
but  sometimes  we  all  get  caught  up  in  our  work.   The  crisis
committee brought people together from all the different services and
sectors,  and we talked  about  concrete  issues.   Real  partnerships
came out of this.  For example, members of the health committee
talked  with  members  of  the  APE (education  association),  and  we
started giving classes on health at the school.   Here we were, for
years, the school and the health centre only a few hundred meters
apart, but it took something to bring us together, to spark the idea.  
The school director highlighted the capacity building element of the relief effort, saying
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There  are  so  many  changes  in  the  education  system  since
decentralisation.  When UNICEF workers came down, my staff and I
learned a lot.   First,  people from Bamako and Sikasso work more
with policy makers, so there are many decisions that we think are not
a good idea, but they understand better.  Additionally, because they
hadn't only been teaching the national curriculum like we were, they
came with different ideas of doing things in the classroom.  It was a
very good chance for our school.  I don't  think it ended when they
went back to the city either, because now that they have spent time
with us, understanding our challenges, they can't forget it.  
In  the  case  of  Loulouni,  tensions  between  the  sous  prefet and  the  mayor  were  often
expressed in terms of refugee protection.  If the relief effort had adequately considered the existing
dynamics, it could have been used as a powerful tool for capacity building and conflict resolution.
Instead, refugee protection was framed as separate from and in conflict with the interests of the host
community.   While  this  may be necessary in  refugee  situations characterised by a high level  of
refugee-host conflict, this was not the case in Loulouni, and this framing of the situation only served
to polarise the mayor and sous prefet.  
Furthermore,  by placing  refugee  protection exclusively in  the  hands of  the  sous prefet,  a
distrust of local officials and lack of responsiveness to the community that decentralisation was going
to great lengths to overcome was exacerbated.  Sixty-three respondents thought the sous prefet had
too much power in general,  and this number increased to seventy-two when asked about powers
relating to the refugee influx.  The former  sous prefet's secretary discussed the transformatory role
the refugee influx had briefly during his interview (5 July, 2006).
When the refugees first came, it was difficult for us.  There was
more work than we could handle,  overseeing everything;  it  was
chaos!   In  the  long  run,  there  have been benefits.  We  worked
closely with NGOs that didn't  know about us before, and to this
day the relationship remains.  Before, they showed no interest in
us, but now, they come to the sous prefet to talk about projects.
It's a benefit for the community.  It has made some people in the
community jealous, but these are only people who don't know that
we are working for them.  
The lack of clarity in mandate and at times ad hoc implementation that may be inherent in any
emergency relief situations reignited power struggles between local actors.  In certain contexts, there
may be nothing transformatory about such struggles.  In the case of Loulouni, however, and arguably
in  many refugee  hosting  countries  in  a state  of  political  transition,  the  outcomes of  such power
struggles will have a defining impact on emerging political structures.  This is particularly true in the
early  years  of  decentralisation in  Mali,  since  legislation  on the  decentralisation  of  powers  is  not
sufficiently developed to provide clarity on roles.   As a result,  the local reality in Loulouni is in a
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position to shape policy as much as the opposite is the case.  
As  stated  in  the  introduction,  the  administrative  goals  of  decentralisation  in  Loulouni  are
multidimensional.   The  primary goal  is,  through the creation of  the elected position of  mayor,  to
establish  clear  downward  accountability  to  the  electorate  of  Loulouni.   Similarly,  administrative
decentralisation also aims to enhance transparency in decision making, and allocative efficiency in
service  delivery.   This,  combined  with  greater  transparency,  also  aims  to  enhance  resource
mobilisation, as the advantages of investing in local government become clear.  
According  to the evidence presented in the  previous two chapters,  the refugee influx has
created challenges for the administrative decentralisation process.  Much of this comes back again to
the difficulty in creating strong accountability structures.  The reasons for this are multifold, and by no
means  all  due  to  the  refugee  influx.   The  third  chapter  discussed  problems  in  this  that  were
independent of the refugee influx.  These included a lack of history of democratic political systems,
the complexity of the actors and powers divided among them, and the lack of resources. The lack of
democratic  history,  particularly  when  combined  with  the  complexity  of  actors  and  powers,  has
inhibited the administrative aspects of  the decentralisation process simply because it  is  often too
difficult to discern who is to be held accountable for what, and who must do the holding to account.  A
lack of resources, while at times clarifying roles simply by limiting them in scope, also undermined the
creation  of  clear  accountability  structures  by  eroding  confidence  in  local  government,  making
concrete demands for service provision or development seem futile.  
The refugee influx has threatened the administrative aspects of the decentralisation process.
While  the  influx  helped  somewhat  the  problem  of  resources,  it  did  not  necessarily  help  the
adminsitrative  aspects  of  decentralisation  along.   As  the  discussion  of  service  delivery  clearly
showed, with the resources that  accompanied the refugees came conflict,  both between the host
community and refugees about access to the resources, but also between different local government
actors about control of the resources.  The relative clarity of roles that had been facilitated by the
limited powers and resources  to control  at  a  local  level  was obscured by the  refugee presence.
Humanitarian aid is inherently centralised, both because it is arguably used primarily during crisis
situations, where such centralisation is necessary, and also because it is largely funded by multiple
international donors, meaning that it much be channeled through the capital.  As a result, the balance
between  regulation  being  upwardly  accountable,  but  distribution  of  resources  being  downwardly
accountable, was disturbed.  By giving powers for the allocation of resources at the local leve to the
sous prefet, the degree to which decentralisation was truly implemented was reduced.  
This effective recentralisation of powers has had a negative impact on the other adminsitrative
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goals of decentralisation.  As mentioned earlier in the section, as well as in previous chapters, the
sous  prefet  works  in  less  transparent  ways  than  the  mayor.   Furthermore,  because  he  is  not
accountable to a local electorate, nor does he have consultative decision making processes, he has
less allocative efficiency than the mayor.  While the refugee influx did not necessarily change the way
the  office  of  the  sous  prefet worked,  it  did  change  the  trajectory  of  decentralisation  from  an
administrative  point  of  view,  in  that  new  powers  were  devolved  to  an  upwardly  accountable,
untransparent governing body.  
There would be a valid argument  to  be made that  such a system was necessary for  the
protection of  the refugees;  an official accountably only to the local population would not have an
incentive to protect the refugee population, skewing what precisely constitutes efficient allocation of
resources.  While this argument is credible, it is also important to note the transformatory impact any
shift  in  powers has on the decentralisation process while legislation is still  being  solidified.   The
challenge to the administrative aspect of decentralisation would be less pressing if it were contained
to the influx itself.  However, as evidence earlier in this section has shown, there was an element of
norm creation when the sous prefet took on these new powers.  
So far, this chapter has looked exclusively at the impact the refugee influx has had on the
adminsitrative decentralisation process.  The articulation of decentralisation in Mali is such that the
political decentralisation process is equally important.  Additionally, the goals of both processes are
inherently connected, and as such, discussing one without the other is incomplete.  While challenges
to  administrative  decentralisation  can  stall  complete  political  transformation,  the  political
decentralisation process in Loulouni has been moving ahead.  The next section will see how it has
been shaped by the refugee influx.  
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From creating to managing – political transformation
One  of  the  most  significant  findings  of  the  newly  emerging  empirical  research  on
decentralisation  is  that  central  governments  are  better  than  local  governments  at  creating
infrastructure – initially installing the service - whereas  local governments are better at managing and
maintaining what is already in place (Fageut, 1999).  Since the refugee influx created a shift in focus
from infrastructure creation to management, it actually created a situation that was more conducive to
decentralised governance.  Furthermore, since the demands of management and maintenance are
clear, and full involvement on the part of the community is inherent to a conflict resolution process,
this has created a situation whereby the local government has a clear mandate that is visible to the
community, facilitating accountability and transparency.  
Chapter 2 mentioned a lack of ownership of the decentralisation process as an inhibition to
the creation of strong accountability mechanisms.  A lack of ownership of many local government
functions is understandable, as there has not been a history of public involvement in health, water,
education and other  services,  and much of  the process of  service provision and financing,  even
under the new decentralisation regime, is relatively technocratic and complex.  The management of
access, however, and conflicts related to it, inherently include all involved parties, making a lack of
civic engagement effectively impossible.  This makes management of services and conflict resolution
two areas where decentralisation in Mali is based placed to succeed.  
Decentralised  control  of  management  issues,  such  as  access  to  services,  is  relatively
uncontroversial.  It is clearly within the mandate of locally elected officials to manage services that
they are theoretically responsible for  providing,  and negotiate  citizens'  access to the same.  The
arrival of refugees raises many questions about access to services for host communities.  Complex
negotiations inevitably take place to determine the rights of refugees to make use of public services,
as well as the rights of hosts to access relief related services.  While it is possible to follow certain
universal guidelines, in practice, each local situation is individual and specific enough that no one
formula  can  be  applied  to  every  circumstance.   Local  governing  authorities  are  particularly  well
placed to deal with these issues, and at the same time they are institutionally strengthened by being
given the mandate to make decisions on issues that were formerly nonexistent.  
The conflict resolution element may need to be treated with a bit more caution, as it could
imply a potentially undesirable or undemocratic institutional change.  While the need for leadership
on issues of services access can only strengthen local governments in a desirable way, the merging
of negotiating access to services with the broader role of resolving conflicts has different implications
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for the political decentralisation process.  In Loulouni, more than half of those surveyed cited conflict
resolution  as  an  important  role  of  the  mayor's  office,  and  of  those  respondents  citing  specific
experiences they had interacting with the mayor, more than half were parties to a conflict.  Outside of
conflicts related to the relief effort, these conflicts were rarely connected to access to services.  They
dealt, in order of frequency, with land use, tenure, management of the weekly market, crime, and
management of  civil  society associations.23  In the cases of  land use and tenure,  as well as the
management of associations, the mayor was often being asked to create legislation without a legal
framework from which to work.  In other land use and tenure disputes, as well as those related to
crime, the mayor was being asked to perform essentially judicial functions.  
The lack  of  judicial  and legislative support  at  a local level is  a challenge to decentralised
institutions.  From a short term point of view, it may have positive benefits.  Many of the interactions
citizens  in  Loulouni  have  had  with  the  mayor  surrounded  conflict  resolution,  and  as  such,
communication and interaction was fostered between the population and local government, which is
crucial  to  the  success  of  decentralisation,  particularly  around  issues  of  transparency  and
accountability.  Much of the power of traditional authorities comes largely from a legitimacy vested in
them by the population, even if they do not technically have the capacity for enforcement.  Having
local government behave similarly could be seen as a positive, capacity building step.  
The long term danger of this, however, is two-fold.  First,  it  is likely to create a confusion
among executive, legislative, and judicial functions.  The complete lack of judicial functioning on a
local level in Mali, while perhaps in the short term is strengthening the commune council, will certainly
be a hindrance in the long term.  At best, in the medium term it will cause a power struggle between
the sous prefet and the mayor, as the  sous prefet remains responsible for policing and security; in
other words, enforcement.  While this could turn into a desirable system of checks and balances, it is
firstly not a sign of strong governance to trust in the goodwill of all involved to create this system, and
secondly another opportunity for the central government to add another layer of recentralisation.  
The second long term danger of having local communes responsible for  some unspecified
collection  of  executive,  legislative,  and  judicial  functions  is  that  it  risks,  as  some  critics  of
decentralisation have suggested (Benjamiasen, 2004), local government simply being another layer,
or another role player, in a situation where all parties already lack various elements of legitimacy,
capacity, etc.  The PGP, and therefore governance related aspects of decentralisation, are based on
the principles of shared governance.  As one donor report explains,
Shared  governance  is  supposed  to  bring  together  all  of  the
23 This clearly demonstrates that these civil society organisations are not yet fulfilling expectations as
democratic counter-balances to local government.  
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structures and actors with legitimacy in the eyes of the people so as
to  yield  well-respected  decisions  and  higher  levels  of  citizens’
participation. Up to now, the PGP has not sufficiently incorporated
the legitimate structures and actors that exist  outside the realm of
modern governance. If the PGP is to gain the full participation and
ownership of all sectors and groups of the population, it will have to
intensify and extend its work in  this regard, by reaching out formally
to  the  other  structures  and  actors  --  or  rather,  persuading  the
communes to do so.
As the section on actors above maintains, there seems to be a disconnect between aiming for
participation, and aiming for democracy; the two are not necessarily equal as long as those targeted
for participation are not themselves democratic.  
The influx of refugees and the relief effort  that accompanies them raises unique questions
about participation.  The principle behind democratised decentralisation in Mali is that elected officials
are accountable to their politically engaged electorate.  This way, resources are allocated according
to the wishes of the people.  This makes two assumptions.  First, that the resources to be allocated
are in the hands of the elected leaders.  Second, that either the electorate or the law will provide
adequate protection for minorities and non-voters (for example, refugees, immigrants, children, etc.).
Proponents of decentralisation argue that it is better positioned than other governing systems
to account for the second assumption, because ideally under decentralisation what will happen is an
internalisation  of  externalities  (Oates,  1999).   Much  of  the  Sahelian  decentralisation  literature,
grounded primarily in natural resources management,  maintains this as an underlying assumption.
Critiques of this are now emerging (Prud'homme, 2000; Nejhuis, 2004; Breton, 2001) that argue this
ideal is not achieved.  One of the implications of this is that there is not adequate minority protection.
In fact,  authorities may be required to act in a discriminatory fashion if that is the will of the local
majority.
During the refugee influx, Loulouni was also hosting many returned migrants and others 'non
native' to the commune.  This made determining who the local electorate was challenging, essentially
raising  questions  about  whose  participation  in  the  democratic  process  was  trying  to  be  elicited.
Perhaps more significantly, however, what this participation is being elicited for is called into question
when  the  relief  effort  brings  in  numerous  resources  outside  the  allocatory  powers  of  the  local
government.  
The relief effort  brought in resources that were worth many times the annual budget of the
commune.   Landau  noted  in  a  refugee  affected  area  in  Tanzania  that  some  residents  thought
international organisations related to the refugee influx had done more to help residents in terms of
development in the last five years than the government has in the past twenty (Landau, 2004).  While
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in Tanzania district authorities denied this, both residents and government officials in Mali tended to
blend actors' roles in development.  A close cooperative relationship was always expressed, although
like any relationship, there were still frustrations on both sides.  As the mayor said (interview, 11 June
2006),
you can say  international  organisations  do more  for  development
than we do, but it's just a matter of perspective.  Our work overlaps.
They cannot  work without  us, we cannot  work without them.  We
must be realistic  – other countries  have money,  and Mali is poor.
We cannot develop without their resources.  But at the same time,
just money is not development, we know the population here, and we
understand how to turn their resources into something that can be
used to benefit the people.  It is a partnership.....Of course there are
factors  that  effect  community  perceptions.   The commune council
can't  drive around in  a  big  new car,  and we don't  put  signs  and
stamps on all  the work we do.   Some of  our  work  is  quiet.   Not
everybody realises how many teachers' salaries we pay, or broken
equipment for the school we repair.  It is not as visible as a big new
pump, but it is also important, and it adds up.  We are not trying to
catch the eye of the community, we are trying to get work done.  
When it came to talking about international organisations or NGOs working in Loulouni, many survey
respondents echoed the sentiments of the mayor.  As one respondent said,
so  many organisations come to  Loulouni  with their  big  cars,  they
have money, but it's no use to us.  Only the mayor and leaders in the
city understand how these resources work.  They understand how to
work together with these organisations for our development.  They
have their work for our development and the NGOs also have their
own ideas, but neither can accomplish anything without the other.  
An  interesting  feature  of  democratic  decentralisation  is  that  because  local  populations
distinguish  between  powers  and  responsibilities,  authorities  are  only  as  responsible  for  service
provision as their constituents think they should be, regardless of what powers have been devolved
administratively.  This makes understanding the relationship between the electorate and the local
government  particularly  important.   One  frequently  levelled  criticism of  decentralisation  is  that  it
creates  an  environment  in  which  local  elites  are  able  to  hijack  the  resource  allocation  process,
exacerbating  inequalities.   While  this  study  does  not  suggest  that  this  accurately  describes  the
process in Loulouni, it is true that the wealthy and educated are disproportionately involved in the
decentralisation process.  While this was true before the arrival of refugees, the establishment of the
camp exacerbated the situation (mayoral meeting records, 1999-2005, and survey responses).  
The most commonly cited reason by poor respondents on their lack of engagement in politics
is the most intuitive as well – a lack of time.  According to a time use survey done by a Peace Corps
volunteer  in Loulouni  (Site  log,  2001),  household respondents  that  this  study identified as in the
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wealthiest quarter had on average six times more leisure time than those in the bottom quarter.  As
one respondent explained,
When decentralisation was new, in 1998, 1999 and 2000, I went to
many meetings at  the mayor's  office,  and the  sous prefet's office.
Many people came out to explain the changes, and I went because it
is  important  to  learn.   Many  of  the  things  they  discussed  in  the
beginning will be important to me some day, such as where to go to
get an ID card, or register a marriage.  Decentralisation is not so new
any more.  The mayor still has many meetings, and they talk about
important  things,  but  I  don't  have time for  all  of  that.   Now that  I
understand how the new government works, I have my fields to work
in.  People who are involved in managing the issues in Loulouni, they
can sit in the meetings and exchange ideas.  If something affects my
household  some  day,  maybe  I  will  go  too,  but  so  far  it  has  not
happened.  
Another  possibility  is  that  the wealthiest  25% of  residents were  far  more  likely to  claim that  the
refugee influx was having a 'strong'  impact  on the community.   Of  the interactions they reported
having  with the mayor's  office,  over  half  of  them were  refugee-related  issues.   Only  one of  the
respondents outside of the wealthiest 25% reported interacting with the mayor or local government
officials on issues relating to the refugees.  
This should not be divorced from the dynamics that underpin wealth and political allegiance in
Loulouni.  There is a strong differentiation made between 'original' inhabitants of Loulouni, and new
immigrants.  The village chief, mayor, and a majority of the wealthiest quarter of respondents form a
part  of  the former category.  The other strata of  respondents in the wealthiest  quarter  are either
employees of organisations generally based in Sikasso who are on short term contracts in Loulouni,
or successful businessmen from other areas who chose to settle in Loulouni.  These migrants were
no  more  likely  to  have  a  negative  view  of  the  refugee  influx  than  the  rest  of  the  population.
Additionally, they were far more likely to talk about either national or regional economic implications
of  the  Ivorian  crisis  than  the  original  wealthy  inhabitants,  who  framed  the  situation  as  primarily
political.
On a national level, it is likely true that the primary impact of the conflict in Cote d'Ivoire is
economic rather than political, since Mali is landlocked, and very dependent on Senegal and Cote
d'Ivoire for the transportation of most of the country's manufactured goods.  Locally, while there has
been an economic impact, it  has likely been a temporary one.  The political impact, on the other
hand,  has been transformatory.   In  some ways,  the  Ivorian refugees came to  the rescue of  the
decentralisation  process  in  Loulouni.   Support  for  decentralisation  was  fading  because  local
government  authorities  did  not  have  the  resources  to  provide  infrastructure  and  services  in  the
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commune, reducing the level of community involvement and interest in the process.  This was revived
when humanitarian  agencies  injected  the  commune  with  resources  to  support  the  refugees  and
reduce the burden their arrival would have on the community.  
At the same time, the arrival of refugees may be hindering the establishment of the kind of
accountability mechanisms decentralisation needs to succeed.  On one hand, when the demands the
community made of  local government officials changed from the provision of  infrastructure to the
negotiation of access and rights to use existing infrastructure, the local government was much better
able to respond to the needs of the community.  However, this is enforcing a system that has been in
place in Mali for a long time, in which the public sector is not providing services.  One of the political
aims of decentralisation is to change this pattern.  As long as the citizens of Loulouni are not going to
expect service delivery on the part of local government,  however, the system of tax payment and
accountability envisioned by Mali's leaders at the national level, and partners at the international level,
will not be established.  This is closely related to the developmental implications of the refugee arrival
on decentralisation, which will be discussed in the following section.  
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Development Aspects
A central consideration in evaluating the impact of refugee related activities is the resources of
the host community.  The lack of resources on the public sector to undertake development activities
in  Loulouni  and other  rural  communes  means that  many of  such  activities  had long  since been
privatised by default, largely left in the hands of NGOs or individuals.  There are numerous economic
models for analysing the effectiveness and efficiency of decentralisation, but if there is not financial
support for decentralised governing structures, these models can all be thrown out the window.  In
Loulouni, any role player who invests resources in services or infrastructure can be seen as having a
positive  contribution  towards  the  development  goals  of  decentralisation  simply  because  the
decentralised governing structure does not have the resources to implement their own development
activities.  However, it is important to point out that while this may work towards the developmental
aims of decentralisation, it is coincidental, and does not represent any institutional change.  
The significance of relief services delivered in a decentralised context is threefold.  First, they
ease some of the pressures on local government who is unable to provide these services with the
resources available.  This is particularly true of resources which the host community and refugees
both  use without  distinction,  such as  school  supplies  at  the  secondary  school  attended  by both
refugees and hosts.  As Whitaker suggested, this seemed to foster a higher degree of satisfaction
with the local government than would otherwise be the case.   More respondents  cited that  local
government should be responsible for coordinating NGO interactions to develop the commune than
to actually provide services (sixty-four vs. two), and on the whole, respondents were satisfied with the
government's work in this department, some of them specifically mentioning refugee-related aspects.
For example, one respondent noted
the mayor does a good job cooperating with outside projects.  When
the Ivorians came, he saw that there was a chance to develop the
commune.  Without his leadership, we would not have the pumps we
have now.  He also helped bring improvements to the school, and to
the  road.   These  are  things  not  just  anyone  in  the  community
understands how to facilitate.  
The second is that these services are instituted outside of the accountability structures of local
government.  While the relief effort may add legitimacy to local government by creating powers and
responsibilities that previously did not exist, it is simultaneously undermining them through the back
door, by taking control over services that would normally reside with the local government.  This could
inhibit the creation of accountability structures and a solid tax base as the population does not link tax
payment to services provision, and service provision to local government.  It essentially ensures that
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service provision and infrastructure  development  remains  outside of  the  institutional  and political
transformation decentralisation is trying to promote.  
Finally,  they  create  yet  another  ambiguity  in  mandate  that  must  be  clarified  for
decentralisation to function effectively.  One of the cornerstones of decentralisation as formulated by
the central government in Mali is that local communities will be politically and financially responsible
for the provision of many of their own services.  The challenge to decentralisation here is multi-fold.
First, it is unclear whether the central or local governments will end up deciding how decentralisation
will unfold on this issue.  Secondly, it raises questions about what kind of relationship decentralised
authorities will have with international donors, who will inevitable be providing the resources for many
different aspects of the process.  Finally, it demands questioning the extent to which communities can
be  autonomous  in  defining  the  roles  of  local  government  officials.   It  would  certainly  be  an
unprecedented (and potentially dangerous) experiment in democracy were there to be no parameters
legislated instituting checks on local government officials.  
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6. Conclusion
This study has examined the impact a refugee influx has had on the process of democratic
decentralisation in one commune in southern Mali.  It has found that the influx of refugees has had a
profound  impact  on  the  transformation  of  governance  in  the  commune.   It  has  encouraged  the
process of  political  decentralisation to  become more participatory,  through creating incentives for
interaction between residents of Loulouni and local government officials.  At the same time, some
degree of recentralising took place, since many new powers and resources that were brought be the
humanitarian influx were placed in the hands of the upwardly accountable sous prefet.  
From an administrative point of view, the impact of the humanitarian influx in Loulouni has
threatened the decentralisation process.  The way decentralisation has been implemented in Mali is
such that powers were devolved often while legislative, financial, and other forms of support were still
evolving.  This created a delicate time period (in which this research was conducted) during which
local government authorities had to designate their roles and responsibilities with very little support or
enforcement.  Just as the mayor and sous prefet had reached certain working norms in line with the
little guidance they had, the humanitarian influx came, introducing a large number of resources and
powers  that  had  not  existed  before  in  the  commune.   The  result  was  a  significant  degree  of
recentralisation.  Had this been explicitly temporary, the impact of the humanitarian influx could not
accurately be described as transformatory.  Because the decentralisation process in Mali is still so
nascent, however, and the process of political transformation was still very much in progress, and
also very much defined by practice, a large amount of norm creation in the offices of the sous prefet
and mayor went on with the arrival of the refugees.  
From  a  political  point  of  view,  however,  the  humanitarian  influx  granted  decentralisation
several victories.  Before the influx, a lack of resources at the local level was holding back the political
goals of decentralisation.  Citizens saw little utility in political involvement, since local government was
not in a position to provide services.  When resources and infrastructure accompanied the refugee
influx, the demands citizens made of local government authorities changed from service provision to
negotiating rights and access to services.  This is something the local government had the capacity to
do, and because of this, a good deal of trust was restored between residents of Loulouni and their
elected leaders.  A cautionary note must be added, however.  While it is too early to know if this will
be the case, there is a possibility that the shift  from demanding services to conflict  resolution will
inhibit the longer term creatio nof accountability structures at the local level.  
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The  conclusions  that  can be drawn from this  study speak  first  to  the literature  in  forced
migration studies that is connected to state transformation.  It supports the findings of Landau and
Whitaker  who claim that refugees are having a fundamental,  transformatory impact on the state.
Both Landau and Whitaker  were studying the case of  Tanzania,  but  neither focussed on sepcific
bureaucratic  changes  the  state  was undergoing.   Rather,  they  defined  state  transformation  in  a
broader social sense, looking primarily at affiliations citizens expressed towards the state.  This study
has taken the premise of  their  findings,  and applied it  to a specific  case of  state transformation:
decentralisation.  Its findings have been in line with those of Landau and Whitaker; essentially, that
refugees are transforming the way citizens interact with governments in important and fundamental
ways.  This study particularly bolsters their claims because they both used Tanzania as a case study,
while this study was done in Mali, a significantly different political context.  
While  using  refugee studies  as an analytical  framework  for  studying  decentralisation  may
initially seem like a poor choice, a strong justification for this approach can be found in 'mainstream'
political science literature.  In Cages of Reason, Silberman (2000) argues that the rise of Weberian
rationalised bureaucracy in State function is not the conquest of one specific institutional structure,
but rather that rationalised bureaucracies have taken two different shapes.  He divides these into a
position-oriented structures, and a professionally-oriented structures.  Silberman argues that which
structure evolved in these states is a function of leadership disputes at the turn of the century. It is
not only the leadership disputes that shape states, but rather a lack of sufficiently rationalised State
institutions  that  led  to  leadership  disputes  and  transformation  of  State  institutions.   As  such,
leadership  disputes  can  be  seen  as  flags  for  times  of  transformation  of  State  institutions,  and
Silberman has shown that the nature of the leadership disputes will play a crucial role in determining
the shape of emerging institutions.  
The current decentralisation process in Mali is undeniable a time of tremendous institutional
change in the State's  bureaucratic  system.  This paper has argued that  the refugee presence is
playing an important role in shaping local political processes, particularly redefining power dynamics
and  leadership  disputes.   A  refugee  presence  can  then  be  seen  as  having  a  substantial
transformatory impact on the shape of the institutions currently emerging from this period of political
evolution.  
The short-term political consequences of the refugee impact may have a positive affect on
governance. This study found that the refugee influx in Loulouni has promoted interaction with local
government officials, and shifted demands away from the provision of services that officials lack the
resources to provide to negotiation of management and conflict resolution, which local governments
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are better equipped to handle.  This has played an important confidence building role that is crucial to
the decentralisation process.  The long-term consequences, however, could be more problematic, as
power  struggles  between  upwardly  and  downwardly  accountable  officials  regarding  their
responsibilities  to  the  refugees  could  result  in  an  institutional  shift  away  from  downward
accountability.  
While this study has exclusively focused on the commune of Loulouni, there are implications
for other parts of Mali and other countries currently undergoing a process of decentralisation.  As
mentioned in the introduction and throughout the paper, many countries, particularly in Africa, share
certain historical and economic links, and are experiencing decentralisation in similar ways.  While
each case will have important differences, there are lessons from Loulouni that can be generalised.
This  generalisation  must  be done  with  caution;  much  of  this  thesis  was devoted  to  background
information about the history and context of decentralisation in Loulouni, to completely understand
the process and the dynamics surrounding it.  In generalising, the same process of contextualising
must take palce.  
Decentralisation,  like  any  process  of  political  transformation,  is  cross  cutting,  requiring
coordination in  administrative,  political,  and fiscal  policies  that  can be applied across  a range of
social, economic, and political realities.  In Loulouni, the administrative fragility that was aggrevated
by the arrival of refugees highlights the need for coordination of each step along the way.  Otherwise,
any  change  in  context,  such  as  the  refugee  influx  in  Loulouni,  can  create  norms  and  become
transformatory.  Having political transformation come before there is legislative guidance and fiscal
support risks undermining the decentralisation process as a whole.  
A  second  lesson  is  for  the  humanitarian  organisations  that  operate  in  areas  of  political
transformation.  As noted previously, many refugee crises happen in weak states, with challenges of
institutional capacity, and ongoing transformation of the roles and responsibilities of state institutions.
It is then particularly necessary to be sensitive to the political realities on the ground.  In Loulouni,
humanitarian organisations had such capacity when compared to local government structures, that it
was nearly inevitable that they would shape the political realities in Loulouni.  Given the potential to
impact the decentralisation process tremendously, they could have been a strong tool for promoting
participatory governance without compromising the protection of refugees that was their mandate.
By working through upwardly rather than downwardly accountable officials at the local level, they took
the decentralisation process in Loulouni several steps back.   This element of  planning should be
introduced into all relief operations.  
While  this  study did answer  many of  the  questions  it  set  out  to  ask,  it  created  far  more
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questions in the process.  There is a clear need for more research linking the influx of refugees to
specific kinds of political transformation.  The causal linkages of political transformation as a cause of
forced migration, and even migration more generally, are well explored in the literature.  However,
comparably  little  work  has  been  done  looking  at  the  impact  forced  migration  has  on  political
transformation.  It is clear in both bodies of literature that there is a demand for this to be done, and
this study confirms the need for further exploration of the issue.  While this study has broadly treated
the impact the influx of one group of refugees has had on one decentralisation process, there is a
need for comparative work to be done on the subject.  Much of the comparative work that has been
done  on  decentralisation  has  been  at  the  international  level;  very  few  of  the  conclusions  are
applicable  to  local  contexts.   There  are  many  challenges  in  ensuring  such  large  studies  are
methodologically rigorous, or sufficiently in-depth to be relevant for comparison given varying national
contexts.  
Additionally, there is a need to link humanitarian influxes to state transformation in many more
concrete ways.  Decentralisation is only one example of state transformation.  There is an equal need
for links to be created between a refugee influx and the creation of legislation, electoral processes,
judicial precedents, and other political processes that have the potential to fundamentally transform
the way states function, and citizens interact with them.  
Some decentralisation research is now being done that looks at the decentralisation process
of  certain  ministries  in  various  countries  in  a  comprehensive  way,  to  increase  the  technical
understanding  of  legislative  and  other  processes,  and  the  most  effective  and  efficient  ways  of
supporting decentralisation in each arena.  However, most of these studies are exceptionally case
specific, and there is a need for methodological synthesis for solid conclusions to be drawn.  There is
a  need  for  a  standardisation  of  language  and  indicators  of  success  in  decentralisation,  so  that
effective and conceptually sound comparative studies can be done.  With the current literature, such
a study is virtually impossible at anything but a broad, international level.  
Finally, there is a need for  the research question to be turned on its head, to explore the
implications of decentralisation on refugee protection and camp management.  As the autonomy of
local governments becomes better understood, their autonomy related to a refugee influx will provide
an important missing link between theory and practice in forced migration studies literature.  This gap
is  already widely acknowledged  in  the  forced  migration  studies  literature  (Misago,  2005),  but  as
norms develop for interaction between humanitarian agencies and local governing bodies, there will
certainly be a call better to understand these dynamics.  
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Appendixes
Appendix 1: Illustrative tables of how powers are being decentralised in Mali
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Appendix 2:
Change in rainfall in Mali over the past century (Source: Meteological Association, Bamako)  
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Map of southern Mali and surrounding regions  
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Appendix 4: 
Table  of  dependent  and  independent  variables  in  measuring  the  success  of  the  decentralisation
process.  
Dependent Variables Indicators
Accountability and transparency
• Current laws regarding information provision
• My own ability to access information
•  Perceived availability of information by local officials and 
citizens
•  Local government's oversight and monitoring structures
•  Accountability perceived by local officials
•  Accountability perceived by voters
Responsiveness to community
•  Local officials' reported priorities in taking budgetary and
planning decisions
•  Responsiveness perceived by the community
•  Specific examples
Resource mobilization • Tax records
•History of village caisse spending
• Resources available to local government
•Resources available to community associations
• Resources available to refugee camp
Efficiency in service delivery ·  Survey of services provided by local government, refugee
camp related organizations, and other parties
·  Perceived responsibility for service provision by
community members and service providers
· Reported satisfaction about services provided by
government, refugee related organizations, and other
parties
Interaction between government and populace ·  Minutes of local government meetings
·  Attendance of local government meetings
·  Local officials' schedules
·  Community perceptions of interactions
·  Local officials perceptions of interactions
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Dependent Variables Indicators
Collective grassroots action ·  Presence of associations and other CBOs
·  Resources available to associations present
·  Perception of collection action by the community and local
government
·  Specific examples
Independent Variables Indicators
Human capital ·  Level of formal education achieved
·  Other trainings and/or informal education
·  Number of languages spoken
Social cohesion ·  Degree to which gender impacts responses
·  Degree to which ethnicity impacts responses
·  Perceptions of the extent to which the community works
together
·  Specific examples
Involvement in political process ·  Reported interest
·  If registered as a voter
·  If reported voting in the last election
· Voter turnout in last election
·  Ability to name elected officials
Economic equality ·  Number of responses in each economic bracket as
determined by primary profession, other sources of
income, head of household's profession, if and how many
employees are hired, and whether they are paid in cash. 
·  National Department of Statistics information on poverty
levels and equality in Loulouni
Refugee impact ·   To be determined by controlling for other independent
variables
·  Specific examples
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